Suchergebnisse

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE EXPERIENCES OF THREE IMPORTANT PARTIAL-PREEMPTION PROGRAMS-THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977 (SMCRA), THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (OSCH ACT), AND THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976 (RCRA)-OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES TO IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTIONS HAVE SHAPED THE REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP. THE EVIDENCE THE AUTHORS GATHER SUGGESTS THAT THE CONTROL OF REGULATORY PROGRAMS HAS SHIFTED OVER TIME BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES. IN THE INITIAL YEARS OF THESE PROGRAMS, WHAT THE CONGRESS INTENDED TO BE A REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP WAS, IN EFFECT, ALMOST TOTAL FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AUTHORITY. UNDER THE RONALD REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, THE OPPOSITE OCCURRED; FEDERAL REGULATION IN MANY CASES BECAME DE FACTO STATE REGULATION AS FEDERAL OFFICIALS ESSENTIALLY ABDICATED THEIR OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY. BY THE END OF THE 1980S, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BEGAN AGAIN TO ASSERT GREATER CONTROL OVER INTERGOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY PROGRAMS. THE REGULATORY RELATIONSHIP THAT EMERGED IS ONE IN WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES SHARE RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT DIFFERENCES IN VOTER RECOGNITION OF CANDIDATES MAY CAUSE VARIATIONS IN PARTISAN DEFECTION RATES, WHICH COULD ACCOUNT FOR CHAMBER DIFFERENCES IN REELECTION RATES. THIS DEFECTION HYPOTHESIS IS TESTED HERE USING SURVEY DATA FROM 1956-1980. THE RATES AT WHICH PARTY IDENTIFIERS DEFECT FROM THEIR PARTY'S SENATE AND HOUSE NOMINEES ARE COMPARED. ALTHOUGH THE PATTERN FOR ALL SENATE RACES PARALLES THAT FOR ALL HOUSE RACES, THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERENCES IN THE ANTICIPATED DIRECTION SINCE 1970. DEFECTION PATTERNS IN RECENT SENATE ELECTIONS HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, BEEN LESS PRO-INCUMBENT, WHICH IS WHAT THE HIGH PROPORTION OF DEFEATS AMONG INCUMBENT SENATORS WOULD LEAD US TO EXPECT.