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"Legislatures and Representation in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

This paper studies the territorial scope of the bills presented by members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Argentine National Congress) during Juan Domingo Perón's first two terms in office (1946–1955). Its main objective is to observe the effect that modifying the electoral system (switching from incomplete party ballots in multimember districts to relative majorities in single-member districts) had on that scope. Experimental techniques (an interrupted time-series and a within-subjects design) are used to analyze a novel database including every bill presented in the Chamber of Deputies during the period in question. Contrary to theoretical expectations, an increase is observed in the share of bills with a territorial scope that goes beyond deputies' districts – especially for those presented by legislators from the opposition and from larger provinces. In addition, by separately analyzing the effect on the ruling party and the opposition, the paper uncovers a plausible explanation for previous nonconclusive findings.

This paper presents a state of the art of the literature about the role political parties played in the process of political, economic and administrative decentralization in Latin America, both as dependent and independent variables. It makes a contribution to the understanding of the region's political systems and their recent evolution, and suggests explanations for the differences found among the countries of the region. Furthermore, it provides an original point of view from which to observe events of relevance for the study of Latin America. Of particular significance are the national party systems development and shifts, the interrelation between national and subnational party arenas, and the motivations behind the actions of individuals politicians and political parties considered as organization with given goals. ; El presente artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura sobre el rol que los partidos políticos cumplieron en los procesos de descentralización política, económica y administrativa en América Latina, tanto como variable dependiente como independiente. Dicha revisión realiza un aporte a la comprensión de los sistemas políticos de la región y su evolución reciente y provee explicaciones para las diferencias encontradas entre los distintos países de la región. Además, permite observar desde una óptica distinta de la usual fenómenos relevantes para el estudio de América Latina. Especialmente significativos son la conformación y cambio de los sistemas de partidos nacionales, la interrelación partidaria entre niveles nacionales y subnacionales y las motivaciones de los políticos y de los partidos políticos en tanto organizaciones con objetivos definidos.

El presente artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura sobre el rol que los partidos políticos cumplieron en los procesos de descentralización política, económica y administrativa en América Latina, tanto como variable dependiente como independiente. Dicha revisión realiza un aporte a la comprensión de los sistemas políticos de la región y su evolución reciente y provee explicaciones para las diferencias encontradas entre los distintos países de la región. Además, permite observar desde una óptica distinta de la usual fenómenos relevantes para el estudio de América Latina. Especialmente significativos son la conformación y cambio de los sistemas de partidos nacionales, la interrelación partidaria entre niveles nacionales y subnacionales y las motivaciones de los políticos y de los partidos políticos en tanto organizaciones con objetivos definidos. ; This paper presents a state of the art of the literature about the role political parties played in the process of political, economic and administrative decentralization in Latin America, both as dependent and independent variables. It makes a contribution to the understanding of the region's political systems and their recent evolution, and suggests explanations for the differences found among the countries of the region. Furthermore, it provides an original point of view from which to observe events of relevance for the study of Latin America. Of particular significance are the national party systems development and shifts, the interrelation between national and subnational party arenas, and the motivations behind the actions of individuals politicians and political parties considered as organization with given goals.

This paper analyzes the distributive strategies of presidents in federal countries under different contexts of fiscal centralization and party system nationalization by studying the allocation of discretionary fiscal transfers to the Argentine provinces and comparing two periods in which presidents from the same political party (Peronist) operated under different contexts: one of fiscal decentralization and party system nationalization during Carlos Menem's presidencies; and another of fiscal centralization and party system denationalization during the presidencies of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. The analysis shows that in both cases the distribution followed strategic considerations even when this means, in the first case, to reward the over represented provinces and, in the second, the copartisan ones. Adapted from the source document.

This paper studies the territorial scope of the bills presented by members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Argentine National Congress) during Juan Domingo Perón?s first two terms in office (1946?1955). Its main objective is to observe the effect that modifying the electoral system (switching from incomplete party ballots in multimember districts to relative majorities in single-member districts) had on that scope. Experimental techniques (an interrupted time-series and a within-subjects design) are used to analyze a novel database including every bill presented in the Chamber of Deputies during the period in question. Contrary to theoretical expectations, an increase is observed in the share of bills with a territorial scope that goes beyond deputies? districts ? especially for those presented by legislators from the opposition and from larger provinces. In addition, by separately analyzing the effect on the ruling party and the opposition, the paper uncovers a plausible explanation for previous nonconclusive findings. ; Fil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina

Se analizan las estrategias distributivas presidenciales en países federales en contextos cambiantes de centralización fiscal y nacionalización del sistema de partidos, mediante el estudio de la distribución de transferencias discrecionales a las provincias argentinas y comparando dos períodos en que presidentes del mismo partido enfrentaron contextos diferentes: 1) descentralización fiscal y nacionalización partidaria durante las presidencias de Carlos Menem; y 2) centralización fiscal y desnacionalización del sistema de partidos durante las presidencias de Néstor Kirchner y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. El análisis muestra que la distribución obedeció a consideraciones estratégicas, aunque en el primer contexto se premió a los distritos sobrerrepresentados en el Congreso Nacional y, en el segundo, a aquellas provincias cuyos gobernadores pertenecían al mismo partido que el presidente. ; This paper analyzes the distributive strategies of presidents in federal countries under different contexts of fiscal centralization and party system nationalization by studying the allocation of discretionary fiscal transfers to the Argentine provinces and comparing two periods in which presidents from the same political party (Peronist) operated under different contexts: one of fiscal decentralization and party system nationalization during Carlos Menem's presidencies; and another of fiscal centralization and party system denationalization during the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The analysis shows that in both cases the distribution followed strategic considerations even when this means, in the first case, to reward the over represented provinces and, in the second, the copartisan ones.