Suchergebnisse

Changes in different aspects of euroscepticism developed at different paces and in varying directions in the regions and countries of the European Union (EU) from 1994 to 2004. Using Eurobarometer data, along with data on country and region characteristics, information on the positions of the political parties and media attention paid to the EU, it is tested in detail whether opposite developments in euroscepticism were associated with opposite developments in influencing contextual characteristics.The authors found that the Netherlands became systematically more sceptical towards the EU, whereas the opposite trend was found in Spain. The introduction of the Euro partially explains these divergent trends, but the direction of this effect varies with countries' GDP. Changes in media attention on the EU further explain the changes in the public's attitude. However, this effect is contingent upon specific circumstances. Growing media attention increases political euroscepticism in countries with a negative EU budget balance, whereas it decreases such scepticism in countries with a positive balance. The effect of left-right ideological placement is contingent upon the EU budget balance as well. Finally, the effect of education on euroscepticism is found to be smaller in countries with a higher GDP.

In this article we set out to improve our knowledge on voting for extreme right-wing parties, i.e. the Republikaner, by taking into account social, political and contextual characteristics. We test four theories that provide explanations as to why certain social categories are more likely to vote for the Republikaner. The hypotheses are tested with multilevel analyses, with data from a national sample (N=4688). Multinomial analyses provide additional information on how theoretically derived political attitudes effect voting behaviour. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

THE AUTHORS OF THIS ARTICLE FORMULATE A MODEL TO EXPLAIN POLITICAL APATHY AMONG LOWER-CLASS PEOPLE IN THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE MID-80S. THEY ALSO SPECULATE ON AND FORMULATE AN EXPLANATORY MODEL ON THE MOTIVES OF THOSE WHO, DURING THIS PERIOD, WERE STILL INCLINED TOWARD POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, NOTABLY TOWARD RADICAL ACTIVITIES. THE MODELS ARE TESTE WITH DATA GATHERED IN THE NETHERLANDS IN 1985. THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT BEING A MEMBER OF A DEPRIVED CLASS INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING MORE ANOMIC. IN TURN, ANOMIE BRINGS ABOUT POLITICAL APATHY. THE ANALYSES FURTHER SUGGEST THAT PERSONS WHO GIVE PRIORITY TO SO-CALLED POST-MATERIALISTIC VALUES ARE MORE PRONE TO RADICAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR THAN OTHERS.

In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N=49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-rational differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

"In einer früheren Studie haben wir festgestellt, daß in den Niederlanden der Säkularisierungsschub der sechziger und siebziger Jahre in den achtziger Jahren beendet schien. In diesem Beitrag wird der Säkularisierungsprozeß in den Niederlanden in den achtziger Jahren (gemessen an der Abnahme der Kirchenmitgliedschaft und am Rückgang kirchlicher Praktiken und christlicher Glaubensvorstellungen) weiter verfolgt anhand von drei national repräsentativen Umfragen in den Jahren 1979, 1985 und 1990. Dabei wird auch geachtet auf eventuelle Unterschiede im Tempo der Säkularisierung bei verschiedenen sozialen Kategorien und Konfessionsgruppen. Säkularisierung als Abnahme der Bedeutung der Religion für säkulare, nichtreligiöse Einstellungen und Verhaltensformen wurde bisher nicht untersucht. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir Säkularisierungsprozesse im Sinne abnehmender sozialer Relevanz der Religion. Konkret wird geprüft, ob sich die Korrelationen zwischen Religiosität und verschiedenen nichtreligiösen Einstellungen und Verhaltensformen im Laufe der achtziger Jahre verringert haben. Schließlich wird berichtet über andere Formen des Wertwandels in den Niederlanden in den achtziger Jahren. Dabei wird geachtet auf den Zusammenhang dieser Wertwandlungsprozesse mit dem Säkularisierungsprozeß. Hat sich die niederländische Gesellschaft in den achtziger Jahren weiterhin entbürgerlicht oder haben die familiäre und wirtschaftliche Bürgerlichkeit zugenommen? Dieselbe Frage wird auf Hedonismus, gesellschaftskritische Werte und Konservatismus untersucht." (Autorenreferat)

An alternative approach to studying the relationship between the working class & authoritarianism is presented to overcome the difficulties found in the debate between C. P. Middendorp's & J. D. Meloen's "Over het autoritarisme van de arbeidersklasse" ([Working-Class Authoritarianism] Acta Politica, 1989, 24, 83-96) & P. Dekker's & P. Ester's "Klassepositie als determinant van autoritarisme; een reactie op Meloen en Middendorp" ([Class Position as a Determinant of Authoritarianism; A Response to Meloen and Middendorp] Acta Politica, 1989, 24, 97-104). Analysis of statistical data compiled in A. Felling, et al (Religion in Dutch Society 1985. Documentation of a National Survey on Religious and Secular Attitudes in 1985, Amsterdam: Steinmetz Archive, 1987), shows that it is not the working class, but rather small independent businessmen & farmers, who are the most authoritarian segments of the Dutch population. 4 Tables, 21 References. M. Meeks