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Am 9. März 2017 hat der Bundestag die 9. Novelle des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) mit neuen Regeln zur Fusionskontrolle verabschiedet. Die Novelle sieht unter anderem die Einführung erweiterter Aufgreifkriterien vor. Diese neuen Kriterien sollen insbesondere der zunehmenden Digitalisierung der Wirtschaft Rechnung tragen. So soll die Fusionskontrolle auch in Märkten angewendet werden können, in denen zwar nur geringe Umsätze generiert werden, die jedoch hohe Unternehmenskaufpreise gepaart mit starken Netzwerkeffekten und schädlichen Konzentrationsentwicklungen aufweisen. Daher wird insbesondere ein neues Kaufpreiskriterium eingeführt. ; The Ninth amendment of the German Competition Act introduces new merger control thresholds. These thresholds are designed to close an enforcement gap that is especially found in parts of the digital economy. As the takeover of Facebook and WhatsApp revealed, traditional turnover-based thresholds are inapplicable to business models prevalent in some parts of the digital economy. The amendment addresses these limitations and specifically introduces a transaction value-based threshold that will enable the Federal Competition Authority to carry out merger control in certain mergers with high transaction values and low turnovers.

Seit einigen Jahren werden bei Fusionskontrollverfahren international verstärkt neue Methoden der quantitativen ökonomischen Analyse angewandt. Mit diesen Verfahren können neue Argumente Einzug in Fusionskontrollentscheidungen erhalten und traditionelle Ansätze der Fusionskontrolle bereichern. Dabei basieren die Verfahren verstärkt auf betriebs- und volkswirtschaftlichen Daten und Methoden. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt daher diese neuen Methoden, den UPP-Test, den GUPPI-Test, den IPR-Test und Merger-Simulationsverfahren vor und erläutert ihre Eignung für Fusionskontrollentscheidungen. Dabei wird ein Vergleich der Verfahren hinsichtlich ihrer Einsetzbarkeit vorgenommen. Schließlich werden bisherige Anwendungsfälle vorgestellt.
In recent years innovative quantitative methods were introduced in international merger control procedures, giving rise to a stronger focus on economic theory and managerial data. Therefore, in this article these new methods, the UPP-Test, the GUPPI-Test, the IPR-Test and merger simulations are discussed and evaluated. One particular focus of this analysis is the suitability of these tests given the restrictions of typical merger control procedures.
Keywords: pricing pressure, merger simulation, diversion ratio

This unit was published in "International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks" Błachucki, M., ed., (2020). The acquistion of WhatsApp by Facebook in 2014 revealed that the internationally prevalent system of turnover-based merger control thresholds was struggling to cope with cases in the digital world in which merging parties, typically acquisition targets, do not generate sufficient turnover to fall under turnover thresholds of international merger control regimes. The German and Austrian legislators reacted by introducing new size of transaction tests in their merger control thresholds, with the German and Austrian competition authorities issuing respective guidelines in 2017/2018. In various jurisdictions and at the EU level, the question arose whether such thresholds should also be introduced, or whether it will suffice if Germany and Austria could control high value low turnover transactions and could refer them to the EU level under the existing EU Merger Regulation's referral mechanism. This article sheds light on this debate. It explains the details of the German and Austrian size of transaction tests and the joint German-Austrian guidelines, and analyses how they, and the typical transaction value merger cases, fit into the referral mechanism of the EU Merger Regulation.

This unit was published in "International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks" Błachucki, M., ed., (2020). The acquistion of WhatsApp by Facebook in 2014 revealed that the internationally prevalent system of turnover-based merger control thresholds was struggling to cope with cases in the digital world in which merging parties, typically acquisition targets, do not generate sufficient turnover to fall under turnover thresholds of international merger control regimes. The German and Austrian legislators reacted by introducing new size of transaction tests in their merger control thresholds, with the German and Austrian competition authorities issuing respective guidelines in 2017/2018. In various jurisdictions and at the EU level, the question arose whether such thresholds should also be introduced, or whether it will suffice if Germany and Austria could control high value low turnover transactions and could refer them to the EU level under the existing EU Merger Regulation's referral mechanism. This article sheds light on this debate. It explains the details of the German and Austrian size of transaction tests and the joint German-Austrian guidelines, and analyses how they, and the typical transaction value merger cases, fit into the referral mechanism of the EU Merger Regulation.