Suchergebnisse

National audience ; Post-reform markets in commodity-exporting countries in Africa and Latin America are generally characterized by the withdrawal of government organizations from commodity marketing, the emergence of new private agents operating as traders and exporters, and farmers' participation in the newly-reconfigured market regulatory authorities. However, the liberalization process varied across countries and resulted in the emergence of various marketing systems. This empirical analysis aims at providing better understanding of the situation faced by farmers likely to be exposed to both high world price volatility and possible market power of private agents. Focusing on three coffee exporting countries which have experienced market liberalization in the mid-1990s but display very different marketing systems today, I show that asymmetric adjustments of producer prices that characterized the pre-reform period and were favorable to farmers have disappeared in the post-reform period. Moreover, in spite of farmers' participation in market authorities, largest decreases in world prices may be transmitted relatively quickly to farmers when the number of exporters remains small.

National audience ; Post-reform markets in commodity-exporting countries in Africa and Latin America are generally characterized by the withdrawal of government organizations from commodity marketing, the emergence of new private agents operating as traders and exporters, and farmers' participation in the newly-reconfigured market regulatory authorities. However, the liberalization process varied across countries and resulted in the emergence of various marketing systems. This empirical analysis aims at providing better understanding of the situation faced by farmers likely to be exposed to both high world price volatility and possible market power of private agents. Focusing on three coffee exporting countries which have experienced market liberalization in the mid-1990s but display very different marketing systems today, I show that asymmetric adjustments of producer prices that characterized the pre-reform period and were favorable to farmers have disappeared in the post-reform period. Moreover, in spite of farmers' participation in market authorities, largest decreases in world prices may be transmitted relatively quickly to farmers when the number of exporters remains small.

Post-reform markets in commodity-exporting countries in Africa and Latin America are generally characterized by the withdrawal of government organizations from commodity marketing, the emergence of new private agents operating as traders and exporters, and farmers' participation in the newly-reconfigured market regulatory authorities. However, the liberalization process varied across countries and resulted in the emergence of various marketing systems. This empirical analysis aims at providing better understanding of the situation faced by farmers likely to be exposed to both high world price volatility and possible market power of private agents. Focusing on three coffee exporting countries which have experienced market liberalization in the mid-1990s but display very different marketing systems today, I show that asymmetric adjustments of producer prices that characterized the pre-reform period and were favorable to farmers have disappeared in the post-reform period. Moreover, in spite of farmers' participation in market authorities, largest decreases in world prices may be transmitted relatively quickly to farmers when the number of exporters remains small.

International audience ; Agri-environmental Schemes (AES) are a central component of the European environmental policy, but few of these schemes have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often expressed about their effectiveness. We use original data collected from winegrowers who participated in an AES targeting non-point source pollution from herbicides in 2011 and 2012 in the South region of France. Using the variation in the implementation of the scheme across time and space and a matching approach, we show that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from 38 to 53 percent below what they would have used without the scheme, and 42 to 50 percent in 2012. Further, our results suggest that least demanding AES options are effective in avoiding pollution peaks when weed pressure is high, whereas more demanding AES options guarantee an overall reduction in herbicide use, even during relatively easy farming years in which less weed pressure is experienced.

International audience ; Agri-environmental Schemes (AES) are a central component of the European environmental policy, but few of these schemes have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often expressed about their effectiveness. We use original data collected from winegrowers who participated in an AES targeting non-point source pollution from herbicides in 2011 and 2012 in the South region of France. Using the variation in the implementation of the scheme across time and space and a matching approach, we show that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from 38 to 53 percent below what they would have used without the scheme, and 42 to 50 percent in 2012. Further, our results suggest that least demanding AES options are effective in avoiding pollution peaks when weed pressure is high, whereas more demanding AES options guarantee an overall reduction in herbicide use, even during relatively easy farming years in which less weed pressure is experienced.

International audience ; Agri-environmental Schemes (AES) are a central component of the European environmental policy, but few of these schemes have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often expressed about their effectiveness. We use original data collected from winegrowers who participated in an AES targeting non-point source pollution from herbicides in 2011 and 2012 in the South region of France. Using the variation in the implementation of the scheme across time and space and a matching approach, we show that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from 38 to 53 percent below what they would have used without the scheme, and 42 to 50 percent in 2012. Further, our results suggest that least demanding AES options are effective in avoiding pollution peaks when weed pressure is high, whereas more demanding AES options guarantee an overall reduction in herbicide use, even during relatively easy farming years in which less weed pressure is experienced.

Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are a central component of the environmental policy of the European Union. Despite widespread interest and investment in AESs, few of these pro- grams have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often expressed about the effectiveness of voluntary programs. The purpose of this article is to estimate the additional effects of AESs targeting nonpoint source pollution from pesticides, focusing on one emblematic case study: herbicide use in vineyards. We use original data collected from winegrowers participating in AESs in the south of France, and we use exogenous variation in the timing of the implemen- tation of the AESs as a natural experiment. We show that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the programin 2012 was around 30%belowwhat theywould have usedwithout the program, while the impact was significantly higher in 2011 - around 50% - presumably be- cause of higher weed pressure. Although significant, these impacts remain smaller than what had been expected by policymakers. Focusing on the "zero herbicide between the vine rows" option, which is both the most often chosen as well as the least stringent among the mea- sures,we moreover showthe presence of windfall effects. Simple extrapolation of these results suggests that this level of effectiveness may not be sufficient to ensurewater quality in thewa- tersheds targeted by the AES.

Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are a central component of the environmental policy of the European Union. Despite widespread interest and investment in AESs, few of these pro- grams have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often expressed about the effectiveness of voluntary programs. The purpose of this article is to estimate the additional effects of AESs targeting nonpoint source pollution from pesticides, focusing on one emblematic case study: herbicide use in vineyards. We use original data collected from winegrowers participating in AESs in the south of France, and we use exogenous variation in the timing of the implemen- tation of the AESs as a natural experiment. We show that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the programin 2012 was around 30%belowwhat theywould have usedwithout the program, while the impact was significantly higher in 2011 - around 50% - presumably be- cause of higher weed pressure. Although significant, these impacts remain smaller than what had been expected by policymakers. Focusing on the "zero herbicide between the vine rows" option, which is both the most often chosen as well as the least stringent among the mea- sures,we moreover showthe presence of windfall effects. Simple extrapolation of these results suggests that this level of effectiveness may not be sufficient to ensurewater quality in thewa- tersheds targeted by the AES.

Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are a central component of the environmental policy of the European Union. Despite widespread interest and investment in AESs, few of these pro- grams have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often expressed about the effectiveness of voluntary programs. The purpose of this article is to estimate the additional effects of AESs targeting nonpoint source pollution from pesticides, focusing on one emblematic case study: herbicide use in vineyards. We use original data collected from winegrowers participating in AESs in the south of France, and we use exogenous variation in the timing of the implemen- tation of the AESs as a natural experiment. We show that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the programin 2012 was around 30%belowwhat theywould have usedwithout the program, while the impact was significantly higher in 2011 - around 50% - presumably be- cause of higher weed pressure. Although significant, these impacts remain smaller than what had been expected by policymakers. Focusing on the "zero herbicide between the vine rows" option, which is both the most often chosen as well as the least stringent among the mea- sures,we moreover showthe presence of windfall effects. Simple extrapolation of these results suggests that this level of effectiveness may not be sufficient to ensurewater quality in thewa- tersheds targeted by the AES.

We present the first disaggregated estimation of the causal effects of a nationwide AES program on environmentally-relevant practices for a nationally representative sample. We study the AES program that has been implemented in France between 2000 and 2006 as part of the EU policy for rural development. The causal effect of the AES program is the average difference between practices of participants in the presence of the program and what their practices would have been had the program not been implemented. This counterfactual situation cannot be observed and intuitive approximations using non participants' practices or participants' practices before receiving the AES are plagued by large sources of bias (selection bias and time trend bias). To correct for these sources of bias, we use Difference-in-Difference (DID) matching. The main idea is to compare each participant to a non participant "twin" with the same observed characteristics. We combine matching with DID to correct for any remaining bias that may be due to unobserved variables. Our results suggest that the size of windfall effects of the AES programs depends on the specific prerequisites for each AES. For example, the AES supporting conversion to organic farming, which combined large payments with the strong requirement of not being an organic farmer when applying for the AES, have had negligible windfall effects. We cannot conclude on the extent of windfall effects of payments for extensive herding. We provide a first attempt to integrate the results of causal analysis in a cost-benefit evaluation of the AES. We argue that evaluation should be prepared at the same time the program is designed. This would improve the collection of data and enable using the first results of the evaluation to design the next program (by suppressing or altering the less efficient AES). Finally, this could allow for the implementation of experimental methods to evaluate policies that do not comply with the assumptions of DID-matching, like payments for extensive herding.

