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Recent studies (Brace and Hall 1990, 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992; Hall and Brace 1989) have demonstrated that state supreme court judges' decisionmaking is influenced by the type of selection mechanism that put them into office. In particular, judges are found to respond to the interests of those who have placed them on the bench. We extend this line of inquiry further by testing the effect of rules governing the retention of these judges in merit systems. Do these judges respond to the subtle differences in constituency that these rules establish? We address this question with a larger dataset than that used in previous studies of decisionmaking (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), and we find overwhelming evidence of the effects of these retention rules. In fact, we also conclude that judicial decisions are more influenced by the actor charged with retaining them than the actor who placed them on the bench in the first place. Adapted from the source document.

Recent studies (Brace and Hall 1990, 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992; Hall and Brace 1989) have demonstrated that state supreme court judges' decisionmaking is influenced by the type of selection mechanism that put them into office. In particular, judges are found to respond to the interests of those who have placed them on the bench. We extend this line of inquiry further by testing the effect of rules governing the retention of these judges in merit systems. Do these judges respond to the subtle differences in constituency that these rules establish? We address this question with a larger dataset than that used in previous studies of decisionmaking (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), and we find overwhelming evidence of the effects of these retention rules. In fact, we also conclude that judicial decisions are more influenced by the actor charged with retaining them than the actor who placed them on the bench in the first place.

Following the Civil War, the Democratic Party enjoyed almost complete dominance in southern electoral politics. Democratic hegemony was particularly acute in gubernatorial elections: In most southern states, more than a century elapsed before the first Republican governor was elected. Gubernatorial electoral success is a fundamental question, given the prominence of governors in state politics and the importance of states in the federal system. Here, we develop a model that explains the election of Republican gubernatorial candidates. We find that election of Republican governors in the South was delayed because of a comparative lack of quality Republican gubernatorial candidates in that region throughout much of the 20th century. Our research clarifies the contradictions reported in prior work by demonstrating that the effect of candidate quality varies by party and region. Interestingly, the competitive advantage once enjoyed by the Democratic Party in the South is now firmly held by the Republican Party. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Following the Civil War, the Democratic Party enjoyed almost complete dominance in southern electoral politics. Democratic hegemony was particularly acute in gubernatorial elections: In most southern states, more than a century elapsed before the first Republican governor was elected. Gubernatorial electoral success is a fundamental question, given the prominence of governors in state politics and the importance of states in the federal system. Here, we develop a model that explains the election of Republican gubernatorial candidates. We find that election of Republican governors in the South was delayed because of a comparative lack of quality Republican gubernatorial candidates in that region throughout much of the 20th century. Our research clarifies the contradictions reported in prior work by demonstrating that the effect of candidate quality varies by party and region. Interestingly, the competitive advantage once enjoyed by the Democratic Party in the South is now firmly held by the Republican Party.

Prior studies hypothesize that judges time their retirements to allow a like-minded president to select their replacements. We propose a modification to this argument and theorize that during the earlier part of a district court judge's career, it is the likelihood of elevation to an appeals court and other career-oriented concerns that affect whether the judge resigns or stays on the bench. It is during the latter stage of a judge's career when the desire to be replaced with a like-minded judge affects the retirement decision. Our analysis reveals that judges who are not yet pension eligible are influenced by being passed over for appeals court nominations as well as financial incentives to leave for private practice. Only judges who have attained pension eligibility appear to consider their ideological compatibility with the president when deciding to call it quits.

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.