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This narrative and empirical analysis investigates Hilary's claim that in his day they would not have left a man behind to die. The authors examine over 60 years of Himalayan climbing data and stories in order to test the changes in cooperation in this extreme life and death environment, In 2006, Sir Edmund Hillary lambasted the modern climbing fraternity for abandoning other climbers to a slow frozen death on Everest, claiming that in his day they would never leave someone to die. This followed the controversial death of David Sharp, passed by an estimated 40 climbers who were more interested in the summit than the life of a fellow human being. But was this stinging criticism true or just the faded recollections of a former climbing giant? This book investigates that claim through a narrative analysis, which combines the empirical analysis of Hawley and Salisbury's Himalayan Expedition Database with the anecdotal evidence provided by a plethora of newspaper articles and books. While there is evidence supporting the claim that commercialization is to blame for the breakdown of pro-social behaviour, the results cannot conclude if it is the commercial climber or the operator driving the problem and that the Sherpa are the saving grace

AbstractWhile behavioural economics has become part of mainstream economic theory, showing systematic deviations from the standard homo economicius in normal environments, there has been little exploration of behaviour in the extreme – such as conflict, disasters or war zones. This has led to the underdevelopment of behavioural theory examining the choices or motivations of individuals within these environments, resulting in sub-optimal models and policy. This work provides an entry point for the application of behavioural economics within conflict zones, specifically the examination of decision-making of non-combatant individuals. Additionally, it provides insight into the related disaster research field, detailing current studies, overview methodological approaches, approaches and limitations. Concluding with a general discussion and potential implications for policy.

Nearly 10,000 records of visits by members of the Department of Spiritual Health Care to patients in St Thomas' and the Evelina London Children's Hospitals were analysed. Less than one percent of patients proactively sought support from the Department. Department initiated visits raised this to over three percent, with each patient being visited nearly three times on average. Increasing the availability and awareness of Muslim and Buddhist care providers resulted in a higher proportion of visits to patients with these religious beliefs. Despite nearly a quarter to half of all patients not being religious, only four percent of visits were to these patients. This indicates that the pastoral and spiritual needs of many patients who were not religious were not being met. This should be a serious cause for concern.

This article examines the conduct of fiscal policy since 1974. It is in two parts. The first contains a chronological narrative of what policy-makers did during the period. It describes, in rapid summary, the major policy developments and the setting within which policy formation evolved. The style of part I is more journalistic than scientific, the intention being to convey some sort of impression of what things were like at the time—of the pressure of immediate problems and the unexpectedness of many economic developments—an impression which would perhaps be lost in a more analytical and abstract treatment. The second part is concerned with the more technical task of measuring the effects of policy changes. It emphasizes the leverage of fiscal instruments—the first impact' of policy upon the level of demand—rather than the more indirect effects on the balance of payments and inflation, important though these may have been as target variables.

The policy debate which preceded the introduction of monetary targets by and large avoided the practical problems of controlling the money supply. Frequently, the impression was given that the money supply is an exogenous policy instrument, subject to exact measurement and precise control. In reality, the money supply is not a label for a rigorously defined single statistic, but a term describing a concept, or rather several distinct concepts, for which numerous different statistical representations have been proposed. The authorities cannot simply exogenise the money supply (on some definition or other); they can only affect it indirectly by influencing the actions of banks and depositors through, for example, the raising of Minimum Lending Rate or the imposition of the corset. In other words, the money supply is not an instrument but an intermediate target, a target which, given existing instruments and the existing institutional setting, is not at all easy to hit.

This article discusses the experience to date with monetary targets. The first section briefly surveys the historical background to the adoption of monetary targets and gives a résumé of monetary policy during the last three years. Without delving deeply into the subtleties of the complicated art of central banking, the next section gives an inter pretation of what the Bank of England actually does when it attempts to control the money supply, which does not correspond at all closely to the simple representation of the techniques of money supply control contained in some of the standard economics textbooks. Attention is also drawn to the problems of the present approach to monetary policy making. Finally an assessment of the performance of recent policy is offered.

Over the years a large number of empirical studies have investigated the effects of monetary factors on various forms of private expenditure. This article surveys the evidence which has accumulated with a view to throwing some light on the basic issue of how, and how strongly, monetary policies influence real economic activity in this country. The evidence is varied and often contradictory and only tentative conclusions can be drawn.