Suchergebnisse

Der vorliegende Beitrag skizziert ueberblicksartig nationale und internationale Verteilungstendenzen im Kapitalismus und wirft einen kursorischen Blick auf die diesen Trends zugrunde liegenden Mechanismen. Sowohl auf der Ebene der Nationalstaaten als auch auf internationaler Ebene hat die Ungleichheit in den letzten Jahrzehnten eines globalisierten Finanzkapitalismus deutlich zugenommen. Hinter dieser Entwicklung stehende Mechanismen sind der inhaerente Zusammenhang zwischen oekonomischem Kapital und gesellschaftlicher Machtverteilung, der Umstand, dass große Vermoegen in der Regel auch groessere Zuwaechse verzeichnen sowie die zunehmende Mobilitaet von Kapital und der damit verbundene abnehmende wirtschaftspolitische Einfluss von Staaten. Mittel um dieser Entwicklung entgegen zu steuern sind neben den typischen nationalstaatlichen Umverteilungsmassnahmen vor allem eine Rueckkehr zur Vollbeschaeftigungspolitik und eine kritische Reflexion ungehemmter Freihandelspolitik.

Dieser Beitrag interessiert sich fuer die Entwicklung der Verteilung und das Potential der Besteuerung von Vermoegen und diskutiert diese Fragen mit Rueckgriff auf neuere Forschungsergebnisse. Dabei wird das gesellschaftspolitische Potential einer direkten Vermoegensbesteuerung vor dem Hintergrund steigender Vermoegensungleichheit ebenso diskutiert wie die zu erwartenden Aufkommen einer solchen direkten Vermoegensbesteuerung. Die Berechnung des Aufkommenspotentials erfolgt dabei anhand von verschiedenen hypothetischen Steuermodellen. In einem zweiten Schritt werden diese Ergebnisse mit den tatsaechlichen Tendenzen der Vermoegensbesteuerung innerhalb der OECD Laender kontrastiert. Hier zeigt sich, dass der Beitrag von vermoegensbezogenen Steuern (=Summe von Grund-, Erbschafts-, Schenkungs- und Nettovermoegenssteuern) am gesamten Steueraufkommen ueber die letzten Jahrzehnte zurueckgeht und in den meisten Laendern eher niedrig ausfaellt. Eine moegliche Erklaerung hierfuer liegt im auch steuerpolitisch gefuehrten Standortwettbewerb. Bemerkenswert ist dabei vor allem die Sonderrolle der Schweiz und Luxemburg, die im Vergleich zum OECD Durchschnitt um ein vielfaches hoeheres Aufkommen (relativ zum BIP) aus direkter Vermoegensbesteuerung lukrieren koennen.

This paper analyzes the determinants of the European Commission's NAIRU estimates for 14 European OECD countries during 1985-2012. The NAIRU is a poor proxy for 'structural unemployment': Labor market institutions - employment protection legislation, union density, tax wedge, minimum wages - underperform in explaining the NAIRU, while cyclical variables - capital accumulation and boom - bust patterns in housing markets - play an important role. This is relevant since the NAIRU is used to compute potential output and structural budget balances and, hence, has a direct impact on the scope and evaluation of fiscal policy in EU countries.

Unfettered market forces tend to violate basic universal concepts like justice, dignity or fairness. Therefore we suggest moving to a new concept of markets, which we label 'civilized markets'. A civilized market tries to ensure that free entrepreneurship and open markets are eventually compatible to these basic and universal values that also serve as moral cornerstones of the European project. We propose to establish a new European institution that should set and enforce minimum standards for goods sold on the European market in order to accomplish what we call a 'civilized market'.

We use an agent-based stock-flow consistent model of a closed economy without technological change that considers different classes of households, status consumption and a Minskyan banking sector to analyze the relationship between rising saving rates, the accumulation and distribution of private financial wealth and the evolution of public debt. Conducting a series of experiments, we find evidence for Keynes' famous claim that a rise in the propensity to save will not necessarily be matched by a rise in the propensity to invest, culminating in either chronic government deficits or consistently high unemployment rates if the government refuses to accept those deficits. The result emerges endogenously from the interaction of fully decentralized agents. The model indicates that promoting consumer credit can at best provide a very short-lived relief to this problem.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of structural polarization and macroeconomic divergenceinthecontextofEuropeanintegration,wherethelatterisprimarilyunderstood as an increase in economic and financial openness. In the process of estimating the dynamic effects of such an openness shock on 26 EU countries, we develop a taxonomy of European economies that consists of four groups: core, periphery, and catching-upcountriesinEasternEuropeaswellasfinancialhubs.Weshowthatthese four country groups have responded in a distinct way to the openness shock imposed by European integration and argue that the latter should be seen as an evolutionary process that has given rise to different path-dependent developmental trajectories. These trajectories are linked to the sectoral development of European economies and the evolution of their technological capabilities. We propose a set of interrelated policy measures to counteract structural polarization and to promote macroeconomic convergence in Europe. ; Refereed/Peer-reviewed ; (VLID)4898433 ; Version of record

This paper analyzes the dynamics of structural polarization and macroeconomic divergence in the context of European integration, where the latter is understood primarily as an increase in economic and financial openness. In the process of estimating the dynamic effects of such an openness shock on 26 EU countries, we develop a taxonomy of European economies that consists of core, periphery and catching-up countries, as well as financial hubs. We show that these four country groups have responded in a distinct way to the openness shock imposed by European integration and argue that the latter should be seen as an evolutionary process that has given rise to different path-dependent developmental trajectories. These trajectories relate to the sectoral development of European economies and the evolution of their technological capabilities. We propose a set of interrelated policy measures to counteract structural polarization and to promote macroeconomic convergence in Europe.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of structural polarization and macroeconomic convergence vs. divergence in the context of European integration, where the latter is understood primarily as an increase in economic and financial openness. In the process of estimating the dynamic effects of openness shocks on 26 EU countries, we develop a taxonomy of European economies that consists of core, periphery, financialized and Eastern European catch-up economies. As these four country groups have responded in a distinct way to the openness shocks imposed by European integration, we argue that the latter should be seen as an evolutionary process that has given rise to different path-dependent developmental trajectories. These trajectories relate to the sectoral development of European economies and the evolution of their technological capabilities. We propose a set of interrelated policy measures to counteract structural polarization and to promote macroeconomic convergence in Europe.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of structural polarization and macroeconomic convergence vs. divergence in the context of European integration, where the latter is understood primarily as an increase in economic and financial openness. In the process of estimating the dynamic effects of openness shocks on 26 EU countries, we develop a taxonomy of European economies that consists of core, periphery, financialized and Eastern European catch-up economies. As these four country groups have responded in a distinct way to the openness shocks imposed by European integration, we argue that the latter should be seen as an evolutionary process that has given rise to different path-dependent developmental trajectories. These trajectories relate to the sectoral development of European economies and the evolution of their technological capabilities. We propose a set of interrelated policy measures to counteract structural polarization and to promote macroeconomic convergence in Europe.