Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14763
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14763
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17042
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8506
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This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to "collude" to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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In: European journal of political economy, Band 79, S. 102445
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 51, S. 15-26
In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2018, 13: 1–36
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One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. Recent empirical findings show that binding term limits invalidate this result: democratic dyads in which at least one country imposes term limits on the executive are as conflict prone as autocratic and mixed dyads. Moreover, in democracies with two-term limits conflicts are more likely during the executive's second term. To rationalize these findings, we model international relations as a repeated prisoners' dilemma. We show that the fear of losing office makes democratic leaders less willing to start costly conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can run for re-election. Term limits thus make it harder to sustain peaceful relations.
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In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 427-462
ISSN: 1554-0634
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10873
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