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In this large-scale ISEAS study, Razeen Sally looks at Southeast Asia in the World Trade Organization, against the background of national trade policy trends post-Asian crisis, sluggish ASEAN economic integration, and the recent high-speed proliferation of bilateral and regional trade negotiations. ASEAN co-operation in the WTO has broken down, with little prospect of revival. Nevertheless, Sally argues forcefully that Southeast Asia needs a liberal, rules-based multilateral trading system; a

Book Cover; Title; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; The foundations of classical liberalism; What is classical liberalism?; The international political economy of David Hume and Adam Smith: commercial openness, institutional change and unilateral free trade; American excursions: Knight and Viner; The political economy of Frank Knight: classical liberalism from Chicago; Jacob Viner as historian of ideas and international political economist in the classical liberal tradition; German neoliberalism: Eucken, BOhm, ROpke

This paper interprets China's overall trade policy since its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) almost a decade ago, and more recently in the wake of the global economic crisis. The first section briefly summarises policy trends leading up to WTO accession, as well as recent trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns. The second section looks at China in the WTO: its record of implementing WTO commitments; its participation in the Doha Round; and in dispute settlement. The next section looks at China's trade-related reforms outside the WTO, especially unilateral measures and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Section Four highlights challenges for China's trade policy: in the context of domestic reforms; in the WTO; in PTAs; in its key bilateral relationships; and in the context of global macroeconomic tensions. Section Five puts Chinese trade policy in a bigger domestic political-economy and geopolitical context. Section Six concludes. (.)

The global economic crisis has sparked short-term divergence of economic performance between the West and emerging markets, and thereby accelerated the longer-run convergence of the latter on the former. This Shift to the East is also even more evident in international trade and FDI than it is in other channels of globalisation. But emerging markets' political and economic institutions, and intra-regional divisions, continue to hold back their rise. That means the Shift to the East will not translate into Chinese or other emerging-market leadership for a long time to come - if ever. The USA is still the fulcrum of international relations, and the world is far from being "post-American". Thus the economic shift to emerging markets, accelerated by the crisis, does not translate into a paradigmatic shift in global political-economic order. But it does insert more multipolarity and uncertainty into that order, and leaves more of a leadership vacuum. (.)

India, like China, had a "good" crisis; both have spearheaded exuberant post-crisis recovery in emerging markets. A combination of stable government and roaring growth gives rise to predictions that India will hit annual growth rates of 10 per cent or more. This is India hype. Reforms have stalled since 2004, with no prospect of big change. The combination of a barely-reforming government in Delhi and turbulent global economic conditions will make it difficult to maintain existing levels of growth. Geopolitically, India is a rising regional and global power, but it is still a second-tier emerging power, well behind China. Turning to trade policy: India's cumulatively substantial trade and FDI liberalisation has narrowed the gap with other developing countries. External protection is now much closer to Chinese and ASEAN levels. But that still leaves significant pockets of protection in agriculture, some industrial products and big-ticket services sectors. (.)