Suchergebnisse

AbstractWhen the Biden administration came to power, the hope was that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (2015), the so‐called Iran nuclear deal, would be restored. Due to domestic constraints and in the case of Iran also a valid alternative, both the US and the Rohani administration played hardball during the negotiations. As the Iranian nuclear program further advanced and the ties with Russia and China became stronger, the conservative Raisi administration was even less interested in reviving the nuclear deal. What remains are mini‐deals that are more advantageous for Iran than for the US. Billions of dollars of Iran are (or will be) unfrozen by the US, while Iran's break‐out time of its nuclear program has shrunk to zero days. Given that the overall goal of the international community (and especially the US) was to prevent Iran from building the bomb, one can only conclude that that policy has basically failed. Although Teheran has not built the bomb yet, it is now closer to the bomb than ever. Liberal theory and more in particular Putnam's two‐level game help explain this outcome.

Analysing the alliance system in Europe and Asia in a comparative perspective also demands having a look at the specific role of nuclear weapons in the defence doctrines, and more in particular the role of US extended nuclear deterrence. The main question that this article wants to resolve is: what are the similarities and differences in both regions with respect to extended nuclear deterrence? This (comparative) descriptive analysis is complimented with the following predictive question: which trends in both regions make it likely that extended nuclear deterrence will be strengthened, weakened, or maybe completely disappear? To answer these questions, the following structure is followed: first, the concept of extended nuclear deterrence will be described; next, this concept of extended nuclear deterrence will be applied to Europe and Asia; lastly, three trends that have an impact on the current debate on extended nuclear deterrence are analysed: 1) the deteriorating security situation; 2) the changing balance of power, and more in particular the relative decline of the US and the rise of China; and 3) the evolving nuclear arms control and disarmament regime, including the arrival of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). (Asian Aff/GIGA)

AbstractThis article attempts to discover why states have chosen to co‐ordinate within ad hoc informal international organizations instead or on top of formal ones, in order to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis in the period 2003–15. Three informal groups of states – the E3 (France, Germany and the UK), the EU‐3 (the E3 + the EU High Representative), and the EU‐3 + 3 (the EU‐3 + the US, Russia, and China) – are widely seen as having contributed to the diplomatic solution. Empirically, one can wonder why formal international organizations like the UN, the IAEA and the EU were not able to do the wheeling and dealing by themselves in the case of the Iranian nuclear conflict. From a theoretical perspective, this article highlights the role of informal international organizations, a subject that is under‐researched both in EU and International Relations studies. It will argue that these temporary informal international organizations have three advantages: no (or less) bureaucracy, speed, and the ability to buy time for more important diplomatic actors like major states or formal international organizations.

AbstractThe relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imaginable: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post‐Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro‐Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine.