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The hopes that e‐voting would increase voter turnout have not really materialized; any turnout increases in those countries where Internet voting has been introduced have been negligible. But the effect of one mechanism by which this mode of voting might influence turnout is still largely unknown, namely its potential to keep voters voting at higher rates than paper voting, and thus if not reversing, then at least putting a halt to further decline in turnout. This article examines the degree to which people who vote on the Internet once carry on doing so, thereby testing the hypothesis that e‐voting is more habit forming than paper voting. We test if e‐voting displays traits typical of a habit, that is, being a self‐reinforced behavior detached from its original motivations. Survey data are analyzed from five consecutive and e‐enabled nationwide elections in Estonia between 2009 and 2015. The results suggest e‐voting to be very "sticky"; a first time e‐voter is very likely to stay e‐voting in subsequent elections at consistently higher rates than a typical paper voter is to stay paper voting, or a nonvoter to remain a nonvoter. The results call for a re‐examination of the association between Internet voting and turnout.

This article examines the degree to which sponsored private member's bills (PMBs) in parliament can be explained by electoral incentives. Such bills are a peculiar piece of draft legislation – technically simple, topically unimportant and with negligible passage rates. Yet members of parliament (MPs) sponsor them in large numbers. One possible explanation for this behaviour is the electoral context arising out of the variance in electoral district size and electoral list types, which makes a strong personal reputation comparatively more important for some MPs. Sponsoring bills that have no realistic chance of becoming actual regulations could be a form of personal reputation‐building and/or vote‐seeking behaviour. Evidence is examined on the sponsoring of such bills in Finland between 2003 and 2007 and in Estonia between 1999 and 2007 in order to determine if the electoral context explains why some MPs do this more frequently. The results suggest that the electoral system does have an effect. MPs who have been elected under rules where personal reputation is not central in getting elected are less likely to sponsor such bills the larger their electoral district becomes.

The UNDP report The Silent Majority Speaks (2007) demonstrates widespread consent and a popular desire for change while promoting a single state with strong regions as a compromise model for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Surprisingly, our own research (2009) on political legitimacy reveals quite the opposite tendencies, where political entities such as the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) more often drift apart than merge together. What strikes us is the fact that the FBiH, which advocates a more integrated state, does not necessarily have more legitimate grounds for achieving that goal than the secessionist counterclaim of RS in its own right. The two entities remain worlds apart on a range of issues and agree only on rather abstract principles of an ideal political order.