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Intro -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acronyms -- Contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- 1. Richard Saunders - Introduction: The Many Facets of Marange's Diamonds -- 2. Richard Saunders - Geologies of Power: Conflict Diamonds, Security Politics and Zimbabwe's Troubled Transition -- 3. Alan Martin - Reap What You Sow: Corruption and Greed in Marange's Diamond Fields -- 4. Shamiso Mtisi - Enforcer or Enabler? Rethinking the Kimberley Process in the Shadow of Marange -- 5. Farai Maguwu - Marange Diamonds and the Kimberley Process: An Activist's Account -- 6. Tinashe Nyamunda - Free-for-Allf Artisanal Diamond Mining and Economic Redistribution on the Edges of the State, 2006-2008 -- 7. Mathew Ruguwa - The Social Impact of Mining on Schools in Marange, 2006-2013 -- 8. Crescentia Madebwe and Victor Madebwe - Forced Removals and Hidden Power: Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Marange -- 9. Melanie Chiponda and Richard Saunders - Holding Ground: Community, Companies and Resistance in Chiadzwa -- 10. Richard Saunders - Epilogue: Back to the Beginning -- Bibliography.

The diamond fields of Chiadzwa, among the world's largest sources of rough diamonds have been at the centre of struggles for power in Zimbabwe since their discovery in 2006. Against the backdrop of a turbulent political economy, control of Chiadzwa's diamonds was hotly contested. By 2007 a new case of 'blood diamonds' had emerged, in which the country's security forces engaged with informal miners and black market dealers in the exploitation of rough diamonds, violently disrupting local communities and looting a key national resource. The formalisation of diamond mining in 2010 introduced new forms of large-scale theft, displacement and rights abuses. Facets of Power is the first comprehensive account of the emergence, meaning and profound impact of Chiadzwa's diamonds. Drawing on new fieldwork and published sources, the contributors present a graphic and accessibly written narrative of corruption and greed, as well as resistance by those who have suffered at the hands of the mineral's secretive and violent beneficiaries. If the lessons of resistance have been mostly disheartening ones, they also point towards more effective strategies for managing public resources, and mounting democratic challenges to elites whose power is sustained by preying on them.

Previous research shows that leader turnover and change in a leader's winning coalition are associated with rivalry termination. However, this research often conflates change in leadership or winning coalition with more fundamental reform of the institutions governing the state. This article argues that only changes in a rival's governing institutions should lead to rivalry termination. Changes in leader preferences may lead to conciliatory policies, but provide no certainty regarding the sincerity or longevity of these policies. Fundamental changes to the institutions of a state alter the menu of policy options available to the leadership and are difficult to undo. Institutional reform in Rival A makes the leadership of Rival B more willing to undertake potentially risky cooperative action, leading to rivalry termination. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry terminations spanning 1919–2010, finding that institutional reform in one rival leads to an increase in the likelihood of rivalry termination regardless of the issues of contention. Irregular leader turnover and change in a state's winning coalition have no effect. Further, in a break with previous research, I find that any institutional reform—toward autocracy, toward democracy or laterally—is associated with an increased likelihood of rivalry termination.

This article argues that dramatic political change in State A poses a threat to the interests that other states B share with it. The more salient those interests are to State B, the greater the threat posed by domestic political change within State A. Thus major changes in one state place the leaders of formerly friendly states into a domain of losses, motivating risk-seeking behavior in hopes of reversing these losses. Conversely, the new leaders of the state undergoing domestic political change initiate similarly risk-seeking behavior to defend their new endowments. The conflicts that result sow the seeds of long-lasting enmity (rivalry) between former partners. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry onset during the period 1950–2005 and find evidence that in the wake of dramatic political change in State A, rivalries are most likely to form between A and its close partners.

This paper examines evolving models and experiences of domestic resource mobilization in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. Grounded in UNRISD's Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization and Social Development project, the study explores key questions around the nature and dynamics of resource bargaining over revenue mobilization and allocation; the changes in relationships among key actors; and the forms and outcomes of institutional development surrounding resource bargaining processes. It adopts a historicalcomparative approach to explore the evolving balance of forces among actors and emerging institutional constraints that are seen as catalyzing the formulation of successive resource mobilization strategies and associated development outcomes. Three case studies of divergent resource mobilization innovations underscore the complexity of challenges faced by governments whose actions are shaped by uneven state capacity and policy autonomy; a weak formal sector in which established business actors wield significant power and influence; and growing contestation over legitimacy and participation by political and social actors. The Zimbabwean case underscores the critical importance of political undercurrents and contesting interests in resource bargaining and the shaping of development policy. It also highlights the uneven nature of social actors' access to and influence in bargaining processes; and of the state itself, in the wake of neoliberal austerity, state capture and intra-elite competition. At the same, the study finds, evidence from Zimbabwe points to the benefits of more transparent, inclusive and capacitated forms of revenue mobilization involving a wider array of social actors.

In 2006, the discovery of world-class deposits of alluvial diamonds in Marange District in eastern Zimbabwe offered important opportunities for the mobilization of significant revenues in a period of severe and worsening economic and social crisis. The new resources quickly became the subject of intense contestation involving the state and a variety of actors including mining communities, civil society, the diamond industry and donors. The paper traces the evolution of these contestations over the course of three successive phases of alluvial exploitation. For each period, the study explores the key dynamics shaping the management of diamond production and trading, and assesses their impact on state-society relations and development outcomes. Particular focus falls on the implications of state capture for the state's institutional capacity and coherence, and the constraints on civil society's and donors' influence with state and business actors. The paper's findings underscore the limits of civil society and donor influence with government in strengthening resource governance through contestation over the management of high-value minerals. In a period of heightened political conflict, economic crisis and elite predation, social claims on resource mobilization were confronted by elite resistance. This resulted in attempts by the state to undermine the achievement and implementation of a workable social consensus around the management of diamond wealth. At the same time, various international legal and regulatory mechanisms established to strengthen resource governance proved to be severely limited in their ability to elicit greater transparency and accountability by both government and diamond miners. ; Prepared for the UNRISD project on Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development

This paper explores the emergence and evolution of social contestation over mineral resources in Zimbabwe through three decades and successive models of state engagement around extractives, revenue mobilization and development planning. It investigates patterns of contestation and outcomes around core issues in the sector, including the mining fiscal regime, the participation of small-scale mining and communities, and the management of the labour market. In exploring the evolving role of stakeholders and constituencies, the paper weighs the origins and effectiveness of different resource mobilization models in terms of the space they provide for meaningful and effective contestation. If gains have been realized under a model, the study asks which constituencies have gained, proposing which vision of development, and under what circumstances of relational power among stakeholders. Similarly, the question of who may have lost - in rhetoric and in practice - is also posed. More broadly, the paper seeks to understand the dynamics of changing forms of state-citizen, state-market and state-donor engagement. Policy practices have been successively dominated and primarily shaped by an elite-driven consensus of political and industry actors, as evidenced by historical patterns of resource mobilization and social development linked to the mining sector. Policy making has been disproportionately focused on the accommodation of "market imperatives" and industrial viability, and has been resistant to meaningful, transparent and sustained forms of social inclusion and redistribution. Recurrent macroeconomic vulnerabilities have resulted in strong donor influence, and have strengthened the capacity of foreign capital to obstruct policy implementation. The consequence has been a persistent and evolving weakness in the mobilization of fiscal resources from the minerals sector, representing a lost opportunity for mining's contribution to social development. ; Prepared for the UNRISD project on Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development