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Abstract
The paper discusses concepts of economic value via a review of Dave Elder-Vass's book Inventing Value. Setting the review in the context of the need to re-evaluate theories of economic value in light of the environmental crisis, it outlines and assesses the book's critical realist approach to the subject, its critiques of existing value theories, the alternative offered by the author—'the social construction of monetary worth'—and its application to the valuation of financial assets. It goes on to discuss whether economic value can be said to be 'invented', the relation between positive and normative theories of value, and what can be salvaged from existing theories of value. It ends by briefly summarising where value theory in the context of the wider economy might go from here.

The article looks at how sociology might regard the concept of 'character', both in terms of the way it is used in public discourse and in its own accounts of social life. In the former, the concept is likely to be regarded with suspicion, especially where it is used to explain individuals' life outcomes in a way that ignores social structures and depoliticizes inequalities. Such usages are to be found in political discourse on welfare and in the character education movement as a solution to problems of 'social mobility'. Yet if character refers to individuals' settled dispositions to act in certain ways, then it has some affinities with the Bourdieusian concept of habitus. The article argues both for developing the critique of ideological uses of the concept and for considering how it might be used in ways that do not misrepresent its explanatory and normative significance.

The paper looks at how sociology might regard the concept of 'character', both in terms of the way it is used in public discourse and in its own accounts of social life. In the former, the concept is likely to regarded with suspicion, especially where it is used to explain individuals' life outcomes in a way that ignores social structures and depoliticizes inequalities. Such usages are to be found in political discourse on welfare and in the character education movement as a solution to problems of 'social mobility'. Yet if character refers to individuals' settled dispositions to act in certain ways, then it has some affinities with the Bourdieusian concept of habitus. The paper argues both for developing the critique of ideological uses of the concept and for considering how it might be used in ways that do not misrepresent its explanatory and normative significance.

The rentier economy is not only dysfunctional but unjust. In this paper I use a moral economic approach to defend this proposition by going back to basic concepts. Drawing upon classical political economic theory and political theory, and the work of Hobson and Tawney and more recent theorists, I propose a set of complementary distinctions that deepen understanding of rentiership: earned and unearned income; wealth-creating and wealth-extracting investment; property and improperty. I then comment on the relations, similarities and differences between capitalists and rentiers. Next I review the changing relation between critiques of rentiership and notions of 'free markets' and 'property-owning democracy' in the history of capitalism, with particular emphasis on the relation of neoliberalism to rent-seeking. Finally, I briefly discuss the implications of rentiership for reducing inequality and averting global heating.

Political economy has become divorced from normative political theory, resulting in an uncritical economic science and a political philosophy that has little critical purchase on actually existing economicpractices. The Foundational Economy Collective works within a framework of moral economy and uses the concepts of capabilities and use-value to radically reorient our conception of how our economy – or economies – should work.

AbstractThe paper questions the assumptions that facts and values are always radically different, that objectivity and values do not mix, and that values are subjective and a‐rational and should be excluded from social science. It argues (1) that such assumptions are underpinned by unnoticed slippages between different meanings of objectivity and by misunderstandings of the nature of values and normativity; (2) that evaluative judgments—often in the form of "thick ethical concepts" in which description and evaluation are fused—are necessary for objective description in social science; and (3) that framing the values issue in terms of the relations between is and ought misrepresents the place of normativity in social science and in everyday life.