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Within the European Union, the Member States have generally retained powers in the field of direct taxation and use them to attract investment, thereby creating competition on the tax law market. In the past, this tax competition has taken the form of positive action by the Member States (e.g. introduction of favourable tax systems for certain categories of undertakings or activities) to which taxpayers responded by planning their activities. It can be seen that this tax competition has evolved in order to encompass a different form, characterised by a Member State's (too) passive attitude towards (aggressive) corporate tax planning. This contribution examines how the latter phenomenon of passive tax competition is addressed by European law and, in particular, by the rules on state aid which the Commission mobilised against it since 2013. This mobilisation has given rise to a number of criticisms that the Commission's actions imply a substantive misinterpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU and in particular of the requirement of selectivity that upsets the vertical and horizontal structure of the EU legal order. The purpose of this article is to analyse exclusively the merits of this wave of criticism and thus to assess the Commission's actions from an institutional point of view. ; Within the European Union, the Member States have generally retained the powers in the field of direct taxation and use them to attract investment, creating thus competition in the tax law market. In the past, this tax competition has in the form of positive actions by states (eg introduction of tax regimes favorable for certain categories of enterprises or activities) to which taxpayers reacted by planning their activities. We observe that this tax competition has evolved to encompass a different form, which is characterized by the (too) passive attitude of a member vis-à-vis the (aggressive) tax planning of companies. This contribution examines how this last phenomenon of passive tax competition is apprehended by European law and in ...

Au sein de l'Union Européenne, les Etats membres ont généralement conservé les compétences dans le domaine de la taxation directe et les utilisent pour attirer les investissements, créant ainsi une concurrence sur le marché du droit fiscal. Par le passé, cette concurrence fiscale s'est manifestée sous la forme d'actions positives des Etats (ex. introduction de régimes fiscaux favorables pour certaines catégories d'entreprises ou d'activités) auxquelles les contribuables réagissaient en planifiant leurs activités. On observe que cette concurrence fiscale a évolué afin d'englober une forme différente, qui se caractérise par l'attitude (trop) passive d'un Etat membre vis-à-vis de la planification fiscale (agressive) des entreprises. Cette contribution étudie la manière dont ce dernier phénomène de concurrence fiscale passive est appréhendé par le droit européen et en particulier par la réglementation sur les aides d'Etat que la Commission a mobilisée dès 2013 à son encontre. Cette mobilisation a suscité un nombre de critiques, selon lesquelles les actions de la Commission impliquent une interprétation erronée de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE sur le fond et en particulier de l'exigence de sélectivité qui bouleversent la structure verticale et horizontale de l'ordre juridique de l'UE. Le but du présent article est d'analyser exclusivement le bien-fondé de cette vague de critiques et, partant, d'évaluer les actions de la Commission d'un point de vue institutionnel. ; Within the European Union, the Member States have generally retained the powers in the field of direct taxation and use them to attract investment, creating thus competition in the tax law market. In the past, this tax competition has in the form of positive actions by states (eg introduction of tax regimes favorable for certain categories of enterprises or activities) to which taxpayers reacted by planning their activities. We observe that this tax competition has evolved to encompass a different form, which is characterized by the (too) passive attitude of a member vis-à-vis the (aggressive) tax planning of companies. This contribution examines how this last phenomenon of passive tax competition is apprehended by European law and in particular by state aid rules that the Commission mobilized in 2013 against it. This mobilization has given rise to a number criticism that the Commission's actions imply an erroneous interpretation Article 107 (1) TFEU on the merits and in particular the requirement of selectivity which upset the vertical and horizontal structure of the EU legal order. The purpose of this article is to analyze exclusively the merits of this wave of criticism and hence evaluate the actions of the Commission from an institutional point of view.

Au sein de l'Union Européenne, les Etats membres ont généralement conservé les compétences dans le domaine de la taxation directe et les utilisent pour attirer les investissements, créant ainsi une concurrence sur le marché du droit fiscal. Par le passé, cette concurrence fiscale s'est manifestée sous la forme d'actions positives des Etats (ex. introduction de régimes fiscaux favorables pour certaines catégories d'entreprises ou d'activités) auxquelles les contribuables réagissaient en planifiant leurs activités. On observe que cette concurrence fiscale a évolué afin d'englober une forme différente, qui se caractérise par l'attitude (trop) passive d'un Etat membre vis-à-vis de la planification fiscale (agressive) des entreprises. Cette contribution étudie la manière dont ce dernier phénomène de concurrence fiscale passive est appréhendé par le droit européen et en particulier par la réglementation sur les aides d'Etat que la Commission a mobilisée dès 2013 à son encontre. Cette mobilisation a suscité un nombre de critiques, selon lesquelles les actions de la Commission impliquent une interprétation erronée de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE sur le fond et en particulier de l'exigence de sélectivité qui bouleversent la structure verticale et horizontale de l'ordre juridique de l'UE. Le but du présent article est d'analyser exclusivement le bien-fondé de cette vague de critiques et, partant, d'évaluer les actions de la Commission d'un point de vue institutionnel. ; Within the European Union, the Member States have generally retained the powers in the field of direct taxation and use them to attract investment, creating thus competition in the tax law market. In the past, this tax competition has in the form of positive actions by states (eg introduction of tax regimes favorable for certain categories of enterprises or activities) to which taxpayers reacted by planning their activities. We observe that this tax competition has evolved to encompass a different form, which is characterized by the (too) passive attitude of a member vis-à-vis the (aggressive) tax planning of companies. This contribution examines how this last phenomenon of passive tax competition is apprehended by European law and in particular by state aid rules that the Commission mobilized in 2013 against it. This mobilization has given rise to a number criticism that the Commission's actions imply an erroneous interpretation Article 107 (1) TFEU on the merits and in particular the requirement of selectivity which upset the vertical and horizontal structure of the EU legal order. The purpose of this article is to analyze exclusively the merits of this wave of criticism and hence evaluate the actions of the Commission from an institutional point of view.

Depuis l'entrée en fonction de la Commission Juncker et la divulgation massive d'informations relatives à des rulings fiscaux par un consortium de journalistes, de nombreuses personnes et entreprises ont pris conscience de l'étendue du droit des aides d'État en matière fiscale et des conséquences financières de son application en termes de récupération.Ces développements en matière fiscale illustrent à nouveau la capacité de la Commission à mobiliser le droit des aides d'État au soutien d'une politique européenne, touchant ainsi à l'activité de certaines entreprises, et démontrant la nécessi