Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Elements of Lattice Games -- 2.1 Lattices -- 2.1.1 Partially Ordered Set -- 2.1.2 Join and Meet -- 2.1.3 Lattice -- 2.1.4 Interval -- 2.1.5 Complete Lattice -- 2.1.6 Lattice Set Order -- 2.1.7 Correspondence and Fixed Point -- 2.2 Lattice Game -- 2.2.1 Definition -- 2.2.2 Best Response -- 2.2.3 Nash Equilibrium Set -- 2.2.4 Dominance Solvability and Global Stability -- 2.2.5 Parameterized Lattice Games -- References -- 3 Games with Strategic Complements -- 3.1 Codirectional Incentives -- 3.1.1 Increasing Differences -- 3.1.2 Supermodular Function -- 3.1.3 Single Crossing Property -- 3.1.4 Quasisupermodular Function -- 3.1.5 Increasing Maximizers -- 3.2 Game with Strategic Complements -- 3.2.1 Definition -- 3.2.2 Increasing Best Response -- 3.2.3 Nash Equilibrium Set -- 3.2.4 Dominance Solvability and Global Stability -- 3.2.5 Monotone Comparative Statics of Equilibrium -- References -- 4 Games with Strategic Substitutes -- 4.1 Contradirectional Incentives -- 4.1.1 Decreasing Differences -- 4.1.2 Submodular Function -- 4.1.3 Dual Single Crossing Property -- 4.1.4 Quasisubmodular Function -- 4.1.5 Decreasing Maximizers -- 4.2 Game with Strategic Substitutes -- 4.2.1 Definition -- 4.2.2 Decreasing Best Response -- 4.2.3 Nash Equilibrium Set -- 4.2.4 Dominance Solvability and Global Stability -- 4.2.5 Monotone Comparative Statics of Equilibrium -- References -- 5 Monotone Games -- 5.1 Monotone Incentives -- 5.2 Monotone Game -- 5.2.1 Definition -- 5.2.2 Monotone Best Response -- 5.2.3 Nash Equilibrium Set -- 5.2.4 Dominance Solvability and Global Stability -- 5.2.5 Monotone Comparative Statics of Equilibrium -- References -- Index.

In competitive economies with private firm ownership, incomplete markets, and firm shareholders changing over time, several firm objectives have been proposed. Some are useful to understand efficiency of equilibria, and others are explicitly consistent with majority shareholder control or collective choice rules, but it is not always clear if versions of each type are consistent with versions of the other type. This paper shows that ex-post, value maximizing rules, (including those proposed by Dreze, and Grossman and Hart,) are consistent with shareholder preferences in such economies; that is, along the equilibrium path, in every period and state of the world, every coalition of a firm's shareholders in that period and state approves a value maximizing production plan. This result applies to cases when shareholders within a firm and across firms can form coalitions, and when stock trading can be ex-dividend or cum-dividend, and with a combination of both. This result does not resolve the problem of inefficiency of stock market equilibria, or that of ex ante disagreement among shareholders. It can help understand when firm objectives with some desirable properties are consistent with a particular version of shareholder control, and it provides a stability criterion (in terms of robustness to shareholder coalitions) for organizing productive resources in such economies.

This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. Compared to related models, this model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, it is shown that every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium. Therefore, bankruptcy can co-exist with smoothly functioning competitive markets in fairly general economies. Examples highlight some welfare effects of bankruptcy.