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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part 1. Transforming American Liberalism -- Chapter 2. Race -- Chapter 3. Transforming Liberalism, 1933-1940 -- Chapter 4. Liberalism Transformed -- Part 2. Realignment From Below: Voters And Midlevel Party Actors -- Chapter 5. Civil Rights and New Deal Liberalism in the Mass Public -- Chapter 6. The African American Realignment and New Deal Liberalism -- Chapter 7. State Parties and the Civil Rights Realignment -- Chapter 8. Beyond the Roll Call -- Part 3. The National Parties Respond -- Chapter 9. Facing A Changing Party -- Chapter 10. Lincoln's Party No More -- Chapter 11. Conclusions -- Notes -- Index

The 'Oxford Handbooks of American Politics' are the essential guide to the study of American political life in the 21st century. With engaging, new contributions from the major figures in the field this volume provides the key point of reference for anyone working in American politics today.

From the 1910 overthrow of ""Czar"" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions h

From the 1910 overthrow of "Czar" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions have proved remarkably adaptable and yet consistently frustrating for members and outside observers alike. Analyzing leadership, committee, and procedural restructuring in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989), Schickler argues that coalitions promoting a wide range of member interests drive change in both the House and Senate. He shows that multiple interests determine institutional innovation within a period; that different interests are important in different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed, as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich in light of these findings. Schickler's model of "disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of institutional innovation--and thus of American political development and history

Few transformations have been as important in American politics as the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic Party over the course of the 1930s–60s and the Republican Party's growing association with more conservative positions on race-related policies. This paper traces the relationship between New Deal economic liberalism and racial liberalism in the mass public. A key finding is that by about 1940, economically-liberal northern white Democratic voters were substantially more pro-civil rights than were economically-conservative northern Republican voters. While partisanship and civil rights views were unrelated among southern whites, economic conservatives were more racially conservative than their economically liberal counterparts, even in the south. These findings suggest that there was a connection between attitudes towards the economic programs of the New Deal and racial liberalism early on, well before national party elites took distinct positions on civil rights. Along with grassroots pressure from African American voters who increasingly voted Democratic in the 1930s–40s, this change among white voters likely contributed to northern Democratic politicians' gradual embrace of civil rights liberalism and Republican politicians' interest in forging a coalition with conservative white southerners. In attempting to explain these linkages, I argue that the ideological meaning of New Deal liberalism sharpened in the late 1930s due to changes in the groups identified with Roosevelt's program and due to the controversies embroiling New Dealers in 1937–38.

I examine competing explanations for House rules changes with significant partisan overtones. I sought to identify all rules changes adopted from 1867 to 1998 that were intended either to advantage or to undermine the majority party and its leaders in their efforts to shape the House agenda. I test a majority party cartel model of institutional change against a model that focuses on the ideological balance of power on the floor, that is, on the closeness of the median voter to the median member of the majority and minority parties. I also evaluate the conditional party government approach. The data analysis suggests the preeminent importance of shifts in the ideological balance. Two variables identified by the conditional party government theory, party polarization and party capacity, obtain limited support, but their effect is neither as robust nor as large in magnitude as that of change in the median voter's position.