This paper discusses guilt and responsibility in Jaspers and Levinas. First, it explores the concept of guilt in Jaspers and shows that while "metaphysical guilt" deepens the existential dimension of human life it remains indifferent to the moral dimension of guilt and responsibility uncovered by Levinas. Second, the paper explores the notions of guiltless responsibility and unavoidable guilt in Levinas and shows that responsibility is not limited to specific wrongdoing or explicit acknowledgment of guilt. By drawing out these differences between Jaspers and Levinas, the author asks if Levinas's approach might provide illuminating guidance to talk about our guilt and responsibility for the Holocaust as well as other social events.
By distinguishing between space and place, the article situates and analyses the meaning of the closest place – home – in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. The effort to encounter transcendence, to escape, to leave, to not be attached a particular place, and not to be driven by a nostalgia to return, is dominant in Levinas's philosophy. This article shows that dwelling in a place, as settling in a home, also has a positive meaning for Levinas. This positive meaning comes, however, not from an ontological but from an ethical relationship with a place. The home is shown as chosen place, warm and human, as opposed to a given or natural place. On the one hand, the home is a necessary condition for security, but also the very condition of interiority and activity, of having the place in the world in contrast to thrownness. On the other hand, it is not a place where I is embodied and rooted in like a vegetable, but a place where I welcome the other.
The article peruses the idea that art, and more specifically, representation of the face, has something monstrous and uncanny in it. The author concentrates on Levinas's philosophy and shows that, first, art by giving the image to the face, freezes it in a plastic form and by this means turns it inevitably into a caricature. Second, face in art, unlike alive face, lacks temporality. What is lively, what is human expression is locked, not able to change, not exposed to vulnerability and therefore no longer is an ethical face of the Other. The article argues that Levinas does not reject the art but tries to re-locate it in a larger context of world: its meaning comes from being engaged in the word: social, cultural, political and above all ethical context.
The present article discusses the topics of war and peace in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It focuses on Totality and Infinity (1961) and aims to show that war here is presented as a suspension of morality. This article argues that on the one hand, war is understood as a historical event, and as an ontological principal on the other. In turn, peace is also understood ambiguously: first, as an opposition to war, and second, as an eschatology which is the true peace. The question of war and peace also reveals the problematic relationship between politics and ethics in Levinas's philosophy. These themes penetrate and frame the book. And, as totality is war and infinity is peace, the alternative title of Totality and Infinity might be War and Peace.
The present article discusses the topics of war and peace in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It focuses on Totality and Infinity (1961) and aims to show that war here is presented as a suspension of morality. This article argues that on the one hand, war is understood as a historical event, and as an ontological principal on the other. In turn, peace is also understood ambiguously: first, as an opposition to war, and second, as an eschatology which is the true peace. The question of war and peace also reveals the problematic relationship between politics and ethics in Levinas's philosophy. These themes penetrate and frame the book. And, as totality is war and infinity is peace, the alternative title of Totality and Infinity might be War and Peace.
[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English] The present article discusses the topics of war and peace in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It focuses onTotality and Infinity(1961) and aims to show that war here is presented as a suspension of morality. This article argues that on the one hand, war is understood as a historical event, and as an ontological principal on the other. In turn, peace is also understood ambiguously: first, as an opposition to war, and second, as an eschatology which is the true peace. The question of war and peace also reveals the problematic relationship between politics and ethics in Levinas's philosophy. These themes penetrate and frame the book. And, as totality is war and infinity is peace, the alternative title ofTotality and Infinitymight beWar and Peace. ; [straipsnis ir santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba] Šiame straipsnyje svarstoma karo ir taikos tema Emmanuelio Levino filosofijoje. Daugiausia dėmesio skiriama jo veikaluiTotalybė ir begalybė(1961) ir siekiama parodyti, kad Levinas karą supranta kaip moralės suspendavimą. Teigiama, kad Levino filosofijoje karas atsiskleidžia, viena vertus, kaip istorinis įvykis, o antra vertus– kaip ontologinis principas. Savo ruožtu taika taip pat suprantama nevienodai – ir kaip opozicija karui, ir kaip eschatologija. Karo ir taikos santykis taip pat atskleidžia politikos ir etikos santykio problemą Levino filosofijoje. Šios temos savotiškai įrėminaTotalybę ir begalybęir, jei totalybė yra karas, o begalybė – taika, alternatyvus šios knygos pavadinimas galėtų būtiKaras ir taika.
