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Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start
from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that
if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it
will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of
a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers
have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the
importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather than unity of
consciousness. While this shift contributes significantly to the
discussion, it does not offer a fully satisfying alternative. Unity of
consciousness still seems required if identity is to be as important as we
think it is. Views of identity based on agential unity do, however, point
to a new understanding of unity of consciousness which meets Parfit's
challenge, yielding an integrated view of identity which sees persons as
both subjects and agents.