Suchergebnisse

A new contractarianism -- Arguing for contractarianism -- Sidestepping objections to contractarianism -- Political liberalism -- Legal liberalism -- The political status of sentient animals -- The legal status of sentient animals -- Conclusion -- Appendix A. Extant normative theories of legal personhood.

"This book argues that contractarianism is well suited as a political morality and explores the implications of deploying it in this way. It promises to revive contractarianism as a viable political theory, breaking it free from its Rawlsian moorings while taking seriously the long-standing objections to it. It's natural to think that the state owes things to its people: physical security, public health and sanitation services, and a functioning judiciary, for example. But is there a theory-a political morality-that can explain why this is so and who the state's people are? This new contractarianism deploys a reversed state of nature thought experiment as the starting point of political theorizing. From this starting point it develops a political morality: a theory of the common ground of the role moralities attached to the various roles within the state. Contractarianism, so understood, can provide a basis for already popular ideas in political theory-such as political and legal liberalism-and overturn conventional wisdom, for example that the state is obligated to secure justice and that animals should have no legal standing. Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral and political philosophy"--

How should we choose between competing explanatory stories? -- Against monism -- Against Rossian pluralism -- Non-Rossian pluralism -- The question of scope, part I: distributive moral concerns -- The question of scope, part II: non-distributive moral concerns -- Doing harm and failing to rescue -- The distribution of health care resources.

Explaining Right and Wrong aims to shake the foundations of contemporary ethics by showing that moral philosophers have been deploying a mistaken methodology in their efforts to figure out the truth about what we morally ought to do. Benjamin Sachs argues that moral theorizing makes sense only if it is conceived of as an explanatory project and carried out accordingly. The book goes on to show that the most prominent forms of moral monism--consequentialism, Kantianism, and contractarianism/contractualism--as well as Rossian pluralism, each face devastating explanatory objections. It offers in place of these flawed options a brand-new family of normative ethical theories, non-Rossian pluralism. It then argues that the best kind of non-Rossian pluralism will be spare; in particular, it will deny that an action can be wrong in virtue of constituting a failure to distribute welfare in a particular way or that an action can be wrong in virtue of constituting a failure to rescue. Furthermore, it also aims to show that a great deal of contemporary writing on the distribution of health care resources in cases of scarcity is targeted at questions that either have no answers at all or none that ordinary moral theorizing can uncover.

Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with collective bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to collective bargaining impedes unions' ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lowerand middle-income groups. This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize politically through the union form without also organizing economically for collective bargaining purposes. Doing so would have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts from the constraints of collective bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that would be necessary to enable such unbundled "political unions" to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the union context and suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem.