Suchergebnisse

The study aims to assess the distributional effects of taxing financial transactions including a focus on gender. It specifically investigates the impact of the low interest rate environment on tax revenues and distribution. The first part of the study is explorative, aiming to develop a concept for the assessment. This is because the role of low or even negative interest rates is not yet specifically considered in the context of FTT. In the second part, the challenge is to find appropriate data for European countries in order to assess distributional effects. The study also highlights the existing data gaps that prevent a long-term evaluation of FTT with regard to tax revenues, impact, and distributional consequences.

The present study examines the effects of the introduction of a financial transaction tax along with enhanced cooperation across 11 European Union member states. In particular, based on the tax concept of the European Commission, the tax revenues for four participating countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, are estimated. [.] ; Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Wirkungen der Einführung einer Finanztransaktionssteuer im Rahmen einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit von 11 Staaten der Europäischen Union. Insbesondere werden auf der Grundlage des Steuerkonzepts der Europäischen Kommission die Aufkommen für vier beteiligte Länder, Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und Österreich, geschätzt. [.]

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Wirkungen der Einführung einer Finanztransaktionssteuer im Rahmen einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit von 11 Staaten der Europäischen Union. Insbesondere werden auf der Grundlage des Steuerkonzepts der Europäischen Kommission die Aufkommen für vier beteiligte Länder, Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und Österreich, geschätzt. [.] ; The present study examines the effects of the introduction of a financial transaction tax along with enhanced cooperation across 11 European Union member states. In particular, based on the tax concept of the European Commission, the tax revenues for four participating countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, are estimated. [.]

The present study examines the effects of the introduction of a financial transaction tax along with enhanced cooperation across 11 European Union member states. In particular, based on the tax concept of the European Commission, the tax revenues for four participating countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, are estimated. ; Translation of "DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 95 – Fiskalische und ökonomische Auswirkungen einer eingeschränkten Finanztransaktionssteuer." (Translated by Miranda Siegel, DIW Berlin)

Die Europäische Kommission hat 2013 einen Richtlinienentwurf vorgestellt, der die Einführung der Finanztransaktionssteuer für elf Mitgliedsstaaten vorsieht. Die Steuer zielt auf Finanzinstitute, zwischen denen 85 Prozent des Handels mit Finanzinstrumenten stattfindet. Privathaushalte sind nur insofern direkt von der Steuer betroffen, als sie steuerrelevante Wertpapiere besitzen (Aktien, Anleihen und Fondsanteile) und diese handeln. Um die Steuerlast für die Privathaushalte der unterschiedlichen Vermögens- und Einkommensklassen exakt bestimmen zu können, sind Daten zu deren Partizipationsraten an den steuerrelevanten Wertpapieren sowie zur jeweiligen Umschlagshäufigkeiten notwendig. Solche Daten existieren nicht. Geeignete Indikatoren erlauben es jedoch, die Betroffenheit der Haushalte in den einzelnen Einkommens- und Vermögensklassen durch die Finanztransaktionssteuer abzuschätzen. Die Befunde lassen auf einen überproportional hohen steuerrelevanten Wertpapierbesitz in den oberen Einkommens- und Vermögensschichten schließen. Die Steuer wirkt somit progressiv insofern, als sie die oberen Einkommens- und Vermögensklassen überdurchschnittlich belastet. Damit trägt sie zur sozialen Nachhaltigkeit im Sinne einer fairen und verteilungsgerechten Gesellschaft bei. ; In 2013 the European Commission presented a draft for a directive to introduce the financial transaction tax among eleven member states. The tax targets financial institutes among which 85 percent of the trading occurs. However, households owning stocks, bonds and shares of funds are also directly affected if they deal with these instruments. Accurate data on the participation rates of households of different wealth classes on tax-relevant securities and turnover rates are necessary to determine the class-specific tax burden. Because of the lack of such data the affection of households belonging to different wealth classes can only be estimated. The estimations suggest that the more wealthy households own disproportionally often tax-relevant securities. A progressive impact insofar as the tax affects the upper wealth classes far more than the lower classes can be infered from this evidence. Therefore the tax could contribute to social sustainability.

We argue that a financial transaction tax complements financial market regulation. With the tax, governments have an additional instrument at hand to influence trading activity. FTT aims to reduce regulatory arbitrage, flash trading, overactive portfolio management, excessive leverage and speculative transactions of financial institutions. The focus clearly addresses these classes of activities that have contributed to the financial crisis. However, if contrary to expectations harmful transactions will not be curbed, FFT generates at least large tax revenues that can contribute to cover the costs of the financial crisis. The trend towards centralized clearing and depositaries makes tax evasion more difficult than it was in the past. Tax avoidance is, of course, never completely avoidable. Therefore the effect of the tax should be monitored closely so that governments can react quickly if tax loopholes and taxinduced geographical relocation plans of financial institutions come to light.

