Suchergebnisse

AbstractScholars have often dismissed the effect of war on state formation in regions like Latin America, where mobilization for war is deemed insufficiently intense and international conflict fails to out‐select weaker states. Against this conventional wisdom, I contend that wars can affect state‐building trajectories in a postwar period through the different state institutions that result from victory and defeat. After reconsidering the role of war outcomes in classical bellicist theory I use difference‐in‐differences analysis to identify the effect of losing vis‐à‐vis winning a war on levels of state capacity in a panel of Latin America (1865–1913). I then illustrate my causal mechanisms in case studies of the Paraguayan War (1864–1870) and the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) and apply the synthetic control method to these cases. Although out‐selection of losers obscures the effect of war outcomes in European history, Latin America illuminates their long‐term consequences.

"Hegemony" published on by Oxford University Press.

El presente trabajo se enmarca en el actual debate sobre potencias emergentes intentando un aporte desde una perspectiva latinoamericana. Para ello trabajará algunas disyuntivas teóricas que se han tornado difíciles de resolver para el mainstream racionalista de la disciplina, desarrollando un modelo de cambio complementario del programa realista actual. Argumentaremos que este marco presenta algunas ventajas para el estudio de diversas cuestiones relativas a las relaciones de poder en América del Sur, destacando en particular dos preguntas: ¿qué características de la política exterior del Brasil han logrado constituirlo en una potencia emergente? ¿Y por qué los países de la región no han desarrollado una política exterior acorde al desafío que significa el ascenso de su principal contraparte regional?

AbstractRecent trends demonstrate that states with sufficient capabilities to be granted regional power status by its peers (primarily other states within their region) can nonetheless renounce regional leadership. This article analyzes the puzzling behavior of these detached or reluctant regional powers. We argue that resorting to an approach grounded in neoclassical realism is helpful to explain why regional powers might not exercise leadership. In this article regional leadership is conceptualized as an auxiliary goal within the grand strategy of a regional power. This goal will be pursued in the absence of certain structural and domestic constraints. Great power competition determines the incentives for regional leadership at the structural level. Capacity to extract and mobilize resources for foreign policy affects the decision to pursue leadership at the domestic level. We apply the analytical framework to analyze Brazil's detachment from South America after the Cardoso and Lula presidencies.

We contribute to the extensive literature on international influences on democratization and democratic breakdowns by conceptualizing hegemonic mechanisms of regime change and assessing them empirically. Our findings are based on a multi-methods approach and highlight the varying importance of hegemonic influences in post-1945 Latin America. We argue that us support for democratization was consistent in the wave of transitions to democracy that began in Latin America in 1978 and that it was decisive in many of these transitions. While past work has attributed responsibility to the us for the waves of democratic breakdowns from 1948 to 1956 and 1964 to 1976, an examination of the 27 breakdowns from 1945 to 2010 gives reason to doubt this interpretation. Future research could use these conceptual and methodological tools to explore the role of other powers in waves of democracy and authoritarianism./n ; Este trabajo busca contribuir a la literatura sobre los factores internacionales que afectan el surgimiento y ruptura de la democracia a través de la conceptualización y análisis empírico de diversos mecanismos por los cuales una potencia internacional puede provocar cambios de régimen en su área de influencia. A través de múltiples métodos, analizamos el rol de Estados Unidos en 64 episodios (27 quiebres y 37 transiciones democráticas) que tuvieron lugar en América Latina entre 1945 y 2010. Primero, utilizamos la técnica de análisis cualitativo comparado (qca) para examinar el papel que desempeñaron las embajadas estadounidenses en estos episodios. Segundo, estudiamos casos específicos (las primeas transiciones y quiebres en olas de cambio de régimen) donde la influencia de Washington es claramente discernible de los efectos de la difusión. Tercero, analizamos estadísticamente el impacto de los flujos de ayuda externa de Estados Unidos sobre las probabilidades de supervivencia de los regímenes políticos de la región. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el apoyo a la democracia por parte de los Estados Unidos fue consistente durante la ola de transiciones democráticas que comenzó en la región en 1978, y que fue decisivo en muchas de estas transiciones. En comparación, la importancia de estos mecanismos hegemónicos en las olas autoritarias que tuvieron lugar entre 1948 y 1956 y entre 1964 y 1976 es menos evidente. Futuras investigaciones podrían utilizar las herramientas conceptuales y metodológicas aquí propuestas para explorar el rol de esta y otras potencias regionales en procesos similares de expansión y retracción internacional de la democracia./n

Abstract
During the nineteenth century, South America was plagued by internal rebellions that destabilized the region's economies and political systems. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, levels of political violence throughout the region declined dramatically. Existing scholarship has paid surprisingly little attention to this historic transformation, in part because comprehensive data on revolts have been lacking. Historical narratives and an analysis of a comprehensive new dataset on all revolts in South America from 1830 to 1929 show that the decline in revolts stemmed in large part from the expansion and professionalization of the region's militaries, which were driven by the export boom and the threat of interstate conflict. Nevertheless, not all types of rebellions declined precipitously during this period, as an original typology of revolts shows. Although the strengthening of the region's armed forces discouraged revolts by non-state actors, it did not significantly reduce rebellions from within the state apparatus, such as military coups.