Book(print)#12005
Cash-flow risk, discount risk, and the value premium
In: NBER working paper series 11816
Search results
Filter
28 results
Sort by:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Article(electronic)#32015
Credit Booms: Implications for the Public and the Private Sector
In: BIS Working Paper No. 481
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Article(electronic)#4January 2006
Comment on: Credit risk transfer and contagion
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, p. 113-121
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Article(electronic)#8October 2006
Adaptive Organizations
In: Journal of political economy, Volume 114, Issue 5, p. 956-995
ISSN: 1537-534X
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Article(electronic)#92005
Cash-Flow Risk, Discount Risk, and the Value Premium
In: NBER Working Paper No. w11816
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Article(electronic)#10May 1, 2004
Referrals
In: American economic review, Volume 94, Issue 3, p. 499-525
ISSN: 1944-7981
This paper studies the matching of opportunities with talent when costly diagnosis confers an informational advantage to the agent undertaking it. When this agent is underqualified, adverse selection prevents efficient referrals through fixed-price contracts. Spot-market contracts that rely on income sharing can match opportunities with talent but induce a team-production problem which, if severe enough, can prevent the referral of valuable opportunities. Partnership contracts, in which agents agree in advance to the allocation of opportunities and of the revenues they generate, support referrals where the market cannot, but often at the expense of distortions on those opportunities that are not referred.
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Article(electronic)#12May 1, 2001
Financial Intermediation without Exclusivity
In: American economic review, Volume 91, Issue 2, p. 436-439
ISSN: 1944-7981
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
Article(electronic)#132017
Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23599
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Article(electronic)#142017
Institutions and Political Party Systems: The Euro Case
In: PIER Working Paper No. 17-014
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN
Working paper
Article(electronic)#152023
Destabilizing Digital 'Bank Walks'
In: George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy & the State Working Paper No. 328
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print
SSRN