Suchergebnisse

Analyzing the East Timor conflict by way of applying William Zartman's notion of `ripeness' and John Burton's `basic human needs' not only proves indispensable for pointing out the personalities, forces and dynamics that might contribute to a negotiated outcome of the East Timor conflict, but also to how these notions might be applied to intractable conflicts more generally. This paper argues that a means of breaking out of the present impasse in negotiations concerning the East Timor conflict is to create what Zartman calls the `ripe moment'. It is argued that the missing ingredient for the `ripe moment' in the case of East Timor is what Zartman calls a `formula for a way out'. Central in the development of such a formula is that parties build upon `basic needs' which they mutually recognize - `Type 1 needs' - and defer to a later stage of negotiations those `basic needs' where disagreement is found - `Type needs'. After criticizing Burton's notion of basic needs and the distinction intended to deal with the criticism of Burton's theory, it is argued that the likely initiators of the `formula for the way out' in the case of the East Timor conflict are what are referred to as pro-autonomy East Timorese. The significance of developing such a formula lies in its potential to become a focus of negotiations between the Indonesian government and representatives of pro-autonomy East Timorese - negotiations that are supported by the international community and expatriate East Timorese political organizations.

Argues for the need for a formula, in which parties build upon mutually respected security, for a way out of the impasse in negotiations between the Indonesian government and representatives of pro-autonomy East Timorese; 1980s and 1990s, chiefly. Some focus on the East Timorese political parties and organizations, the Democratic Union of Timorese (UDT), Fretilin, the National Council of Maubere [Timorese] Resistance (CNRM), and the Coordinating Committee of the Diplomatic Front (CCFD).

Argues that readings of the Cold War's end as a triumph of Western values & strategies will strongly influence US policy reactions to political Islam, & the current academic essentialism-contingency debate offers no challenge to this. The essentialist camp (eg, Bernard Lewis, 1990) assumes that the Muslim world is to some degree historically & geographically unified by Islamic texts & language, while the contingency side (eg, Edward Said, 1978) holds that the forces behind political Islam are diverse & dependent on varied & changing circumstances. Both views are drawn on to assess the likely translation of Cold War terminology & thinking (eg, monolithic threat, proxy wars, norm opposition) to the US-political Islam relationship. It is concluded that the academic debate does not contest the notion that the ideas & discourse of political Islam are simply antithetical to liberal democracy. A convergence thesis capable of making such a challenge is proposed. Among other things, it allows an analysis of political Islam's theoretical critique of liberal democracy, an interpretation of political Islam as a competitive paradigm & its theoretical critique of liberal democracy & an understanding of its significance for internal (eg, Roman Catholic) critiques of Western liberal democracy. E. Blackwell

Argues that political Islam offers a challenge to liberal democratic norms, representing a regional variation of global religious revivalism, not a dangerous monolithic force to be contained.