Introduction to the 1st edition -- Introduction to the 2nd edition -- Conception among the anthropologists -- Contested conceptions in the enterprise culture -- The 'obstacle course': the reproductive work of IVF -- 'It just takes over': IVF as a 'way of life' -- 'Having to try 'and 'having to choose': how IVF 'makes sense' -- The embodiment of progress -- Afterword.
Thirty-five years after its initial success as a form of technologically assisted human reproduction, and five million miracle babies later, in vitro fertilization (IVF) has become a routine procedure worldwide. In Biological Relatives, Sarah Franklin explores how the normalization of IVF has changed how both technology and biology are understood. Drawing on anthropology, feminist theory, and science studies, Franklin charts the evolution of IVF from an experimental research technique into a global technological platform used for a wide variety of applications, including genetic diagnosis, livestock breeding, cloning, and stem cell research. She contends that despite its ubiquity, IVF remains a highly paradoxical technology that confirms the relative and contingent nature of biology while creating new biological relatives.
Thirty-five years after its initial success as a form of technologically assisted human reproduction, and five million miracle babies later, in vitro fertilization (IVF) has become a routine procedure worldwide. In Biological Relatives, Sarah Franklin explores how the normalization of IVF has changed how both technology and biology are understood. Drawing on anthropology, feminist theory, and science studies, Franklin charts the evolution of IVF from an experimental research technique into a global technological platform used for a wide variety of applications, including genetic diagnosis, livestock breeding, cloning, and stem cell research. She contends that despite its ubiquity, IVF remains a highly paradoxical technology that confirms the relative and contingent nature of biology while creating new biological relatives. Using IVF as a lens, Franklin presents a bold and lucid thesis linking technologies of gender and sex to reproductive biomedicine, contemporary bioinnovation, and the future of kinship. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.
AbstractAt a crucial meeting during their proceedings, on 9 November 1983, the sixteen members of Britain's influential Warnock Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology reached a key decision on how to base proposals for comprehensive legislation governing this largely uncharted territory. Famously, they chose the formation of the "primitive streak" in the early embryo as the basis for the fourteen-day rule that has now served as the global benchmark for experimental research in this area for nearly thirty years. Based on newly available archival material and interviews, this article offers a sociological account of the ways in which a specific translation of biological facts became the basis for an enduring social contract governing controversial bioinnovation in the UK. In particular, the combined roles of Committee Chair Mary Warnock and biologist Anne McLaren are examined in terms of how a decision, or "iterative settlement," was reached as to "where to draw the line" using specific "developmental landmarks" to establish a basis for legal regulation. Drawing from this analysis, I offer a broader argument concerning the sociology of biological translation and biogovernance that is germane to ongoing debates such that over how to limit CRISPR-Cas 9 gene editing. I contend also that we have yet to fully grasp the historical and sociological lessons to be drawn from the early histories of establishing governance over new forms of technological assistance to human reproduction, and in particular the formation of the "Warnock Consensus."
This paper explores two different but interlinked and contemporaneous debates over reproductive politics in which we can observe at least three distinct combinations of time. In the first part, I describe the shift in the 1980s to a 'biologized' time by British Christian Right‐to‐Life groups, who began to use a secularized ontogeny to promote and defend a religious definition of 'the way, the truth, and the life' – an altered 'theo‐ontology' based on the equivalence of the absolute value of human life, the truth (of biological life), and faith in Christ (as everlasting life). In the second part, I describe a differently 'remixed', and opposing, ontology (secular and semi‐secular, using a hybrid bio‐legal chronometry but orientated toward the timeless horizon of progress) that characterized the debate over the future of in vitro fertilization in the same period, leading up to the adoption of the first Human Fertilization and Embryology (HFE) Act in the UK in 1990. In the third part, I examine the legacy of these debates insofar as they are evident in the more recent political conflicts accompanying passage of an amended HFE Act in 2008 and the debate over so‐called 'cybrid embryos'. These episodes reveal how social movements 'are profoundly shaped by mediations and conflicts between diverse representations, technologies, social disciplines and rhythms of time'. I argue that the varied constructions of temporality in reproductive politics evident in these three distinct episodes are crucial to anthropological understandings of the meaning of 'biological control' in the context of stem cell research, cloning, tissue engineering, and reproductive biomedicine.
One of the most important lessons the work of Marilyn Strathern has taught us about knowledge practices is how they stand alone or intersect according to their context. In turn, this has helped us to develop a more dynamic account of knowledge formations as they both travel and stand still. Indeed it is the vacillation between movement and stasis that explains how essentialisms can either anchor cultural systems of thought or become unmoored – a process Strathern has tracked across both cultural and epistemological contexts. In this paper I use the biological sciences as a context in which to track the process by which analogies 'travel back' to remake both their object and its epistemology, or 'habits of thought'. Indeed, context itself can change, and be changed by, what I am calling analogic return – something we might also consider in relation to scale or perception, or as one of the world-making practices out of which we constantly remake ourselves, now more literally than ever in the context of new genetic technologies and stem cell science.