Suchergebnisse

In questo lavoro si fornisce un'introduzione al numero speciale che ha l'obiettivo di esaminare le caratteristiche e le criticità del sistema tributario in Italia, fornendo anche alcune proposte di revisione dell'attuale impianto che vede Irpef e Iva, tra le altre, come imposte protagoniste, seguite dall'imposizione sul patrimonio immobiliare, tipicamente di competenza locale. A questo proposito, si analizza anche il sistema di finanza territoriale, che sarà inevitabilmente coinvolto in qualsiasi tentativo di revisione del sistema tributario centrale. Un altro tema centrale nel dibattito nel nostro Paese riguarda la tassazione delle imprese digitali, con le relative implicazioni nel contesto internazionale. Infine, poiché il fenomeno dell'evasione fiscale è costantemente al centro dell'agenda politica dei Governi, ci si concentrerà anche su questo tema con l'idea che conoscere meglio l'evasione possa contribuire anche a ridurla.

Questo numero speciale ha l'obiettivo di esaminare le caratteristiche e le criticità del sistema tributario in Italia, fornendo alcune proposte di revisione dell'attuale impianto che vede Irpef e Iva come protagoniste, seguite dall'imposizione sul patrimonio immobiliare, tipicamente di competenza locale. Perciò, si analizza anche il sistema di finanza territoriale, che sarà inevitabilmente coinvolto in ogni tentativo di revisione del sistema tributario centrale. Un altro tema centrale nel dibattito riguarda la tassazione delle imprese digitali, con relative implicazioni nel contesto internazionale. Infine, poiché il fenomeno dell'evasione fiscale è costantemente al centro dell'agenda politica, ci si concentra su questa con l'idea che conoscerla meglio possa contribuire anche a ridurla.

Il lavoro analizza il comportamento opportunistico della burocrazia e gli effetti negativi che ne possono derivare per il settore pubblico, seguendo l'approccio della Public Choice. Tra i possibili rimedi all'inefficienza causata dalla burocrazia, focalizziamo l'attenzione sul ruolo giocato dall'avanzamento tecnologico. L'adozione di nuove procedure informatiche e la digitalizzazione della Pubblica Amministrazione, attraverso il cosiddetto e-government, possono offrire un valido supporto nel processo di snellimento della burocrazia. Questo percorso è già stato intrapreso da tutti i 193 Stati membri delle Nazioni Unite, in linea con gli obiettivi politici considerati di primaria importanza per il 2017.

This paper investigates whether rumours about Greek exit from the euro area have spilled over into other European countries' sovereign bond yields. Our empirical analysis is based on more than 64,000 daily news items on Grexit between December 2014 and October 2015. We build a Grexit intensity index based on the daily change of Grexit news items to capture policy uncertainty about the euro area break-up. Our results suggest that higher intensity of Grexit news drives up government bond yields in peripheral countries (Italy, Portugal, and Spain, excluding Ireland), but that there are no effects on core countries. The asymmetric reaction to Grexit news seems to support a more general 'market-based fiscal disciplining' mechanism at work in monetary unions.

Most of the empirical analysis explores the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth within an institutional void. This paper investigates the connection between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in different institutional settings in 21 OECD countries over the period 1970–2010. We find that the pro-growth effects of fiscal decentralization depend critically on the authority of sub-national governments: tax decentralization leads to higher (lower) rates of economic growth when coupled with high (low) administrative and political decentralization. Tax decentralization is more conducive for growth if sub-national taxes accrue mostly from autonomous revenues such as property taxes. Overall, this provides evidence of institutional complementarities at work among decentralization dimensions leading to relevant insights for policy implications.

Many industrialized countries have recently implemented fiscal decentralization reforms assigning more competences and spending responsibilities to sub-national governments. In this paper we investigate what leads to the decentralization of different categories of public expenditure in 19 developed countries over the period 1980-2006. Adopting a general-to specific empirical approach, we estimate different models for each of the spending functions under analysis. Our results confirm existing findings on the negative link between regional income disparities and expenditure decentralization. A similarly negative relationship is found for a set of demographic variables, leading to the conclusion that macroeconomic and, more importantly, political factors are the key to explain the recently increased decentralization levels in most industrialized countries. Finally, we complete our analysis by studying what determines the sub-national expenditure composition, finding that political and demographic changes are the most important factors in shaping the local spending mix.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the influence of regional economic disparities on the fiscal decentralisation processes in twenty-one OECD countries over the period 1981 to 2005. We use novel and robust measures of fiscal decentralisation based on different degrees of autonomy over both expenditures and taxes granted to subcentral governments. Our results show that high regional economic disparities call for lower fiscal decentralisation. This could be interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining process driven by the relative strength and different incentives of rich and poor regions. Moreover, the extent to which responsibility and decision powers are really left to subcentral governments appears to be crucial. Thus, from a positive point of view, equity considerations seem to suggest avoidance of fiscal decentralisation processes in countries with significant regional economic disparities, notwithstanding the well-known efficiency gains.

This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (tax-separation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes-mostly based on a "tax-separation" scheme-seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required. Adapted from the source document.