Suchergebnisse

Not one inch eastwards - nicht einen Schritt weiter nach Osten. Mit diesen Worten schlug US-Außenminister James Baker Gorbatschow im Rahmen der Verhandlungen um die deutsche Wiedervereinigung einen hypothetischen Handel vor: Ihr gebt euren Teil Deutschlands frei, wir verrücken die Nato nicht nach Osten. Seitdem ranken sich um dieses Gespräch zahlreiche Legenden und Kontroversen. Gab es ein Versprechen des Westens, sich nicht auszudehnen? Und wie kam es zu der heute so umstrittenen Nato-Osterweiterung? Mary Elise Sarotte hat Unmengen von Archivmaterial durchforstet, um eine der großen politischen Streitfragen unserer Zeit zu klären. In ihrem grundlegenden Buch führt sie in das entscheidende Jahrzehnt zwischen dem Mauerfall und dem Aufstieg Putins. Dabei zeigt sie, warum es nicht zu einer neuen Sicherheitsarchitektur für Europa kam und wie damals die Saat gelegt wurde für die Spannungen, die unsere heutige Welt bestimmen. Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges träumten viele von einem «gemeinsamen Haus Europa», vom «Ende der Geschichte» und vom Anbruch eines friedlichen Zeitalters. Doch schon bald verdüsterte sich das Bild. Die Sowjetunion zerfiel im Dezember 1991 und hinterließ ein Machtvakuum. Moskaus blutiger Krieg in Tschetschenien verunsicherte seit 1994 Beobachter im Westen, vor allem aber auch in den Nachfolgestaaten des Warschauer Paktes. So setzten sich in Washington schließlich die Befürworter der Nato-Osterweiterung durch. Am Ende war Europa erneut von einer klaren Trennlinie durchzogen, die Mitglieder von Nicht-Mitgliedern trennte. Nur lag diese Linie jetzt einige hundert Kilometer weiter östlich. Wer es in die Nato geschafft hatte, befand sich in Sicherheit. Doch insbesondere für die Ukraine wurde es dadurch schwieriger, sich aus dem russischen Orbit zu lösen. Mary Elise Sarotte erzählt, wie die Entscheidung für die Nato-Osterweiterung zustande kam, und fragt, ob es Alternativen gegeben hätte. Dabei zeigt sie, wie spannend Geschichte sein kann, wenn man es versteht, sie packend zu erzählen.

Not one inch. With these words, Secretary of State James Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after the fall of the Berlin Wall: if you let your part of Germany go, we will move NATO not one inch eastward. Controversy erupted almost immediately over this 1990 exchange-but more important was the decade to come, when the words took on new meaning. Gorbachev let his Germany go, but Washington rethought the bargain, not least after the Soviet Union's own collapse in December 1991. Washington realized it could not just win big but win bigger. Not one inch of territory needed to be off limits to NATO.0 On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet collapse, this book uses new evidence and interviews to show how, in the decade that culminated in Vladimir Putin's rise to power, the United States and Russia undermined a potentially lasting partnership. Prize-winning historian M. E. Sarotte shows what went wrong

"In The Collapse historian Mary Elise Sarotte shows that the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, was not, as is commonly believed, the East German government's deliberate concession to outside influence. It was an accident. A carelessly worded memo written by mid-level bureaucrats, a bumbling press conference given by an inept member of the East German Politburo, the negligence of government leaders, the bravery of ordinary people in East and West Berlin--these combined to bring about the end of nearly forty years of oppression, fear, and enmity in divided Berlin. Drawing on evidence from archives in multiple countries and languages, along with dozens of interviews with key actors, The Collapse is the definitive account of the event that brought down the East German Politburo and came to represent the final collapse of the Cold War order"--

This essay is one of ten in a special journal issue discussing a 2002 article, "Power and Weakness" by Robert Kagan, which assessed the structural underpinnings of foreign relations between the United States and Europe. Kagan's observations formed a double argument: First, that the relative power of the United States and the relative weakness of Europe frame the way Americans and Europeans approach international politics; and second, that ideas about the efficacy of power also shape the extent to which one pursues and uses it. Adapted from the source document.

Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided "to bribe the Soviets out," as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward. The goal was to establish NATO as the main post–Cold War security institution before alternative structures could arise and potentially diminish U.S. influence. Admirers of a muscular U.S. foreign policy and of NATO will view this strategy as sound; critics will note that it alienated Russia and made NATO's later expansion possible. Either way, this finding challenges the scholarly view that the United States sought to integrate its former superpower enemy into postconflict structures after the end of the Cold War.