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The majority of literature on civil–military relations has focused on coups d'état. Yet, studying lesser forms of military insubordination can offer valuable insight into the true condition of states' civil–military relations. This paper introduces a data collection effort on mutinies across Africa from 1950 to 2018, revealing several interesting trends. First, most African countries have experienced mutinies, with these events increasing in frequency in the post-Cold War period. Second, while mutinies rarely escalate into coups, they are associated with an increased likelihood of coups in the future. This dataset provides a useful tool to explore the complexity of states' civil–military relations.

The majority of literature on civil–military relations has focused on coups d'état. Yet, studying lesser forms of military insubordination can offer valuable insight into the true condition of states' civil–military relations. This paper introduces a data collection effort on mutinies across Africa from 1950 to 2018, revealing several interesting trends. First, most African countries have experienced mutinies, with these events increasing in frequency in the post-Cold War period. Second, while mutinies rarely escalate into coups, they are associated with an increased likelihood of coups in the future. This dataset provides a useful tool to explore the complexity of states' civil–military relations.

AbstractResearch on host-country effects of peacekeeping deployments has highlighted destabilizing consequences for contributing states, suggesting that deployments can increase the willingness and ability of soldiers to mutiny or attempt coups. Yet others expect that peacekeeping contributions may bring a variety of benefits, including improved civilian control of the armed forces. We reconcile these conflicting assessments in two ways. First, we identify important differences across peacekeeping organizations. Missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN) are generally better funded and equipped, invoke selection criteria that should produce fewer grievances than missions operated by regional organizations, and may be more risk averse. The benefits or hazards of peacekeeping can thus vary substantially, leading to different consequences for organizations. Second, the pros and cons of peacekeeping can incentivize mutinies and coups differently. When grievances are present, financial incentives of peacekeeping may prompt soldiers to prefer mutiny over coups to avoid being disqualified from future participation. We assess these expectations for African states' participation in UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2011. We find no evidence that UN peacekeeping deployments increase mutiny risk, while non-UN deployments have a positive effect on the occurrence of mutiny. These findings remain robust across a large number of model specifications.

States are urged frequently by the UN, policymakers, and activists to recognise the human right to water domestically. However, does such legal incorporation, often in national constitutions, affect water policy and the realisation of the right? While several qualitative studies report positive impacts, initial quantitative assessments have questioned the systematic positive impact of the national recognition of the human right to water. Yet, such quantitative analyses of the effects of constitutional rights to water often overlook important mediating policy factors. We test specifically whether strong democratic governance is a significant condition for ensuring that the constitutional recognition of the human right to water has concrete outcomes. Results of a multivariate regression analysis on a global sample of 123 states over a 15-year period provide two findings. First, the constitutionalisation of the right to water and other economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCRs), in national constitutions alone is not associated with material benefits related to the human right to water. Second, the constitutionalisation of those rights can have positive material benefits for water access when the rights are foregrounded in democratic governance.

Though oil wealth is associated with poor economic performance, repression, civil war, and other maladies, the resource is also associated with increased regime durability. We explore this paradox by investigating the influence of oil wealth on coups d'état. Prior findings on the relationship between oil and coups have been inconsistent, a trend we argue is attributable to the varied and sometimes invalid specification of the dependent variable. We theorize that the potential payoff of coups in oil-rich states incentivizes elites to be more risk acceptant when considering coup attempts. We consequently anticipate coup attempts are more likely in oil-rich states, but under conditions that are less likely to succeed. An assessment of a global sample offers strong evidence that oil-rich states are "cursed" with more attempted coups. However, oil rents are not associated with more successful coups. These results explain the curse/durability paradox and point to an understudied aspect of the oil curse and authoritarian survival.

Research on host-country effects of peacekeeping deployments has highlighted destabilizing consequences for contributing states, suggesting that deployments can increase the willingness and ability of soldiers to mutiny or attempt coups. Yet others expect that peacekeeping contributions may bring a variety of benefits, including improved civilian control of the armed forces. We reconcile these conflicting assessments in two ways. First, we identify important differences across peacekeeping organizations. Missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN) are generally better funded and equipped, invoke selection criteria that should produce fewer grievances than missions operated by regional organizations, and may be more risk averse. The benefits or hazards of peacekeeping can thus vary substantially, leading to different consequences for organizations. Second, the pros and cons of peacekeeping can incentivize mutinies and coups differently. When grievances are present, financial incentives of peacekeeping may prompt soldiers to prefer mutiny over coups to avoid being disqualified from future participation. We assess these expectations for African states' participation in UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2011. We find no evidence that UN peacekeeping deployments increase mutiny risk, while non-UN deployments have a positive effect on the occurrence of mutiny. These findings remain robust across a large number of model specifications.

ABSTRACTUnder what conditions can a human rights‐based approach be successfully utilized? This article argues that the efficacy of a human rights discourse is, in large part, determined by the nature of the arena in which rights are claimed. Utilizing process tracing, involving content analysis and in‐depth interviews, the article examines the decades‐long struggle to block the construction of a large dam in southeastern Turkey. The analysis focuses on the struggle's three core dimensions: (a) international activism to influence foreign financial stakeholders; (b) domestic activism targeting the government; and (c) regional conflict over international water flows. Each of these dimensions is characterized by vastly different degrees of discursive rights consensus and leverage. In the international dimension, activists achieved both discursive consensus and leverage and were able to successfully thwart the Turkish government's goal of building a major dam. However, this ultimately proved to be a pyrrhic victory when the Turkish government secured domestic financing for the project. The loss of leverage in the domestic arena rendered anti‐dam activists' rights discourse ineffectual. Finally, the lack of regional consensus on water sharing and Iraq's lack of leverage enabled Turkey to complete the dam.

Democracies are commonly thought to provide greater levels of public goods than autocracies. Given that many public goods are provided locally, higher levels of local democracy are further thought to result in better rates of provision in both autocratic and democratic systems. However, several studies have cast doubt on democratic superiority in public goods provision both nationally and locally. We re-examine these contested relationships, investigating a locally provisioned public good: access to basic water. To determine what, if any, effects democracy has on public goods provision, we analyse the effects of both national and local democratic institutions, in conjunction with economic development. In cross-national regression analyses, we examine a global sample of 140 states from 2000 to 2015, arriving at three findings. First, access to basic water varies little by national regime type once accounting for development. Second, the existence of local elections and the degree to which they are free and competitive are positively correlated with basic water access rates in poor states. Finally, the positive effects of local democracy on water access in poor states increase with democratic institutional longevity. The findings of this study suggest two necessary additions to future research. First, more nuance is needed in the study of public goods provision beyond resources or a theoretical rationale for increased provision related to national regime characteristics. Second, considering the conditional influences of local institutional characteristics, development metrics could help illustrate the complicated circumstances determining access to basic public goods.