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This paper presents a mechanism to mitigate the adverse consequences of the political budget cycle on social welfare. We use a simplified two-period version of Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80, 21-36.] rational budget cycle model to address the normative issue of reducing the budget deficit in pre-electoral periods. A regulation consisting of a sanction scheme contingent on fiscal policy joint with a fixed transfer is shown to provide the appropriate incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections. [Copyright 2007 Elsevier B.V.]

We argue that political competition based on income redistribution a la Lindbeck and Weibull (Public Choice 52:273-297, 1987) may cause distortive regulation in a competitive sector. For this purpose, we propose a model in which imposing a production quota allows the extraction of rents that are then used for vote-buying purposes. Our model permits us to analyze the response of regulatory policy to political factors, such as the size of a group of informed voters and the accuracy of their information about the incumbent. We also show that the extent of voter influence on policy outcomes is shaped by the state of market demand. In particular, if demand becomes weaker, market intervention increases in a magnitude that depends positively on the electoral weight of informed voters. Adapted from the source document.

In this work we assume the level of education as an indicator of political elite's quality. Our hypothesis is that legislators' education level in some of the Latin American countries has not a positive impact on the characteristics of democracy. Instead, under social & economic inequalities, a high level of education shows individual or collective privileges and, therefore, it does not have an effect on the general condition of social & political system. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the linear penalization to inflation found in Walsh (1995) is not the government's optimal choice when the fixed part of the transfer scheme is any given constant & the payment to the central bank represents a cost for the government. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

PurposeThis study verifies the influence of the dimensions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and consumer involvement on the identification of the individual with the company and the corporate reputation, moderated by the product category.Design/methodology/approachA covariance-based structural equation modelling is used to test the model, using a sample of 568 Argentine consumers. A multigroup analysis is employed to assess the moderating effect of the product category.FindingsCSR practices have heterogeneous influence based on their dimension, and this influence is moderated by the product category. Accordingly, environmental practices promote consumer identification with the company, whereas those economically oriented have a direct influence on reputation. In contrast, social practices contribute to reputation if they are connected to the business model.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is focussed on Argentina, analysing two product categories (laptops and financial services for final consumers) and using a large, but not strictly random, sample. In order to mainstream the results, it would be relevant to replicate the proposed model in other countries and with other product categories.Originality/valueIt provides information about the perception of consumers regarding the CSR practices from a multi-dimensional perspective, since they have an uneven effect on identification of consumer with the company and corporate reputation due to the moderating effect of the product category. The findings of this study may be relevant for managers of technology and banking service companies.