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AbstractDavid Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments.

How many serious mistakes can a brilliant philosopher make in a single paragraph? Many think that Mill answers this question by example—in the third paragraph of Chapter IV of Utilitarianism. Here is the notorious paragraph:The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.

It is tempting and not at all uncommon to find the striking—even noble—visage of an Ideal Observer staring out from the center of Hume's moral theory. When Hume claims, for instance, that virtue is "whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation," it is only natural to think that he must have in mind not just any spectator but a spectator who is fully informed and unsullied by prejudice. And when Hume writes that "the true standard of taste and beauty" is set by those who exhibit "[s]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice," he appears to describe a character no ordinary human could actually possess. Indeed, Hume's frequent appeals to the moral sentiments of spectators, his insistence that those sentiments depend upon taking "the general survey," and his persistent invocation of the general point of view (and the corrections it requires), together make the temptation almost irresistible.

The only book on the market to include classical and contemporary readings from key authors in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), this unique anthology provides a comprehensive overview of the central topics in this rapidly expanding field. Each chapter opens with an introduction that helps students understand the central arguments and key concepts in the readings. The selections encourage students to think about the extent to which the three disciplines offer complementary or contradictory ways of approaching the relevant issues. Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Anthology is ideal for undergraduate PPE programs and courses in political philosophy and political economy.

Abstract
The term 'cooperation' is widely used in social and political and biological and economic theory. Perhaps for this reason, the term takes on a variety of meanings and it is not always clear in many settings what aspect of an interaction is being described. This paper has the modest aim of sorting through some of this variety of meanings; and exploring, against that background, when and why cooperation (in which sense) might be of value, or be required, or constitute a virtue.

Abstract:G. A. Cohen famously argued that fundamental normative principles (for example,
concerning justice) are "fact-free" in such a way that
their truth is independent of non-normative facts. For our purposes here, we
take Cohen's claim as given. Our focus is on what might be thought of
as the "other side" of this issue — on whether
the non-normative facts that determine what might be feasible for us to
accomplish are value-independent. We argue that they are not, that people have
reason to think that the normative properties of different possible options can
and sometimes do have a crucial impact on their feasibility. In other words:
facts about feasibility are partially dependent on Cohen's
"fact-free moral principles."

Joan McCord (1930-2004) was one of the most famous, most-respected, and best-loved criminologists of her generation. A brilliant pioneer, Dr. McCord was best known for her work on the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, the first large-scale, longitudinal experimental study in the field of criminology. The study was among the first to demonstrate unintended harmful effects of a well-meaning prevention program. Dr. McCord's most important essays from this groundbreaking research project are among those included in this volume. McCord also co-wrote, edited, or co-edited twelve volumes and authored