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The paper critically discusses some recent contributions to the literature that argue that Smith incorporated the needs of the poor within his account of justice. Three specific claims are examined and rejected: that Smith blurred the traditional distinction between perfect and imperfect rights; that he endorsed the doctrine of the right of necessity; and that he maintained that all people have a natural right to subsistence.

Hume's theory of justice is commonly regarded by contemporary theorists of justice as a theory of justice as mutual advantage. It is thus widely thought to manifest all the unattractive features of such theories: in particular, it is thought to endorse the exclusion of people with serious mental or physical disabilities from the scope and protection of justice and to justify the European expropriation of the lands of defenceless aboriginal people. I argue that this reading of Hume is mistaken. Mutual advantage is only part of Hume's theory, the part that explains the origins of the institutions of justice in a general sense (property and promise keeping), and it is bracketed off from those parts of Hume's theory that explain who is included within the scope of justice, how much each receives, and why and to whom we have a duty to be just. The interpretation of Hume's theory as a theory of justice as mutual advantage not only fails to convey Hume's complex purposes, but it portrays Hume's theory of justice as the kind of theory he was most concerned to refute.

In the theory of property, which he presented in his lectures in Glasgow in 1762–63, Adam Smith moved decisively against the ideas of his Scottish contemporaries and near contemporaries, particularly with respect to the elements of their theories they had inherited from Locke. This article explores the reasons behind this change in direction and discusses the use Smith made of Grotius' theory of property in reformulating his own ideas. I argue that Grotius' influence is evident in three features of Smith's theory: the account of property in the first age of society; the role of agreements in the subsequent development of property; and the nature and scope of natural rights.

Hugo Grotius's work has been misunderstood in regard to his ideas of private property. Grotius asserts that under the original grant of the world to mankind, everyone could take possession of what they needed, & if this is understood to be the same as property rights, then Henry Tuck is correct in saying it is a weak condition. The article instead argues that Grotius actually was referring to the consumption & physical possession of the fruits of the common, which is different from removing things from the common for private use. Therefore, the use of the common is categorically different from occupation, something that is very necessary. Therefore, Grotius's theories interact differently with those of Pufendorf & Locke. R. Larsen

This paper discusses how the adoption of a systematic risk management framework can enhance disaster management. In the analysis of risk, a focus on the interactions between sources of risk and elements at risk, rather than a pre‐occupation with hazards, adds more value to management. Vulnerability is the crucial modifier of consequences and, as such, its analysis highlights critical areas and opportunities for developing effective intervention strategies.Risk communication processes based on community involvement need to underpin the development and application of evaluation criteria to determine which risk treatments will be implemented. Closing considerations reflect on how risk management may be used within public administration to re‐define emergency management service provision. The paper concludes that Emergency Risk Management provides a framework which, by focusing on managing community exposure to major risks, facilitates the identification and implementation of intervention options which address socially significant problems.