Suchergebnisse

ALTHOUGH THIS STUDY IS VERY MUCH AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS, IT IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A FORMAL THEORETICAL PIECE. DESCRIPTION IS A DECIDEDLY SECONDARY CONCERN HERE; RATHER, THE AUTHOR IS CONCERNED WITH ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES AND THEIR THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES.

AMERICA IS THOUGHT TO BE AN EXCEPTIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND, IN MANY OF ITS PARTICULARS, IT CERTAINLY DIFFERS FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOUND IN MOST OF THE WORLD'S DEMOCRACIES. ITS SEPARATION-OF-POWERS REGIME IS THOUGHT TO HAVE SPAWNED, IN RECENT DECADES, THE PHENOMENON OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT IN WHICH PARTISAN CONTROL OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE MAJOR PARTIES. BY IMPLICATION, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS ROBUST REGULARITY IN WHICH DEMOCRATS CONTROL THE LEGISLATURE AND THE REPUBLICANS THE EXECUTIVE IS A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND, THEREFORE, DISTINGUISHES AMERICA FROM ITS PARLIAMENTARY COUNTERPARTS ELSEWHERE. IN THIS ARTICLE, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES, TOO, EXPERIENCE DIVIDED GOVERNMENT. THUS, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT PER SE DOES NOT DISTINGUISH PARLIAMENTARY AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS REGIMES. WHAT DOES, HOWEVER, ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF THIS PHENOMENON: DIVIDED GOVERNMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED IN PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES WHEREAS THEY ARE MANDATED ELECTORALLY IN SEPARATION-OF-POWERS REGIMES.