Suchergebnisse

Die Arbeit analysiert den Einfluss von Arbeitsmarktregimen auf das Sparverhalten privater Haushalte in Deutschland und Großbritannien aus einer vergleichenden Perspektive. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, ob das Sparvermögen abhängig beschäftigter Personen durch ihre Angst vor Arbeitslosigkeit beeinflusst wird. Die Untersuchung widmet sich dem Einfluss von Institutionen auf individuelles Verhalten in unterschiedlichen nationalen Kontexten: geringere Dynamik des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes – operationalisiert über die durchschnittliche Verweildauer in Arbeitslosigkeit – und entsprechend höhere individuelle Angst vor Arbeitslosigkeit tragen demnach zur Erklärung bei, warum die aggregierten Sparquoten privater Haushalte in kontinental-europäischen deutlich höher sind als in angelsächsischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Die theoretische Fundierung auf der Mikroebene liefert ein Buffer-Stock Saving-Modell, wonach sich Individuen gegen Einkommensvolatilität durch das Anhäufen von Sparvermögen absichern (Vorsichtssparen). Anhand von Panel-Daten abhängig beschäftigter Personen in Deutschland (SOEP) und Großbritannien (BHPS) ergibt sich unter Kontrolle für Konsumpräferenzen und weitere Einflussfaktoren in Deutschland bei Einverdiener-Haushalten ein Vorsichtsmotiv, das durchschnittlich einem Drittel des liquiden Vermögens entspricht, wohingegen sich kein vergleichbarer Effekt in Großbritannien zweigt. ; The dissertation analyzes the influence of labor market regimes in Germany and the United Kingdom on private household saving from a comparative perspective. The main question is whether the amount of saving of employees is related to the perception of their individual unemployment risk. The analysis focuses on the influence of institutions on the micro level in different national contexts: lower dynamics of the German labor market – indicated by the average unemployment duration – and consequently higher individual fear of job loss seem to be part of the explanation why in continental welfare states the private saving rates are substantially higher than in their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. The theoretical foundation on the micro level is a buffer-stock saving model, which assumes that individuals insure against income volatility by the accumulation of wealth, i.e. precautionary saving. Using panel data on employees in Germany and the UK from the SOEP and the BHPS reveals that, when controlling for consumption preferences and other aspects, the average amount of precautionary saving in Germany is roughly a third of the liquid wealth in households with one earner – while there is no comparable effect in the UK.

It is a commonplace that the mechanisms established in the stability and growth pact are blunt instruments. They are highly politicised as both the establishment of infringements and possible sanctions are subject to votes in the EU Council. The financial crisis of 2009/10 has dramatically altered the financial situation of many EU member states and has also shown the need for new regulatory instruments to enforce budgetary discipline in the Euro zone. Figures on the EU member states' budget debts from 1999 to 2010 support this argument empirically. We discuss the current reform proposals and show that the introduction of a reversed qualified majority is likely to strengthen substantially the position of the European Commission to sanction non-complying member states. This becomes possible because decisive players in the EU Council will be closer to the position of the Commission.

Abstract
Liberalization is a perennial topic in politics and political science. We first review a broad scholarly debate, showing that the mainstream theories make rival and contradictory claims regarding the role of political parties in (de)liberalization reforms. We then develop a framework of conditional partisan influence, arguing that and under what conditions parties matter. We test our (and rival) propositions with a new dataset on (de)liberalization reforms in 23 democracies since 1973 covering several policy areas. Methodologically, we argue that existing quantitative studies are problematic: They rely on time-series cross-section models using country-year observations; but governments do not change annually, so that the number of observations is artificially inflated, resulting in incorrect estimates. We propose mixed-effects models instead, with country-year observations nested in cabinets, which are nested in countries and years. The results show under what conditions parties matter for (de)liberalization. More generally, the paper argues that mixed-effects models should become the new standard for studying partisan influences.

AbstractWelfare is the largest expenditure category in all advanced democracies. Consequently, much literature has studied partisan effects on total and policy‐specific welfare expenditure. Yet, these results cannot be trusted: the methodological standard is to apply time‐series cross‐section regressions to annual observation data. But governments hardly change annually. Thus, the number of observations is artificially inflated, leading to incorrect estimates. While this problem has recently been acknowledged, it has not been convincingly resolved. This article proposes mixed‐effects models (also known as 'multilevel models' or 'hierarchical models') as a solution, which allows decomposing variance into different levels and permits complex cross‐classification data structures. It is argued that mixed‐effects models combine the strengths of existing methodological approaches while alleviating their weaknesses. Empirically, partisan effects on total and on disaggregated expenditure in 23 OECD countries in the period 1960–2012 are studied using several measures of party preferences and revealing several substantially relevant findings.