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Public policies are the outcome of the interaction among a variety of key political actors, each with its own preferences and incentives, who meet in different arenas and interact within the constraints of the institutions that frame their engagement. Therefore, to recognize the reasons behind the success or failure of any public policy it is necessary to understand the country's political institutions and the policymaking process they in turn help shape. This document looks at a number of those key actors, institutions, and arenas, with the aim of examining the roles, incentives, and capabilities of each of the actors in the policymaking process, by drawing from an extensive literature in political science and political economy. Each of the actors is looked at individually but connected to the other actors by linking the impact of political institutions on their incentives to the features of the policymaking game. Hopefully, this document will provide researchers with the tools necessary to embark in the fascinating analysis of policymaking processes not only for Latin American countries but also for other parts of the world.

Who decides the formulation of social policy? What resources do actors bring to decision-making processes? How do those resources position them within decision making networks? This book addresses these questions by combining an institutional political economy approach to policy making with social network analysis of social policy formulation processes in Latin American and the Caribbean. Based on extensive field interviews with governmental and nongovernmental actors, the case studies of social policy formulation in Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that while in the South American cases societal actors—such as unions and business associations in Argentina, and grassroots organizations in Bolivia—are central actors in the networks, government officials are the main participants in the Caribbean countries. The comparative analysis of the networks of ideas, information, economic resources, and political powers across these cases indicates that differences in the types of bureaucratic systems and governance structures may explain the differences between who decides and what resources underpin their influence in social policy formulation in the region.

AbstractThis article proposes a research agenda for the organization of the executive branch in Latin America by reviewing the literature on the U.S. and Latin American presidencies and outlining the research gap between them. The study finds that while strong, regionwide patterns have been established about cabinets in Latin America, research is lagging behind on the presidential center, presidential advisory networks, and their effects in policymaking. The article sets forth a series of research questions and suggests a combination of quantitative, social network, and case study strategies to address them.

According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, forms of government vary greatly, and budget institutions -the rules according to which budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented- are one (of many) drivers of such variation. This paper argues that under more hierarchical budget rules, presidential and parliamentary systems generate a similar incentive structure for the executive branch in shaping the size of government. This hypothesis is tested on a broad cross-section of countries, presidentialism is found to have a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes or is even reversed when the executive`s discretion over the budget process is higher. Hence, budget institutions that impose restrictions on the legislature`s ability to amend budget proposals can make political regimes look more alike in terms of fiscal outcomes.

Why does personal income taxation (PIT) remain relatively low in many developing countries despite a period of democratic advancement and rapid economic growth? This stylized fact is hard to reconcile with standard political economy models of taxation that expect democratic regimes to bring about redistribution in countries that suffer from high inequality. This article argues that the details of political institutions are key to understand why PIT remains low in many developing and unequal countries. In particular, we show how legislative malapportionment may prevent the use of personal income taxes as a major revenue source by skewing the distribution of political power across groups. Malapportionment is usually not exogenous but the result of design by those with political power at the transition or reform moment. As such, it depends on the structure of political and economic power in society. Based on a sample of more than 50 countries between 1990 and 2007, this article finds that (a) countries with historically more unequal distributions of wealth and income tend to systematically present higher levels of legislative malapportionment and (b) higher levels of malapportionment are associated with lower shares of personal income taxes in GDP.