Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction -- I. International Investment Law: From Good Governance for Foreign Investors to Good Governance for All -- II. Conceptual Framework -- III. Outline of Chapters -- 2. Genesis of 'Good Governance' Narratives in International Investment Law and Scholarship: An Historical and Doctrinal Analysis -- I. Conceptual Inspirations behind the Good Governance Narratives of Investment Treaty Law -- II. Embodiments of Good Governance Precepts in Investment Treaty Law -- III. Competing Visions of Investment Treaty Law and its Good Governance Promise -- IV. Conclusion -- 3. How Do Host States Respond to Investment Treaty Law? -- I. The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Governance in Host States: Key Empirical Questions -- II. Methodology -- III. Are Government Officials Aware of International Investment Law and its Good Governance Prescriptions? -- IV. How Host States 'Learn' from Investment Arbitration -- V. Negative Internalisation: Over-protection and Withdrawal -- VI. Internalising Investment Treaty Prescriptions: Why, at Whose Behest and What Cost? -- VII. Conclusion -- 4. The Role of Remedy Design in Inducing Host States to Comply with Investment Treaty Standards of Good Governance -- I. Damages as a Principal Form of Relief for an Investment Treaty Breach -- II. Can State Compliance with Good Governance Standards be Fostered through Monetary Sanctions? -- III. The Design of Investment Treaty Remedies and State Compliance with Good Governance Standards: -- A Functional Analysis -- IV. Compliance and Optimal Remedy Design: Punitive, Non-pecuniary, Multi-tiered? -- V. Conclusion -- 5. Investment Treaty Law and its Internal Capacity to Foster Good Governance in Host States -- I. Is the Investment Treaty Regime Compliant with Good Governance Standards? -- II. Legitimacy and 'Compliance Pull': (Insufficient) Transparency and Coherence of Investment Treaty Rules -- and Arbitral Jurisprudence -- III. Internationalisation of Investment Law and its (Disempowering) Effects on Governance in Host States -- IV. Good Governance as a Two-way Street: Dealing with Investor Misconduct in Treaty Practice and Arbitration -- V. Conclusion -- 6. International Investment Law and its Anti-participatory Animus -- I. The Investment Treaty Regime and Its Disregard for the Political and Social Interfaces of Development -- II. Foreign Investors and the Domestic Political Process -- III. Developing Countries and the Making of International Investment Law: Lack of Participation and Inclusivity -- IV. Lack of Stakeholder Input in the Making of Investment Treaties in Developed Countries -- V. Conclusion -- 7. Conclusion

This article examines the key pillars of the EU's open strategic autonomy with a focus on its foreign investment policy. It explores three dimensions the EU's investment policy: 1) the creation of the EU-wide FDI screening framework, 2) the proposal of new investigative and enforcement powers in relation to foreign investment subsidies, and 3) the proposal of new mechanisms to enforce EU values on sustainability, including human rights, environment and labour standards. The overarching objective is to unveil the forces at play in the making of EU investment policy and to interrogate the shifting attitudes towards trade and investment in times marked by geopolitical tensions and economic security concerns.
open strategic autonomy, EU investment law, foreign investment policy, foreign investment subsidies

Abstract
For those on the ground, conflict brings about devastation and displacement. For foreign investors who frequently seek commercial opportunities far and wide, conflict is not just a fellow traveller but also a crucial element of the environment in which international investment law was conceived and later took shape. This review essay seeks to uncover some of the fundamental and overarching themes underpinning the relationships between foreign corporations, states and local communities in times of conflict. By focusing on the distinct roles played by the corporation in situations of conflict – as a victim, contributor, beneficiary, perpetrator and accomplice – the essay aims to cast light on international law's troublesome origins, biases and complicities and to highlight a growing concern over the enduring lack of effective avenues for corporate accountability.

This article will examine the evolving attitudes to the exhaustion of local remedies requirement and its waiver in investment treaty instruments through the prism of inequalities of power between different states and the role of international law in entrenching such inequalities. Focusing on the recent proposal by the European Parliament to re-introduce the exhaustion of remedies requirement in European BITs, this article seeks to demonstrate that, just like in general international law and despite the traditional claims of neutrality and depoliticization, inequalities of power continue to influence the making of investment treaty norms and hold sway over the settlement of investment disputes. Lest its long-term sustainability and credibility is undermined by the existing distortions in investment treaty policy and arbitral practice, the institute investor-state arbitration should be reinvigorated through a greater push for reciprocity in the relationship between international tribunals and national courts in developed and developing states alike.

Prior to the rise of international investment treaties and institutionalization of investor–state arbitration, the protection of foreign investors from mistreatment in the host state courts was the preserve of customary international law, which prohibited a denial of justice and provided for diplomatic protection as a principal means of dispute settlement. In contrast, contemporary international investment law offers a whole array of legal standards that can be invoked in seeking redress for the acts of national courts before international arbitral tribunals. In addition to relying on the customary prohibition of denial of justice, investors can challenge judicial conduct under the treaty standards on expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and, in some cases, the obligation to ensure effective means of asserting claims. Although the multiplicity of standards available to aggrieved investors can be regarded as an inalienable part of an effective regime for the protection of foreign investment, it also gives rise to a number of fundamental problems relating to the application of procedural mechanisms designed to control the review of the conduct of national judiciary by international courts and tribunals. Focusing on arbitral cases in which claims of a denial of justice were brought under the rubric of 'a judicial expropriation' and 'a failure to provide effective means of asserting claims', this article seeks to ascertain when investor claims relating to the administration of justice in the host state courts become amenable to arbitral scrutiny. It argues that, by providing a variety of standards under which the acts of judiciary can be challenged, investment treaty law allows investors to circumvent procedural barriers and thus muddles the boundaries demarcating the scope of international review of national judicial conduct.