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The possibility that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability poses a significant threat to the stability of the Middle East and a potential challenge to the long-term viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 2003, diplomatic efforts by the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) have succeeded in suspending the sensitive aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, but prospects for reaching a permanent agreement with the Iranian government are uncertain. If the EU-3 effort collapses, a number of policy options will be given more serious consideration, including sanctions

As the world focuses on Iraq, North Korea is seeking to expand its nuclear arsenal as quickly as possible. By summer 2003, barring major technical mishaps, North Korea will be able to extract enough plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for up to half a dozen nuclear weapons, to add to its current suspected stockpile of one or possibly two nuclear weapons. Over the next several years, North Korea could complete facilities capable of producing sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium for up to a dozen nuclear weapons annually. Options for dealing with this threat are limited. For now, at least, Washington's basic approach seems to be to ignore and downplay the North Korean threat as much as possible, while focusing its energies on Iraq. Once Iraq is out of the way, Washington will face an even greater challenge in overcoming internal divisions and designing an effective strategy to deal with North Korea, where military and political options are more limited and the adversary is more powerful. (Survival / SWP)

The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. Th

The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. Th.