Suchergebnisse

"In the EU public services, both utilities and welfare services can be seen as both building blocks for the internal market and as a persistent irritant in the integration process. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the EU law on public services within the context of European integration. It brings together important analysis of the primary Treaty law, mainly on the internal market and competition, and of the secondary legislation at EU level, including different sector specific regimes. "--

In the EU public services, utilities and welfare services can be seen as both building blocks for the internal market and as a persistent irritant in the integration process. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the EU law on public services within the context of European integration. It brings together important analysis of the primary Treaty law, mainly on the internal market and competition, and of the secondary legislation at EU level, including different sector specific regimes. Particular attention is given to case law of the EU courts. This will be essential reading for those looking to have a broader understanding of the subject.

Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union imposes a special responsibility on undertakings with a dominant position. Digital dominance based on data but also on network effects, platforms, and first user advantage can lead to extreme inequality in bargaining positions with regard to online services, which can result in unfair treatment of competitors, suppliers, and consumers—such as exploitation and discrimination. Online consumers are the focus of this article. In order to tackle competition issues regarding online consumers, I propose interpreting the special responsibility of digitally dominant undertakings as a duty of care in their regard. Digitally dominant undertakings may not just be burdened by but also benefit from this approach, which increases predictability and trust in online markets. It resembles treating online undertakings as information fiduciaries as has been proposed in the USA, but is different because privacy is not the driving concern here and the context is that of antitrust. I look at standards for triggering the duty of care and make proposals for the application of this norm, but both remain to be specified further