Suchergebnisse

This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communication in the presence of typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.

This paper examines the relationship between the bundling decision of a large firm and the impact of spillovers from smaller firms drawing on stylized facts from the software industry. We find that bundling occurs only in the presence of significant spillovers from the two smaller firms. The large firm does not bundle when there are spillovers for only one product. Finally, we show that welfare is higher under bundling.