Suchergebnisse

Between the legislative rule of law (Rechtsstaat) of the nineteenth century and the constitutional State of the twentieth century there is a paradigmatic leap, characterized by the transition from a systemic and functionalistic legal consciousness (instrumental to the socio-political order) to a "personalistic" one. In this sense, the very notion of person in the constitutional State receives a new shape, characterized by the unavailable value of the person-in-relation: it constitutes an inclusive notion, always opened to social transformations, through mutual recognition between social institutions and actors. Such a recognition reveals itself as based on the thoughtful protec-tion of fundamental rights universally recognized to all, but at the same time balanced by jurisprudence, in the case of the onset of conflicts, through the principles of proportionality and reasonableness that have always characterized juridical mediations.

The focus of the paper is the distance between the experience of vulnerability lived by all the people in their social practices and the social conditions of vulnerability resulting from the institution of legal orders. The social practices of mutual trust and recognition among social actors become a neutral object of legal norms; nevertheless only from these practices of entrustment/recognition can arise the subject's difficult path of emancipatory autonomy. In this sense, legal and political institution are grounded in - and preceded by - ethics and politics of recognition of human otherness.