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Governments allocate large sums of money to their military sectors with the stated purpose of providing security for their citizens. The rationale that underlies this is based on a narrow traditional concept of security that links it to the risk of organized violence. Recent security analyses-taking different and broader definitions of security-call into question how far military measures can go towards providing security. They recognize a range of non-traditional security risks that cannot be addressed by military means. The field of public health offers many examples of areas where non-military spending could be far more cost-effective as a means to provide security of human lives. According to reports by the World Health Organization (WHO), among the 10 leading global risk factors identified for developing countries with high mortality rates, four are related to hunger and two are related to the physical environment -- unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene, and indoor smoke. Both of these are in turn linked to poverty. Thus, preventive interventions to reduce hunger, improve the physical environment and reduce poverty are important means of improving the security of human lives. Furthermore, in comparison with military expenditure, the prevention strategies developed for the WHO and other parts of the United Nations to reduce the risks to human lives are highly cost-effective. For example, 8 million lives could be saved annually for an annual investment of $57 billion in basic health interventions, and the cost of attaining the Millennium Development Goals has been estimated at $135 billion. These levels of investment are small compared with the level of world military expenditure, which amounted to $1,204 billion in 2006. More importantly, there are significant overlaps between the risk factors for disease and for collective violence, which suggests that there is an overlap in the agendas for 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear'. This has implications for different types of security strategy. In particular, it means that in addressing one type of security threat, others can also be considered. While economic scarcity and competition for resources are potential sources of conflict and violence, using the world's resources constructively to address hunger, environmental factors and poverty -- including by transfers from the richer countries to the high-mortality developing countries -- is likely both to improve human survival directly and to strengthen international security indirectly. Adapted from the source document.

After a 10-year period of decline, world military expenditure is increasing once again: by 2004 it was close to its peak at the height of the Cold War. What does this increase entail and how can it be interpreted? Is it an indication of a detioratiing security environment or of increasing security? Is spending on the military an effective way of providing security in the current security environment? In responding to these important questions, a good starting point is to analyse the trends and patterns in military spending. Military expenditure is a rough measure of the level of government financial allocations for military purposes. As such, it can measure the priority given to military means of achieving security - assessed according to government perceptions - or of achieving some other types of national objectives, as formulated in national security doctrines. This paper considers trends in the global military spending data, discusses the limitations of the data, and suggests what sort of information is needed to improve analysis of the new security environment. Text in both English and French. Parallel title: Les depenses militaires.

The arms sales of the 100 largest arms-producing companies in the world apart from China in 2005 -- the SIPRI Top 100 -- increased by 3% in real terms over the arms sales of the Top 100 for 2004 and by 18% over those of the Top 100 for 2002. US companies dominate the SIPRI Top 100: 40 US firms accounted for 63% of the combined Top 100 arms sales of $290 billion in 2005. Some 32 West European companies accounted for another 29% and 9 Russian companies for 2 per cent. Companies based in Japan, Israel and India, in descending order, accounted for most of the remaining 6% of world arms sales. Four US companies, one British company and one Italian company increased their arms sales by more than $1 billion in 2005 and 11 companies increased their arms sales by more than 30%. Of these, four were Russian companies and five were companies that increased their arms sales in the areas of information technology and services. Most of these sharp increases were the result of acquisitions of other companies (or parts of other companies) rather than of organic growth. Parts of the US arms industry have benefited substantially from the USA's post-September 2001 policies, particularly the increased demand for new equipment generated by the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These policies have also stimulated strong growth in government expenditure on homeland security, thereby increasing demand in the broader security industry. A major factor behind current developments in the arms industry has been the high and rising fixed costs of advanced weapon systems. Companies use mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies of scale, but the increased concentration of production can also lead to reduced competition and thus remove incentives to keep prices down and innovation up. Government strategies to deal with this economic dilemma have included international collaboration and arms exports; using commercial technology in weapon systems; and outsourcing, privatization and partnerships with the private sector. However, most governments still cannot afford to maintain their current levels of arms procurement and have had to make choices affecting their defence policies and the structure of their arms industries. The debate in the UK in 2006 over a new defence industrial strategy provided a good illustration of the challenges confronting the European arms industry. One of the tasks of the European Defence Agency, established in 2004, is to achieve cost savings, primarily by promoting European collaboration in armaments development and production. Adapted from the source document.