We present the first disaggregated estimation of the causal effects of a nationwide AES program on environmentally-relevant practices for a nationally representative sample. We study the AES program that has been implemented in France between 2000 and 2006 as part of the EU policy for rural development. The causal effect of the AES program is the average difference between practices of participants in the presence of the program and what their practices would have been had the program not been implemented. This counterfactual situation cannot be observed and intuitive approximations using non participants' practices or participants' practices before receiving the AES are plagued by large sources of bias (selection bias and time trend bias). To correct for these sources of bias, we use Difference-in-Difference (DID) matching. The main idea is to compare each participant to a non participant "twin" with the same observed characteristics. We combine matching with DID to correct for any remaining bias that may be due to unobserved variables. Our results suggest that the size of windfall effects of the AES programs depends on the specific prerequisites for each AES. For example, the AES supporting conversion to organic farming, which combined large payments with the strong requirement of not being an organic farmer when applying for the AES, have had negligible windfall effects. We cannot conclude on the extent of windfall effects of payments for extensive herding. We provide a first attempt to integrate the results of causal analysis in a cost-benefit evaluation of the AES. We argue that evaluation should be prepared at the same time the program is designed. This would improve the collection of data and enable using the first results of the evaluation to design the next program (by suppressing or altering the less efficient AES). Finally, this could allow for the implementation of experimental methods to evaluate policies that do not comply with the assumptions of DID-matching, like payments for extensive herding.

We present the first disaggregated estimation of the causal effects of a nationwide AES program on environmentally-relevant practices for a nationally representative sample. We study the AES program that has been implemented in France between 2000 and 2006 as part of the EU policy for rural development. The causal effect of the AES program is the average difference between practices of participants in the presence of the program and what their practices would have been had the program not been implemented. This counterfactual situation cannot be observed and intuitive approximations using non participants' practices or participants' practices before receiving the AES are plagued by large sources of bias (selection bias and time trend bias). To correct for these sources of bias, we use Difference-in-Difference (DID) matching. The main idea is to compare each participant to a non participant "twin" with the same observed characteristics. We combine matching with DID to correct for any remaining bias that may be due to unobserved variables. Our results suggest that the size of windfall effects of the AES programs depends on the specific prerequisites for each AES. For example, the AES supporting conversion to organic farming, which combined large payments with the strong requirement of not being an organic farmer when applying for the AES, have had negligible windfall effects. We cannot conclude on the extent of windfall effects of payments for extensive herding. We provide a first attempt to integrate the results of causal analysis in a cost-benefit evaluation of the AES. We argue that evaluation should be prepared at the same time the program is designed. This would improve the collection of data and enable using the first results of the evaluation to design the next program (by suppressing or altering the less efficient AES). Finally, this could allow for the implementation of experimental methods to evaluate policies that do not comply with the assumptions of DID-matching, like payments for extensive herding.

We present the first disaggregated estimation of the causal effects of a nationwide AES program on environmentally-relevant practices for a nationally representative sample. We study the AES program that has been implemented in France between 2000 and 2006 as part of the EU policy for rural development. The causal effect of the AES program is the average difference between practices of participants in the presence of the program and what their practices would have been had the program not been implemented. This counterfactual situation cannot be observed and intuitive approximations using non participants' practices or participants' practices before receiving the AES are plagued by large sources of bias (selection bias and time trend bias). To correct for these sources of bias, we use Difference-in-Difference (DID) matching. The main idea is to compare each participant to a non participant "twin" with the same observed characteristics. We combine matching with DID to correct for any remaining bias that may be due to unobserved variables. Our results suggest that the size of windfall effects of the AES programs depends on the specific prerequisites for each AES. For example, the AES supporting conversion to organic farming, which combined large payments with the strong requirement of not being an organic farmer when applying for the AES, have had negligible windfall effects. We cannot conclude on the extent of windfall effects of payments for extensive herding. We provide a first attempt to integrate the results of causal analysis in a cost-benefit evaluation of the AES. We argue that evaluation should be prepared at the same time the program is designed. This would improve the collection of data and enable using the first results of the evaluation to design the next program (by suppressing or altering the less efficient AES). Finally, this could allow for the implementation of experimental methods to evaluate policies that do not comply with the assumptions of DID-matching, like payments for extensive herding.