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Den vanskelige forsoningen mellom Kirken og taterne
In: Teologisk tidsskrift, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 83-85
ISSN: 1893-0271
Den økonomiske kirkefront – Hvordan fikk prestene lønn under krigen?
In: Tidsskrift for Teologi og Kirke, Band 82, Heft 4, S. 299-315
ISSN: 1504-2952
Sensitivity Analysis of Risk Tolerance
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 313-321
ISSN: 1545-8504
For a risk-averse decision maker with exponential utility facing a decision between two investments X and Y, there may exist more than one critical value of risk tolerance for which the decision is reversed from one investment to the other. Our main result establishes that if Y is preferred to X by all risk-seeking decision makers, then there is at most one such critical value. We extend this result to linear plus exponential utility functions. The results reduce the input required from a decision maker.
Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution
We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a good jobs' sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high.
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Good jobs, bad jobs and redistribution
We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a .good jobs. sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high. ; In dem Beitrag wird die Frage der optimalen Besteuerung in einer Wirtschaft mit zwei Sektoren untersucht, in der die Regierung an der Verteilung des Arbeitseinkommens interessiert ist. Einkommensungleichheit wird dann durch versunkene Kapitalinvestitionen verursacht, die einen Sektor mit .guten. Arbeitsplätzen schaffen, der durch die Aneignung von Quasi-Renten durch Gewerkschaften entsteht. Ob die Regierung Investitionen subventionieren oder besteuern soll, hängt entscheidend von der Verhandlungsst ärke der Gewerkschaften ab. Wenn die Gewerkschaften schwach sind, dann sieht die optimale Steuerpolitik eine Kombination aus Investitionssteuern und progressiver Einkommensbesteuerung vor. Im Falle von starken Gewerkschaften zeigt sich, daß die beste Handlungsalternative für die Regierung aus dem Einsatz von Subventionen in Kombination mit entweder progressiver oder proportionaler Besteuerung besteht, wobei die letztere dann optimal ist, wenn die Regierung nicht zu sehr an Ungleichheit interessiert ist und wenn die Kosten der Einkommensbesteuerung hinreichend hoch sind.
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