Over the past 40 years, military expenditure data have been used in a variety of political contexts. There have been two fundamental shifts in the use of such data. First, there has been a shift of focus from military expenditure in the countries belonging to the cold war military blocs in the North to that of the developing countries in the South in the post-cold war period. Second, in the UN there has been a shift in the aims of the use of military expenditure data away from disarmament and development towards transparency. This reflects broader changes in the international peace and security community, where the idea of disarmament as a direct path to development has lost ground, while the idea of promoting security through, for example, confidence building, conflict prevention and peacekeeping has gained ground. Increased awareness of the interdependence of security and development is resulting in new ideas on how to promote both. This will hopefully lead to increased use of non-military resources for security provision in the future. However, the picture is mixed since the first half-decade of the 21st century was dominated by the opposite practice: the application of huge military resources in the name of defending and promoting democracy. In general, it appears that data availability and accessibility have tended to improve over time, especially in terms of access to primary sources for developing countries. This is in part because of the general tendency for improved transparency and is possibly also promoted by the efforts of the UN, the international donor community and data-gathering organizations. However, in spite of the improved access to data, the quality of the data remains unsatisfactory. Tracking states' conflict-related expenditure is also a major challenge. The industrialized countries' new modes of financing procurement through private finance require further understanding in order to assess their implications for data quality. The relevance of military expenditure data for the analysis of peace and security issues has been a perpetual issue throughout the 40-year period. The use of military expenditure data to assess military strength, in spite of the fact that such data by their nature are an input measure, tends to lead to misconceptions, as the cold war experience demonstrates. The relevance of military expenditure data is further challenged in the current security environment, with fundamental questions posed by the increased focus on internal security and the changing concept of security. Human security, with its focus on the individual rather than the state, and the blurring of the dividing line between internal security and external defence mean that military expenditure data are of less relevance. This does not mean that data on military expenditure are of no utility, but rather that they need to be complemented by other types of data series in order to capture the dimensions of internal security and human security. Adapted from the source document.

New data from SIPRI shows that the value of the combined arms sales of the top 100 companies in the world (excluding China) in 2003 was $236 billion. The top 100 companies increased their combined arms sales in 2003 by 25% in current dollars. Of these 100 companies, 38 are based in the USA and one in Canada. Together, these accounted for 63.2% of arms sales by the top 100, while 42 European companies (including 6 based in Russia) accounted for another 30.5% of sales. The process of adaptation to the new security environment continues. In the USA the industry is adjusting to the new demands created by the ongoing transformation of the armed forces, the privatization of military services and the increasing importance of the homeland security sector. In Europe the emphasis is on intra-European consolidation and access to the expanding US 'market', that is, the US Government's arms procurement budget. The process of concentration in the arms industry has been slowing down since the late 1990s. While still significant, mega-mergers no longer dominate the pattern of acquisition. In 2003 six acquisitions took place with deal values exceeding $1 billion. In 2004 there was only one deal of this size: the buyout by Italian firm Finmeccanica of the British firm GKN's 50% stake in their joint venture -- the helicopter company Agusta Westland -- and related assets for 1.59 billion ($1.98 billion). In the past decade the top arms-producing companies have grown enormously in size, primarily through acquisitions. They are now comparable in economic importance to many other multinational corporations and, like them, the largest arms-producing companies have sales of a magnitude that make them major economic entities, not only in their domestic environment but also globally. The value of their arms sales exceeds the GDP of most low-income countries and their total sales compare to the GDPs of medium-sized developed or industrializing countries. A comparison for the entire group of top 100 companies shows that the value of their total sales in 2003 is roughly equal to the combined national output of all 61 low-income countries in 2003. With the increasing outsourcing of services from defense ministries and armed forces to the private sector, a growing number of the top 100 companies specialize in services. This trend is most pronounced in the USA, but exists also in West European industry. Consolidation of the European military shipbuilding industry continued in 2004. These efforts were focused on two initiatives: to create a naval counterpart to what EADS represents in aerospace, and to consolidate and develop an industrial strategy for the British shipbuilding industry. However, little progress was made and the future structure of the European shipbuilding industry remains uncertain. The war in Iraq has increased the share of the arms industry held by companies providing services and has reinforced the focus on new military technologies. There is only limited transparency in the contracting process for work in Iraq. What transparency there is depends on NGOs compiling information about the size and content of contracts and about the companies that are awarded them. Company reporting on the military share of their sales is rare and incomplete, and reporting on the military share of their exports and research and development is almost nonexistent. Of the 150 companies included in a table on arms industry data transparency, only 41 can be described as having fully and completely disclosed the extent of their arms sales in a company document. Only limited information is available on commercial arms sales worldwide. This lack of data makes it difficult to establish a firm foundation for political and public discussion of issues relating to arms production and arms sales. Pressures on companies to report their arms sales are weak and current reporting relies entirely on voluntary disclosure of information by the companies themselves. Comprehensive, regular and standardized reporting can be achieved only through internationally harmonized legal requirements for companies to report. Adapted from the source document.

