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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- A Note on Terms and Transliteration -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Revolution and Transition -- 3 Khomeini's Theo-Political order -- 4 The Islamic Order under Khamenei: From Rafsanjani to Rouhani -- 5 Resource Capabilities -- 6 Regional Relations -- 7 Relations with Major Powers -- 8 Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contributors -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: The Middle East and North Africa: An Arena of Change and Transition? -- Part I: The Arab World: Prospects and Challenges in Transition -- Chapter 2: Prospects for Democratization in the Middle East Post-Arab Spring -- Introduction -- The Eruption of the Arab Spring: An Exploration of the Root Causes -- The Failure of the "Rentierism" Approach -- Differing Outcomes on the Political Transition Path -- From Revolutionary Fervor to Political Transition: The Case of Tunisia

Introduction -- From Empire to Islamic Republic -- The Islamic Order -- Rouhani's Presidency and US-Iranian Relations -- The Complex Road Ahead -- Conclusion

Intro -- Half title -- MUP ISLAMIC STUDIES SERIES -- Title page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part I -- A State in Limbo -- Part II -- State, Islam, Ethnicity and Insurgency in Afghanistan -- Mismatching Means and Ends: Strategic Failure in Afghanistan -- Part III -- Reconstruction: A Critical Assessment -- The New City of Kabul: Sustainable Peace and Growth Through Greater Kabul -- Part IV -- The Afghan People: Forgotten and Frustrated -- Prospects for Women: Gender and Social Justice -- Part V -- Australia's Political and Military Objectives1 -- Curiously Incurious: The Australian Media, the Australian Military and Afghanistan -- Public Opinion, Public Affairs and the ADF's war in Afghanistan -- Conclusion -- Imprint.

As two oil-rich states and significant members of OPEC, Iraq is in the grip of a devastating conflict and Saudi Arabia is confronted with a serious legitimacy crisis. They both face much uncertainty over the next few years, although from different sources and in different degrees. The world has been able to cope with Iraq being an erratic oil producer since 1991, with its production at times falling to negligible amounts. Saudi Arabia, however, has been towards the other end of the spectrum during the same period. It has been OPEC's largest and most stable pro-Western producer with a capacity to increase production whenever necessitated either to meet demand for more oil or to moderate oil prices to the extent required to maintain stability in the world market and economy. This can no longer be taken for granted. While international demand and oil prices have risen amid uncertainties about Iraq, sustained threat from international terrorism, technical problems such as the limited availability of shipping and accidental supply disruptions, soaring demand for energy in East Asia, and the incapacity of Russia to increase production, the Saudi political and security environment has correspondingly become a major source of growing concern. If this concern is not alleviated, the Iraqi situation is not stabilised and alternative sources are not found, the international oil market is likely to remain volatile. Oil prices at around $40-45 per barrel over the next three years are a possibility.

Ten years into the war on terror, the Karzai government and its international backers, namely the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), continue to face bleak prospects in Afghanistan. The country suffers from political uncertainty and instability, with a resurgent Taliban movement in control of vast swaths of territory. This article argues that five key factors have interacted inauspiciously to contribute to this situation-the mosaic nature of the Afghan society, an inappropriate political system which has subsequently led to poor governance, the flawed US and NATO political and military strat-egies, the prominence of Afghanistan's narcotics trade and a number of counter-systemic actors, chief among them being the Taliban. A change of US policy by placing a greater emphasis on reform, reconstruction and containment is needed if Afghanistan is to have a chance of getting out of its current deteriorating cycle of violence and bloodshed.

The Iranian leadership's handling of the dispute over the June 2009 presidential election not only bitterly alienated a sizeable proportion of the population; it also deeply split the ruling clerics. The government has lost the support of many ranking Islamist figures, whose continued backing is necessary to maintain its coherence and effectiveness, and its legitimacy has been eroded. If it fails to modify its authoritarian Islamist mindset and power structure to claw back some, if not all, of its lost clerical and public support, the scene is set for a greater popular backlash in the long run. The current turmoil, ostensibly sparked by the election results, stems from a confluence of factors, including growing public discontent with the regime's theocratic behaviour, economic mismanagement and foreign-policy embarrassments, especially since Ahmadinejad became president in 2005. These are symptomatic, however, of deeper structural problems in the nature of the Islamic government that has evolved in Iran.

This article focuses on the two political factions in Iran, the Jihadi (traditionalist combative) and the Ijithadi (creatively interpretive) and their competition and accommodation since the Revolution. The author argues that US-policy and developments in the region have favoured the Jihadis and enabled President Ahmadinejad to act more intransigently and assertively than would otherwise been the case. At a time of profound shift in the sectarian and strategic balance in the region, the challenge for the US and its allies is to widen the arena for Ijithadis within Iranian politics.

Ten years into the war on terror, the Karzai government and its international backers, namely the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), continue to face bleak prospects in Afghanistan. The country suffers from political uncertainty and instability, with a resurgent Taliban movement in control of vast swaths of territory. This article argues that five key factors have interacted inauspiciously to contribute to this situation-the mosaic nature of the Afghan society, an inappropriate political system which has subsequently led to poor governance, the flawed US and NATO political and military strat-egies, the prominence of Afghanistan's narcotics trade and a number of counter-systemic actors, chief among them being the Taliban. A change of US policy by placing a greater emphasis on reform, reconstruction and containment is needed if Afghanistan is to have a chance of getting out of its current deteriorating cycle of violence and bloodshed.