Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia
In: The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific
Preface -- Contents -- About the Editors -- Contributors -- 1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia -- 1.1 Controversies -- 1.2 Medieval Cooperation from Rival Perspectives -- 1.2.1 Two Research Programs -- 1.2.2 Constructivist Perspective -- 1.2.3 Rationalist Perspective -- 1.3 Rational Analyses of Contemporary Cooperation: An Overview -- 1.3.1 Security Cooperation and Conflict Management -- 1.3.2 Security Cooperation and Arms Control -- 1.3.3 Trade Cooperation -- 1.3.4 Currency Cooperation -- 1.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part I Security Cooperation and Conflict Management -- 2 Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Model -- 2.3 The Sequence of Moves and the Payoffs -- 2.4 Information Structure and Beliefs -- 2.5 Preliminaries -- 2.5.1 Intervention Decision of Japan -- 2.5.2 Resistance Decision of the U.S. -- 2.5.3 Initiation Decision of the Challenger -- 2.6 Equilibrium -- 2.6.1 Pooling Equilibrium -- 2.6.2 Separating Equilibria -- 2.7 Implications -- 2.7.1 Deterrence -- 2.7.2 Strategic Logic of Collective Self-Defense -- 2.7.3 Trust in Alliance Politics -- 2.8 Conclusion -- A.1 Appendix -- References -- 3 Information Sharing in Early Stage International Disputes: How China and Japan Communicate -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Theories on International Disputes -- 3.3 Grasping Early Stage International Disputes -- 3.4 A Model -- 3.5 Results -- 3.6 Illustration -- 3.7 Discussion -- References -- 4 Peacekeeping by the UN and Regional Organizations: Sharing the Burden or Passing the Buck? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 UN and Regional Peacekeeping Operations -- 4.2.1 Definitions -- 4.2.2 Determinants of Peacekeeping Missions -- 4.2.3 Troop Contributors -- 4.3 The Model -- 4.3.1 Players and Actions -- 4.3.2 Utilities and Preferences -- Disputants D and E