The changing security environment produces challenges for providers of quantitative indicators on the military sector. Such indicators traditionally include data on military expenditure, arms production & arms transfers. New security thinking & policies, involving the broadening & deepening of the concept of security to include non-military means & security providers other than the state, have had an impact on the relevance of data on military expenditure & other indicators for security analysis. The blurred border between the functions of the military & those of the internal security sectors also raises questions about the meaning of separate data on military spending. Also, if the internationalization of arms acquisition continues to be ignored by the methodologies for studying arms transfers, it will not be possible to describe arms markets, or changes in such markets, reliably. It is therefore important to refine the methodologies in all of these areas. Adapted from the source document.

The restructuring of the US & West European arms industries that was initiated following the end of the Cold War continued during 2002. It was previously driven by the rapid reduction in domestic & external demand for military equipment but the output of the arms industry has ceased to decline since the mid-1990s. In the US, continued concentration has fostered concerns over lack of competition. In Europe, the European Union is assuming a higher profile in defense industrial policy, but governments still differ in their policies on procurement, competition, foreign ownership, & privatization. In Russia the dramatic cuts in government spending on arms procurement after the disintegration of the Soviet Union have been replaced by a modestly increasing trend since 1998. However, the Russian arms industry continues to rely heavily on exports. Lack of funding & opposition by companies & regional politicians hinders the restructuring of the industry. 5 Tables, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

The arms industry has changed profoundly in size & structure since the early 1990s. Until the mid-1990s these changes were driven by the need to adjust arms-producing capabilities to the significant reduction in the demand for military equipment associated with the end of the Cold War. Since the late 1990s arms procurement has stabilized & in a number of countries there had even been slight growth. The current restructuring of the arms industry is to a significant extent driven by large companies trying to secure their already strong positions on the world market through continued acquisitions & international cooperation arrangements. Increased concentration & internationalization in the production of armaments may require international measures to ensure transparency & accountability in arms production in the future. 9 Tables, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

World military expenditure is estimated to have been $1,339 billion in 2007 -- a real-terms increase of 6% over 2006 and of 45% since 1998. This corresponded to 2.5% of world gross domestic product (GDP) and $202 for each person in the world. The subregion with the highest increase in military expenditure over the 10-year period 1998-2007 was Eastern Europe, at 162%. It was also the region with the highest increase in 2007, at 15%. Russia, with a 13% increase in 2007, accounted for 86% of this regional increase. Other subregions with 10-year growth rates exceeding 50% are North America (65%), the Middle East (62%), South Asia (57%), Africa and East Asia (both 51%). The subregions with the lowest growth in military spending over the past 10 years were Western Europe (6%) and Central America (14%). The USA's military spending accounted for 45% of the world total in 2007, followed by the UK, China, France and Japan, with 4-5% each. Since 2001 US military expenditure has increased by 59% in real terms, principally because of massive spending on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also because of increases in the 'base' defence budget. By 2007, US spending was higher than at any time since World War II. However, because of the growth of the US economy and of total US Government spending, the economic and financial burden of military spending (i.e. its share of GDP and of total US Government outlays) is lower now than during previous peak spending years in the post- World War II period. China has increased its military spending threefold in real terms during the past decade. However, due to its rapid economic growth, the economic burden of military spending is still moderate, at 2.1% of GDP. Military spending is rising rapidly in the South Caucasus -- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia -- largely due to the region's three 'frozen' conflicts and the involvement of external actors. The rises have been made possible by economic upswings largely based on oil and gas revenues. The number of countries that increased their military spending in 2007 was higher than in recent years. The factors driving increases in world military spending include countries' foreign policy objectives, real or perceived threats, armed conflict and policies to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping operations, combined with the availability of economic resources. Adapted from the source document.

World military expenditure in 2006 is estimated to have reached $1,204 billion in current dollars. This represents a 3.5% increase in real terms since 2005 and a 37% increase over the 10-year period since 1997. Average spending per capita increased from $173 in 2005 to $184. World military expenditure is extremely unevenly distributed. In 2006 the 15 countries with the highest spending accounted for 83% of the world total. The large increase in the USA's military spending is to a great extent due to the costly military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of the increase resulted from supplementary allocations in addition to the regular budget. Between September 2001 and June 2006, the US Government provided a total of $432 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations under the heading 'global war on terrorism'. This increase in US military spending has contributed to the rise in budget deficits, government debt and outlays on servicing these debts since 2001. Taking both immediate and long-term factors into account, the overall past and future costs until year 2016 to the USA for the war in Iraq have been estimated at $2,267 billion. In 2006 China's military expenditure continued to increase rapidly, for the first time surpassing that of Japan and hence making China the biggest military spender in Asia and the fourth biggest in the world. Amid intense discussions, Japan decided, for the fifth consecutive year, to reduce its military spending in 2006 and to focus its military budget on missile defence. In a comparison of government spending priorities between samples of countries in different per capita income groups, the ratio of military spending to social spending was found to be highest in those countries with the lowest per capita incomes. However, between 1999 and 2003, the share of military expenditure in GDP stayed at a constant level in the high- and middle-income country sample and decreased somewhat in the low-income sample. At the same time social spending as a share of GDP increased in the high- and low-income groups and remained relatively stable in middle-income countries. Adapted from the source document.

Perlo-Freeman ... : Military expenditure. - S. [179]-211 Stallenheim, Petter ... : Military expenditure data, 1999-2008. - S. [212]-242 Perlo-Freeman, Sam: NATO military expenditure by category. - S. 247-253 Perdomo, Catalina ...: The reporting of military expenditure data. - S. [253]-258

World military spending in 2003 increased by about 11% in real terms. This is a remarkable rate of increase, even more so given that it was preceded by an increase of 6.5% in 2002. Over two years world military spending increased by 18% in real terms, to reach $956 billion (in current dollars) in 2003. High-income countries account for about 75% of world military spending but only 16% of world population. The combined military spending of these countries was slightly higher than the aggregate foreign debt of all low-income countries and 10 times higher than their combined levels of official development assistance in 2001. While it is not possible, because of a lack of data, to make the same comparison for 2003, it is clear that these gaps have widened owing to the stark rise in world military expenditure since 2001. Thus, there is a large gap between what countries are prepared to allocate for military means to provide security and maintain their global and regional power status, on the one hand, and to alleviate poverty and promote economic development, on the other. The main reason for the increase in world military spending is the massive increase in the United States, which accounts for almost half of the world total. After a decade of reductions in military expenditure in the period 1987-98 and moderate increases in 1998-2001, the changes in US military doctrine and strategy after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 unleashed huge increases in US military spending in 2002 and 2003. Much of the rise is accounted for by the large supplementary appropriations to cover the costs of the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and of anti-terrorist activities. In the absence of these appropriations, US military expenditure would still show a significant increase, but at a much slower rate, and world military spending would show a rise of 4% rather than 11% in 2003. While military expenditure is also rising in several other major countries, these increases are much smaller, and there is little indication that the strong increase in US military spending is resulting in an equally strong tendency for other countries to follow suit. It is difficult to assess the importance of US influence relative to more basic drivers of military spending, such as changing threat perceptions, increased global responsibilities and force projection, and the dynamics of military technology -- in particular, since these factors are often strongly interlinked with the relevant countries' relations with the USA. While all countries accept that no nation is currently able to match the USA in military power, there are other types of response that could impact on their military spending. A review of military expenditure trends in seven other major spenders shows that military expenditure has risen in most years of the five-year period 1999-2003 in all seven countries. India and Japan have raised their military spending in line with their GDP growth. Apart from the two years 2001 and 2002, the same is true for China. In France and the UK, the military burden declined slightly in recent years, but in France it began to rise in 2003 and the burden is planned to increase in the UK. Brazil, unlike other medium-rank powers, is pursuing global influence using a model of 'soft power' rather than increased military expenditure. Its comfortable strategic position and enhanced trading relations have allowed a reallocation of scarce resources to economic and social development. During most of 2003, much of the focus in national military spending debates continued to be on the need to increase military spending to meet increasing dangers and risks in an increasingly complex and globalized world. However, towards the end of the year and in early 2004, there were several indications that other factors, related to the economic burden of the military sector and to ethical considerations, tended to increase in importance in several countries. In particular, the US doctrine of pre-emptive wars was being challenged on both ethical and international law grounds, as well as because of the large costs and dubious successes associated with it. Thus, while US military expenditure is set to continue to grow and will continue to propel world military spending, the pace is likely to fall back somewhat in the next few years. In the longer term it is doubtful whether current levels will be economically and politically sustainable. Adapted from the source document.

World military expenditure, which has been increasing since 1998, rose by 6% in real terms in 2002 to $794 billion (in current prices), 2.5% of world GDP. This sharp acceleration in the rate of increase is overwhelmingly due to large increases by the US, in response to the events of 11 September 2001. However, the war on terrorism has not provoked similar increases in most other countries, in particular in Western Europe, where spending remained flat. Some other major spenders continued to increase military expenditure, including China & Russia, to promote force modernization, & India because of regional security factors. 8 Tables, 3 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.