THIS ESSAY OFFERS AN EXAMINATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE CARTER APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE AUTHOR FINDS THAT CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON AND LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE PRESENTLY WEAK. HE ARGUES THAT MORE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP WILL PRODUCE CLEAR DEFINITION OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES.
Burton M. Sapin is dean emeritus of the Elliott School of International Relations, the George Washington University, and coauthor of the seminal workForeign Policy Decision Making.
US foreign & domestic security policies in the post-WWII period are reviewed, arguing that their consequences, both pleasant & unpleasant, have been largely unanticipated &, at times, costly, particularly those dealing with the Third World. Specific instances of policy failures in less- & underdeveloped countries are cited, arguing that they were often based on oversimplistic assumptions or superficial analyses. Future policy making with respect to US involvement in this area must be more firmly grounded in the surety that national interests are at stake & that specific objectives can be accomplished. Situations where this has not been the case have resulted in the US being tragically overinvolved (Vietnam) or insufficiently devoting necessary resources (eg, economies vulnerable to collapse). It is argued that the current George Bush administration's foreign policy serves primarily rhetorical goals; new terrorism policies are cited as examples. In terms of foreign policy & international politics, there are too many uncertainties & complexities to rush ahead blindly without adequate critical review & skeptical analysis. K. Hyatt Stewart
The failures of process and judgment that help explain the war in Iraq are varied. Established patterns of policy making were overshadowed by mechanisms operating outside the formal system, notably by Vice President Richard Chaney. Also, an arrogant defense secretary overpowered senior military officers as well as the Department of State and its secretary. While it is difficult for Congress to constrain a president once a major military enterprise has been approved, Congress has been even more compliant that usual in this case. There are no panaceas, but manageable changes can strengthen the system and make another Iraq far less likely. The roles of the secretary of state and national security adviser need to be strengthened, and career military officers and civil servants must be encouraged and supported in their efforts to offer independent views to the political leadership. Most important is a policy environment open to varied perspectives rather than driven by narrow dogma.
