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AbstractPolitical machines use state resources to win elections in many developing democracies and electoral autocracies. Recent research has noted that the coordination of machine politics can be much more complex and problem-prone than previously thought. Yet, the role that the subnational political context plays in solving these coordination problems has largely been neglected in the comparative literature. This article seeks to fill this gap and suggests that control over the local administration is an important variable that shapes the effectiveness of authoritarian machine politics. We exploit the great institutional and political variation within one of the most prominent electoral authoritarian regimes of today, the Russian Federation, to test the empirical implications of the theory with detailed local level electoral and socio-economic data as well as multilevel regression models. The empirical results highlight the importance of subnational political structures in supporting electoral authoritarian regimes.

Die Wahlbeteiligung in Russland ist bei Präsidentschaftswahlen generell höher, als bei Parlamentswahlen. Allerdings bestehen auch unterhalb der nationalen Ebene, zwischen den Regionen sowie innerhalb dieser beträchtliche Unterschiede. Bei den Dumawahlen 2016 war die Wahlbeteiligung drastisch gesunken. Eine geringe Wahlbeteiligung kann selbst bei einem überwältigenden Sieg des Amtsinhabers die Legitimität des Wahlergebnisses beeinträchtigen und Unzufriedenheit in der Bevölkerung signalisieren. Eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben der russischen Regieru

Die Wahlbeteiligung in Russland ist bei Präsidentschaftswahlen generell höher, als bei Parlamentswahlen. Allerdings bestehen auch unterhalb der nationalen Ebene, zwischen den Regionen sowie innerhalb dieser beträchtliche Unterschiede. Bei den Dumawahlen 2016 war die Wahlbeteiligung drastisch gesunken. Eine geringe Wahlbeteiligung kann selbst bei einem überwältigenden Sieg des Amtsinhabers die Legitimität des Wahlergebnisses beeinträchtigen und Unzufriedenheit in der Bevölkerung signalisieren. Eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben der russischen Regierung bei den anstehenden Präsidentschaftswahlen von 2018 dürfte daher die Mobilisierung der Wähler sein.

Despite extensive research on electoral turnout in developed democracies, we know relatively little about the determinants of electoral participation in (electoral) autocracies. Yet, electoral mobilization is crucial to understanding electoral authoritarian regime dynamics and democratic regression. This article studies the 'socioeconomic roots' of electoral authoritarianism by using original local-level data from a prominent contemporary electoral authoritarian regime, Russia. The article shows how the electoral mobilization of certain institutionally and socioeconomically state-dependent demographic sectors was a key part in Russia's transition from a competitive to hegemonic authoritarian regime between 2000 and 2004. An original local-level data set allows us to test the hypotheses using multilevel models, controlling for several socioeconomic and contextual variables at both regional and local levels. The results support the hypotheses of electoral mobilization in specific demographic areas and show interesting variations in turnout patterns between the subnational units.

AbstractPrevious studies suggest that women are often perceived as less corrupt and more risk averse, possibly due to longstanding asymmetries in power and marginalization that reproduce certain gender stereotypes. However, much remains unclear regarding the origins of these perceptions. Why are some individuals and societies more prone to perceive women as less corrupt than men? We present the first cross‐country examination of these questions utilizing data from the latest wave of the World Values Survey, covering a total of 49 countries. Our results suggest that both perceived riskiness of corruption and attitude toward gender equality, in addition to the overall level of gender inequality in society, matter in explaining a stronger belief in gender differences in corruptness. However, the positive association between a higher perceived riskiness and the perception that women are less corrupt is mostly limited to societies with high levels of corruption and gender inequality.Related ArticlesCaillier, James. 2010. "Citizen Trust, Political Corruption, and Voting Behavior: Connecting the Dots." Politics & Policy 38(5): 1015–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00267.Malmberg, Fredrik G., and Henrik Serup Christensen. 2021. "Voting Women, Protesting Men: A Multilevel Analysis of Corruption, Gender, and Political Participation." Politics & Policy 49(1): 126–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12393.Tusalem, Rollin F. 2022. "Does Gendered Representation in National Legislatures Promote Substantive Representation and Human Development? Evidence from the Developing World." Politics & Policy 50(6): 1096–137. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12503.

AbstractHow might public policy changes affect electoral support for authoritarian regimes? Missing from the existing scholarship, which focuses mostly on regimes generating political budget cycles and manipulating electoral rules, is an exploration of how non-fiscal and non-electoral policies may impact incumbent support. We examine this issue with electoral and census data from one of the world's most prominent authoritarian regimes – Russia – to evaluate the regime's 2017 change to the policy governing native language instruction, which curtailed minority students' ability to learn their native languages and faced opposition in some ethnic regions. Examining panel data on presidential elections using fixed effects models, our results reveal that the regime's support decreased in titular minority areas in 2018. The results also indicate that some of these patterns emerged in previous national legislative elections and thus cannot be solely attributed to the policy change.