Straipsnyje aptariama Algio Mickūno kritika Emmanuelio Levino etinės filosofijos atžvilgiu, klausiant, ar radikalia išorybe paremtas mąstymas gali būti laikomas filosofija. Viena vertus, Mickūnas Levino fenomenologijoje įžvelgia spekuliatyvumo momentą, nuo filosofijos vedantį link teologijos. Antra, jis tvirtina, kad etinis santykis, esminis Levino mąstyme, galiausiai yra dar vienas ontologinis galios diskursas. Ši Mickūno kritika seka iš jo filosofijos sampratos, kuri atpalaiduojama tiek nuo transcendencijos mąstymo, tiek nuo Vakarų metafizikos apskritai. Laikomasi nuomonės, kad Levino filosofijoje transcendencija nėra tapati spekuliatyviosios teologijos Dievo sampratai. Teigiama, kad Levino filosofijoje ji nurodo į intersubjektyvų santykį, reikalaujantį fenomenologinės prieigos. Autorė gina požiūrį, kad Levino etinė metafizika nėra grindžiama galios santykiu, nėra ji ir Vakarų filosofijos atmetimas. Pripažįstant intersubjektyvumo svarbą, Levino filosofijoje veikiau atskleidžiamas gilesnis, etinis, metafizikos prasmės matmuo, taip drauge pagilinant pačią Vakarų filosofiją.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Levinas, Mickūnas, fenomenologija, metafizika, etika. E. Levinas and Legitimization of Ethical Philosophy – an Answer to A. MickūnasJolanta Saldukaitytė
Abstract This article presents counter-arguments to Algis Mickūnas's critique of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, delving into the question whether thinking based on radical exteriority can remain philosophy. First, Mickūnas argues that there is an erroneous speculation in Levinas's phenomenology which leads out of philosophy into theology. Second, he argues that the ethical relation, central to Levinas's thought, is but another ontological discourse of power. The present article shows that Mickūnas's criticism comes from his concept of philosophy which is free from transcendence as well as Western metaphysics. The author argues that the specific notion of transcendence in Levinas is not the same as is found in speculative theology, which is concerned with God, but is rather the one required by the pursuit of phenomenological research of inter-subjectivity to its limits. The author also argues that the ethical metaphysics defended by Levinas is not the discourse of power nor does it reject Western philosophy. Rather, by recognizing the full significance of inter-subjectivity deeper ethical dimension of meaning is revealed, and hence Western philosophy is deepend and Levinas kept within the bounds of philosophy. Keywords: Levinas, Mickūnas, phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics.
Straipsnyje svarstoma ontologinio skirtumo ir jo santykio su metafizika problema Heideggerio filosofijoje. Pirmiausia parodoma, kad ontologinis skirtumas yra metafizikos ištaka ir jos galimybė. Taip pat analizuojama, kokiu būdu Vakarų filosofijos tradicijoje buvo skiriama būtis ir esiniai ir kodėl Heideggeris tai vadina skirtumo užmarštimi. Svarstant tiesos, išsišakojančios į ontinę ir ontologinę, sampratą aiškinamasi, kaip tai atveria skirtumo pamatymo galimybę. Taip pat parodoma, kaip ontologinio skirtumo įžvalga ir ontologinės tiesos samprata pagrindo problemą leidžia iškelti iš naujo ir pagrindą pamatyti kaip bepagrindybę.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: ontologinis skirtumas, metafizika, tiesa, pagrindas.Ontological Difference and MetaphysicsJolanta Saldukaitytė SummaryThe problem of the "ontological difference" and its relation to metaphysics in Heidegger's philosophy is discussed. The ontological difference is presented as the origin of metaphysics and as its very possibility. In addition, the problem of how being and entities have been separated in the metaphysical tradition and why Heidegger calls this separation the "forgetfulness of difference" is analyzed. In contrast, conceiving the truth as arising from a split between the ontic and the ontological presents the possibility to see the ontological difference itself. An insight into the ontological difference and the conception of ontological truth open the possibility of re-wakening the Grundfrage, the question of ground, and to see the ground (reason) as an abyss (Ab-grund).Keywords: ontological difference, metaphysics, truth, ground.
The paper deals with the problem of ontological difference in the phenomenological context. The tradition of metaphysics was thinking in the perspective of the distinction between being and beings, but the difference itself wasn't thematized. According to Heidegger, the only problem of philosophy is being itself, so the question of being must be asked again, together with the unthought ontological difference. Firstly, Heidegger analyzes the problem of the ontological difference in terms of Kant, focusing on his thesis that being is not a real predicate. Then, the article demonstrates how explaining the problem of ontological difference is related to the conception of Dasein, the meaning of being, beings, and time. Dasein is a special being who knows the difference between being and beings. But the difference may be explained only if we know the meaning of being itself and the meaning of being of beings. Analysis shows that the meaning of being is seen as temporality. Temporality is also a condition of the ontological difference between being and beings as well.
