We examine the presidential nominees' choice of running mate in each election since 1940, when Franklin Roosevelt established a precedent by naming his own. To analyze the 22 choices made from the pool of 127 serious possibilities, we employ a discrete choice model. We find that the presidential nominee's choice is explained primarily by the size of the prospective vice president's state, by whether the running mate finalist was a rival for the nomination, and by the balance in age for the ticket. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
THIS RISE OF TELEVISION AS AMERICANS' PRIMARY NEWS SOURCE HAS OFTEN BEEN DECRIED AS A BLIGHT ON REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. IN THIS ARTICLE THE AUTHORS OUTLINE THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS. THE AUTHORS THEN UNDERTAKE A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF 1888, 1908, 1928, 1948, AND 1988. THE ANALYSIS INDICATES SOME CHANGES DURING THE POST WORLD-WAR II ERA.
Looks toward black Americans for evidence of a 'gender gap' of the type previously documented among white Americans and in several other Western democracies. Such evidence proves, for the most part, to be lacking. (Abstract amended)
Data from a 1984 national survey (N = 2,481 respondents) are used to analyze anticandidate voting in presidential elections, ie, voting focused more on a candidate one opposes than on a candidate one prefers. Such voting is viewed as the end product of a process whereby voters attempt to reduce discomfort that cross-pressures generate within their decision frameworks. In 1984, nearly 33% of all likely voters said they were primarily motivated by a desire to vote against one of the two presidential candidates, a rate of anticandidate voting similar to that observed in the Lyndon Johnson-Barry Goldwater election of 1964, but well below that of the 1980 Ronald Reagan-Jimmy Carter election. However, factors related to anticandidate voting in the past were not consistently linked to anticandidate voting in 1984. It is concluded that the presence of Ronald Reagan exerted such a strong influence on the 1984 campaign that processes that would normally be observable, eg, anticandidate voting, were overridden. 3 Tables, 7 References. HA
John H. Simpson has estimated ("Moral Issues and Status Politics" in Liebman, Robert, & Wuthnow, Robert [Eds], The New Christian Right, New York: Aldine, 1983, 187-205) that 30% of US adults support the sociomoral platform of the Moral Majority. Several criticisms of this estimate &/or the way it has subsequently been interpreted are offered, including the treatment of "don't know" responses, the selection of response category cutting points, datedness of data, the effects of question wording, & substance. Analysis of other items from this data set (the 1977 NORC General Social Survey) results in a much different estimate of public support for the Moral Majority platform. More basically, however, results demonstrate that PO on such complex issues cannot be fairly reflected by a single number. In A Reply to "Measuring Public Support for the New Christian Right: The Perils of Point Estimation," John H. Simpson (U of Toronto, Ontario) contends that his original goal was not to produce a point estimate, but to test a multiple indicator measurement model using the maximum likelihood latent structure analysis technique. The good fit of this model to the observed data is described, & it is concluded that Sigelman's & Presser's criticisms either have no bearing on or do not affect the observed frequencies. Major differences between electoral politics & the politics of public policy formation are reiterated. 4 Tables, 27 References. K. Hyatt
Surveys conducted by the US Information Agency (USIA) in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, & El Salvador, as reported in the press, resulted in findings strongly supportive of President Reagan's foreign policy objectives. Despite Freedom of Information requests, the technical reports, data sets, & information about sampling were not released. Based on the codebook, the questionnaire, & the frequency distributions for each item, which were provided, the data cannot be entirely discounted. Problems in the research design included lack of rural respondents, inclusion only of those with at least seven years of schooling, & lack of opportunity in multiple choice questions to express criticism of the US. However, none of the problems identified render the data totally unworthy of attention & credibility. 3 References. A. Waters
POWERS AND INFORMAL INFLUENCE ALTHOUGH FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL POWERS HAVE OFTEN BEEN EMPLOYED AS A SURROGATE MEASURE OF ACTUAL GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE, THE LINKAGE IS MORE COMPLEX THAN THAT. THIS ARTICLE BUILDS AND TESTS THE ARGUMENT THAT FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL POWERS ARE TRANSLATED INTO INFLUENCE LARGELY THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE GOVERNOR'S INFORMAL POLITICAL RESOURCES. THAT IS, FORMAL POWERS DO RELATIVELY LITTLE TO BOLSTER A GOVERNOR'S INFLUENCE WHERE INFORMAL RESOURCES ARE LACKING, BUT A COMBINATION OF FORMAL POWERS AND INFORMAL RESOURCES CONTRIBUTES GREATLY TO GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE. TESTS OF AN INTERACTIVE MODEL OF THE GOVERNOR'S INFLUENCE OVER STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES STRONGLY SUPPORT THIS INTERPRETATION.
It has been reported that 30% of adults support the 'sociomoral platform of the Moral Majority'. Lodges several criticisms of this estimate and/or the way it has been interpreted. Derives a much different estimate of public support for that platform in the same year. (Abstract amended)
THE OPERATIONALIZATIONS CHOSEN BY WILCOX FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE CONCEDED TO PRODUCE AN APPARENT IMPROVEMENT IN THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE MODEL OF SUPPORT FOR THE MORAL MAJORITY, BUT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ORIGINAL BUELL-SIGELMAN STUDY REMAIN UNCHALLENGED. FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, WILCOX'S PROCEDURE FOR CORRECTING RESPONDENTS' THERMOMETER RATINGS IS NOT NECESSARILY AN IMPROVEMENT, BUT SHIFTS THE FOCUS OF THE ANALYSIS FROM AFFECT TO RELATIVE AFFECT.
SIX ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES ABOUT PUBLIC RESPONSES TO "OUT-OF-CHARACTER" PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WERE TESTED IN AN EXPERIMENT THAT MANIPULATED BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S PREEXISTING POLICY POSITION AND THE NATURE OF HIS ACTION IN AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. IN ADDITION, SUBJECTS THEMSELVES WERE CLASSIFIED AS HAWKS OR DOVES. APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND OF HIS RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS WAS A COMPLEX FUNCTION OF THE POLICY VIEWS OF THE SUBJECT AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION WITH HIS PAST RECORD. DOVES SUPPORTED PRESIDENTS AND ACTIONS THAT WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR OWN DOVISH LEANINGS BUT RESENTED A DOVISH PRESIDENT WHO BEHAVE HAWKISHLY, GENERALLY CONFIRMING THE VIEW THAT SIMILARITY BREEDS ATTRACTION. BY CONTRAST, HAWKS WERE WILLING TO TOLERATE DOVISH BEHAVIOR IF IT WAS UNDERTAKEN BY A HAWK, SUPPORTING THE EXPECTATION THAT OUT-OF-CHARACTER ACTIONS ARE UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF DISARMING WOULD-BE OPPONENTS. FOR NEITHER HAWKISH NOR DOVISH PRESIDENTS WERE THESE FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE "WAFFLING" INTERPRETATION, WHICH HOLDS THAT INCONSISTENCY PER SE IS DOWNGRADED. COMPARED TO PRESIDENTS WHOSE ACTIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PREVIOUS BELIEFS, OUT-OF-CHARACTER PRESIDENTS WERE PERCEIVED AS MORE CHANGEABLE, IN BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SENSES; WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE DISLIKED DOING WHAT THEY HAD DONE; AND WERE JUDGED TO HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY UNINFLUENCED BY INTERNAL CAUSES.
