Suchergebnisse

Verhandlungen in Friedensprozessen sind komplex und verlaufen selten linear. Auch führen sie nur selten zu handfesten, messbaren Ergebnissen wie der Unterzeichnung eines Abkommens. Dies stellt nicht nur Mediator*innen vor große Herausforderungen bei der Begleitung von Verhandlungsprozessen, sondern macht auch die Wirkungsmessung kompliziert. Wie kann trotz sich ständig ändernder Rahmenbedingungen und schwer nachzuweisender Kausalität die Wirkung von Friedensmediation1 evaluiert werden?

Ever since its first appearance on the world stage, nationalism has had violent consequences. There is reason to worry that its current resurgence is no exception and will eventually also result in violent conflicts within and possibly even across European borders. To understand why this might be the case, and to identify ways that could contain renewed nationalist violence, this article looks beyond the populist nationalism of the past years and provides a nuanced picture of the nationalist principle and its macro-historical significance. Looking at evidence from research and remembering empirical examples from the inclusive, liberal post-Cold War period, it shows that violence is not inevitable and that the most heinous forms of nationalism can successfully be contained through accommodative and inclusive power-sharing arrangements. The article ends with some preliminary policy proposals and a first glimpse at alternative forms of identities that allow embedding the nationalist principle in an inclusive European framework of peace.

This article presents a new data set on self-determination movements (SDMs) with universal coverage for the period from 1945 to 2012. The data set corrects the selection bias that characterizes previous efforts to code SDMs and significantly expands coverage relative to the extant literature. For a random sample of cases, we add information on state–movement interactions and several attributes of SDM groups. The data can be used to study the causes of SDMs, the escalation of self-determination (SD) conflicts over time, and several other theoretical arguments concerning separatist conflict that have previously been tested with incomplete or inferior data. We demonstrate the usefulness of the new data set by revisiting Barbara Walter's influential argument that governments will not accommodate SD challengers if they face several potential future challengers down the road because they want to build a reputation for strength. We do not find support for Walter's reputational theory of separatist conflict.

This article presents a new data set on self-determination movements (SDMs) with universal coverage for the period from 1945 to 2012. The data set corrects the selection bias that characterizes previous efforts to code SDMs and significantly expands coverage relative to the extant literature. For a random sample of cases, we add information on state–movement interactions and several attributes of SDM groups. The data can be used to study the causes of SDMs, the escalation of self-determination (SD) conflicts over time, and several other theoretical arguments concerning separatist conflict that have previously been tested with incomplete or inferior data. We demonstrate the usefulness of the new data set by revisiting Barbara Walter's influential argument that governments will not accommodate SD challengers if they face several potential future challengers down the road because they want to build a reputation for strength. We do not find support for Walter's reputational theory of separatist conflict.

This article presents a new data set on self-determination movements (SDMs) with universal coverage for the period from 1945 to 2012. The data set corrects the selection bias that characterizes previous efforts to code SDMs and significantly expands coverage relative to the extant literature. For a random sample of cases, we add information on state–movement interactions and several attributes of SDM groups. The data can be used to study the causes of SDMs, the escalation of self-determination (SD) conflicts over time, and several other theoretical arguments concerning separatist conflict that have previously been tested with incomplete or inferior data. We demonstrate the usefulness of the new data set by revisiting Barbara Walter's influential argument that governments will not accommodate SD challengers if they face several potential future challengers down the road because they want to build a reputation for strength. We do not find support for Walter's reputational theory of separatist conflict.

Owing to an editorial error, the titles in the affiliations of Andreas Schädel and Julian Wucherpfennig in the article by Cederman et al. (2015) in the May 2015 issue of American Political Science Review are incorrect. The correct affiliations are as follows:Andreas Schädel is PhD candidate at ETH Zürich, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland (schaedel@icr.gess.ethz.ch).Julian Wucherpfennig is Lecturer in International Security at University College London, 29/31 Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 9QU, United Kingdom (j.wucherpfennig@ucl.ac.uk).We regret the error.

This article evaluates the effect of territorial autonomy on the outbreak of internal conflict by analyzing ethnic groups around the world since WWII. Shedding new light on an ongoing debate, we argue that the critics have overstated the case against autonomy policies. Our evidence indicates that decentralization has a significant conflict-preventing effect where there is no prior conflict history. In postconflict settings, however, granting autonomy can still be helpful in combination with central power sharing arrangements. Yet, on its own, postconflict autonomy concessions may be too little, too late. Accounting for endogeneity, we also instrument for autonomy in postcolonial states by exploiting that French, as opposed to British, colonial rule rarely relied on decentralized governance. This identification strategy suggests that naïve analysis tends to underestimate the pacifying influence of decentralization.