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Previous scholarship describes an inconsistent role for democratic institutions in driving political participation. Some research has detected signs of attachment leading to greater engagement while others observe a negative, statistical relationship (Levi and Stoker, 2000). In the liberal and electoral democracies of Asia, where support for democratic values appears to be growing (Chu and Huang, 2010; Sanborn, 2015), institutions have taken an outsized role in an individual's decision to participate. This may be reflective of a 'broken back' form of democratization, where an engaged citizenry is continually frustrated by poor performing government actors (Rose and Shin, 2001). In this article, I evaluate the role of efficacy, internal and external, on the decision to attend rallies, participate in campaigns, and contact officials. I find that citizens engage in these actions when they are internally engaged in politics and frustrated with government performance. While this finding offers a simple explanation for the decision to participate, it also signifies the obstacles to democratic consolidation posed by poor-performing institutional actors.

In this article, we consider the attitudinal motivations for political participation in countries across Asia. Specifically, we assess how trust in different types of institutional actors provides incentives for extra-legal actions, such as protest and the use of force, by analyzing the behaviors of individuals based upon their evaluations of representational and implementing institutions. As part of this analysis, we consider attitudes and action in both democracies and non-democracies, arguing for separate mechanisms to motivate unconventional political participation. Using Asian Barometer Survey data, we find that individuals living under democratic regimes are motivated to engage in more costly forms of participation in response to their assessments of trust in elected officials, while those individuals residing in non-democracies engage in these high-risk activities when they are dissatisfied with the performance of the police, civil service, and courts.

What lessons can political science classes borrow from the humanities? This paper presents the results of a multi-year study on teaching about Asia as part of a general education program. Given the challenges of meeting common learning outcomes while also teaching discipline-specific lessons, political science courses often underperformed in assessments when compared to benchmark expectations. While our initial conclusion—that a greater focus on multimodal assignments would promote deeper learning and reflection—proved unfounded, explicitly emphasizing students' reflection on their own process of democratic engagement, in comparison to that of their counterparts in Asia, did seem to address the shortcomings of the previous approaches by giving students context and guidance in their understanding of how democracy works at home and abroad. Data from reflective essays, collected over two years, provide evidence for this finding.

Studies on what causes a state to democratize have focused on economic, social, and international factors. Many of them argue that higher levels of education should promote democracy. However, few articulate clearly how education affects democratization, and fewer still attempt to test the supposed link across time and space. This article fills that gap by considering how different levels of education influence democratization, and the conditions under which education is most likely to promote democracy. Analyses of eighty-five authoritarian spells from 1970 to 2008 find that higher levels of mass, primary, and tertiary education are robustly associated with democratization. Secondary analyses indicate that education is most effective in promoting democratization when both males and females are educated. An illustration from Tunisia follows. Adapted from the source document.

Studies on what causes a state to democratize have focused on economic, social, and international factors. Many of them argue that higher levels of education should promote democracy. However, few articulate clearly how education affects democratization, and fewer still attempt to test the supposed link across time and space. This article fills that gap by considering how different levels of education influence democratization, and the conditions under which education is most likely to promote democracy. Analyses of eighty-five authoritarian spells from 1970 to 2008 find that higher levels of mass, primary, and tertiary education are robustly associated with democratization. Secondary analyses indicate that education is most effective in promoting democratization when both males and females are educated. An illustration from Tunisia follows.

In America and Western Europe, legislatures preceded democratization and contributed to the establishment and maintenance of democratic regimes in the late 18th and the 19th centuries. In Central and Eastern Europe in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, legislatures and democratic regimes appeared simultaneously. In the first 15 years of post-Communist transitions in 12 countries, attachments to the new regimes have been influenced by their institutional structures, their economic performance, and their records in protecting human freedom, while attachment to the new parliaments have been predominantly influenced by cultural factors related to early life socialization including education, age, gender, social status, and attitudes toward the former communist regime. Attachment to parliament was a product more than a cause of attachment to the new regimes, but the parliamentary system of government created a context that contributed to citizens' attachment to their new political institutions. In that respect, attitudes toward parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe played a role similar to the role that these attitudes played in an earlier stage of democratization in Europe and North America, the role of attaching citizens to new political institutions.

We use an experiment built into a series of surveys of Iowa voters during the 2008 Iowa Caucus campaign to test the effect of differing group framing labels on immigration policy preferences. We find that certain framing labels matter, but only among Republican partisans for whom the immigration issue is important. We also find that issue importance produces more conservative policy preferences for Democrats as well as Republicans. We examine and discuss these results as well as their implications for the immigration debate, the interaction between issue salience and policy preferences, and the theory of political framing in general. Adapted from the source document.

Katz and Sala linked the development of committee property rights in the late-nineteenth-century U.S. House of Representatives to the introduction of the Australian ballot. If, as they posited, members sought personal reputations to carry them to reelection in the new electoral environment, the current article argues that behaviors with more immediate political payoffs also should have changed in ways their theory would predict. The article examines whether committee assignments, floor voting behavior, and the distribution of pork barrel projects changed in predicted ways and finds supportive outcomes, but usually only when the office bloc ballot, and not the party bloc ballot, was in use. Adapted from the source document.