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Drawing heavily on theories about Russia's informal politics, American sanctions were designed to change Russian foreign policy by exploiting political conflict among oligarchs and the state elite; however, after nearly eight years of sanctions, Russian elites seem more united than ever. I propose that Russia's oligarchs—the ruthless self‐interested economic elite in Russia's informal political system—might sometimes act as a cohesive oligarchy, particularly when their wealth is threatened from external rather than domestic sources, as has been the case under Western sanctions. Through an in‐depth case study on the design and outcome of sanctions, this article seeks to develop a more dynamic theory of Russia's informal politics and explain the apparent cohesion among state and economic elites since 2014 as the result of a politics of wealth defense induced by Western sanctions.

During the 1990s, a conventional wisdom emerged, based on literature going back decades, that political decentralization might be among the most effective forces for democratization. If ordinary people could participate in autonomous local governments, democracy would be built from the ground up, ultimately shaping the entire political system. Once decentralization reforms were implemented across the world, however, the results were disappointing. Authoritarianism not only thrived at the local level, it could also undermine democratization at the national level. Thus, local-national transference still held, but sometimes as a poison. In this context, the case of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan is an anomaly. Here, the relative success of political decentralization—rather than its failure—nevertheless failed to spur democratization at the national level. I argue that this is because decentralization allowed national authorities to appease international donors while they consolidated their own power. Moreover, while decentralization empowered local communities, it did so in ways that personalized local authority and pitted local and national authorities against one another, resulting in intense localism and antagonistic center-local relations that undermined any democratic transference. The case study findings are based on ten months of field research, which includes interviews with local and national officials, ordinary villagers, and representatives of NGOs and international organizations.

AbstractComputational models have been underutilized as tools for formal theory development, closing off theoretical analysis of complex substantive scenarios that they would well serve. I argue that this occurs for two reasons, and provide resolutions for each. First, computational models generally do not employ the language or modes of analysis common to game‐theoretic models, the status quo in the literature. I detail the types of insights typically derived from game‐theoretic models and discuss analogues in computational modeling. Second, there are not widely established procedures for analysis of deductive computational models. I present a regularized method for deriving comparative statics from computational models that provides insights comparable to those arising from game‐theoretic analyses. It also serves as a framework for building theoretically tractable computational models. Together, these contributions should enhance communication between models of social science and open up the tool kit of deductive computational modeling for theory building to a broader audience.

How do global sources of information such as mass media outlets, state propaganda, NGOs, and national party leadership affect aggregate behavior? Prior work on this question has insufficiently considered the complex interaction between social network and mass media influences on individual behavior. By explicitly modeling this interaction, I show that social network structureconditionsmedia's impact. Empirical studies of media effects that fail to consider this risk bias. Further, social network interactionscan amplify media bias, leading to large swings in aggregate behavior made more severe when individuals can select into media matching their preferences. Countervailing media outlets and social elites with unified preferences can mitigate the effect of bias; however, media outlets promulgating antistatus quo bias have an advantage. Theoretical results such as these generate numerous testable hypotheses; I provide guidelines for deriving and testing hypotheses from the model and discuss several such hypotheses.