1989 bereits wurde in einem Gutachten auf die "unterdurchschnittliche Ertragskraft" der Landesbanken verwiesen und der Zusammenschluss zu einem einzigen Spitzeninstitut gefordert. 20 Jahre später allerdings, inmitten der bislang schwersten Krise der Landesbanken, bewahrte das hiesige Bad-Bank-Gesetz die Landesbanken nicht nur weitgehend vor Wertberichtigungen, sondern eröffnet den Bundesländern auch noch den Ausweg, sich mit einer ländereigenen Bad Bank Konsolidierungsbemühungen des Bundes zu entziehen. Eine Reform des Bad-Bank-Gesetzes ist daher dringend notwendig. Die Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung SoFFin muss in die Lage versetzt werden, die Konsolidierung der Landesbanken aktiv voranzutreiben. Die toxischen Papiere der Landesbanken sollten zwangsweise und mit starken Abschlägen in eine zentrale Bad Bank übernommen und die Altaktionäre mit den Verlusten aus den Fehlinvestitionen belastet werden können. Danach könnten die verbleibenden Restlandesbanken unter dem Druck des Bundes verschmolzen und anschließend durch den SoFFin, möglicherweise im Verbund mit den Sparkassen, rekapitalisiert werden. Eine analoge Verfahrensweise hat Ende der 80er Jahre dem schwedischen Bankensystem zu einer raschen Erholung verholfen und den Steuerzahler langfristig aus der Verlustzone geholt. Die Restrukturierung des öffentlichen Bankensektors muss endlich zu einer zentralen Aufgabe in der Finanzmarktpolitik der Bundesregierung gemacht werden. ; In 1989 a report has already highlighted the "below-average earnings potential" of the German Landesbanken and called for the merger of these state banks into a single central institution. However, 20 years later the bad bank law of Germany saved the ailing Landesbanken not only from write-downs of toxic assets, but also gives the state banks the option to escape possible consolidation efforts of the federal government by establishing a regional bad bank. Therefore, a reform of the German bad bank law is needed that puts the federal government into a position of being able to actively promote the consolidation of the regional Landesbanken. The reform should require from the Landesbanken to write down toxic securities to their market value and transfer them to a central bad bank run by the SoFFin, the German fund for restructuring ailing banks. The existing shareholders would then be charged with the losses from the bad investments. Thereafter, the remaining state banks could, under the pressure of the federal government be merged and recapitalized by the SoFFin, possibly in conjunction with the German savings banks. A similar procedure has allowed the Swedish banking system a rapid recovery from its crisis at the end of the 80s of the last century. The German government must at last give the restructuring of the public banking sector priority in its financial market policy.

Since the summer of 2007, participants in financial markets have been confronted by a crisis of their own making. In order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, the G-20 nations, at their finance summit in Washington on 15 November 2008, resolved to "ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances." However, the elimination of loopholes as a matter of principle does not in itself provide a roadmap for the reconfiguration of financial markets. DIW Berlin is promoting an agenda of nine principles for regulatory reform. Item 1 through 3 focus on the prevention of coordination failures at the micro and the macro level as well as establishing appropriate incentives front and center; item 4 through 6 sketch out opportunities and limits for the future role of government; item 7 and 8 focus on oversight. Finally, item 9 calls for a stronger emphasis on equity financing and makes an appeal for the insight that financing constraints based upon credit worthiness ultimately serve to protect the financial system.

Since the summer of 2007, participants in financial markets have been confronted by a crisis of their own making. In order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, the G-20 nations, at their finance summit in Washington on 15 November 2008, resolved to "ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances." However, the elimination of loopholes as a matter of principle does not in itself provide a roadmap for the reconfiguration of financial markets. DIW Berlin is promoting an agenda of nine principles for regulatory reform. Item 1 through 3 focus on the prevention of coordination failures at the micro and the macro level as well as establishing appropriate incentives front and center; item 4 through 6 sketch out opportunities and limits for the future role of government; item 7 and 8 focus on oversight. Finally, item 9 calls for a stronger emphasis on equity financing and makes an appeal for the insight that financing constraints based upon credit worthiness ultimately serve to protect the financial system.