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This book identifies the different forms that protest voting can take in times when populism flourishes. Contrary to the popular view of protest voting as merely venting frustration, this book argues that protest voting can also be conceived of as a strategic signal of discontent, originating from sources, such as party policy positions. The empirical analyses rest on election survey data collected in democratic countries around the world between 2005 and 2017 to understand protest voting as a strategic signal, and the conditions under which it occurs. The main results show that protest voting can indeed be a strategic signal. This finding challenges the predominant view in the literature and the public discourse of protest voters as aimless, frustrated voters. About the author Christian H. Schimpf is a full-time research associate at the University of Alberta, Canada. His research focuses on electoral behavior, public opinion, and populism in a comparative perspective and his work has appeared, among others, in the American Political Science Review, the Canadian Journal of Political Science, and Political Studies.

This book identifies the different forms that protest voting can take in times when populism flourishes. Contrary to the popular view of protest voting as merely venting frustration, this book argues that protest voting can also be conceived of as a strategic signal of discontent, originating from sources, such as party policy positions. The empirical analyses rest on election survey data collected in democratic countries around the world between 2005 and 2017 to understand protest voting as a strategic signal, and the conditions under which it occurs. The main results show that protest voting can indeed be a strategic signal. This finding challenges the predominant view in the literature and the public discourse of protest voters as aimless, frustrated voters. About the author Christian H. Schimpf is a full-time research associate at the University of Alberta, Canada. His research focuses on electoral behavior, public opinion, and populism in a comparative perspective and his work has appeared, among others, in the American Political Science Review, the Canadian Journal of Political Science, and Political Studies. .

AbstractThis article investigates how Canadian voters react to a perceived lack of quality provided by their most preferred parties and how the anticipated election outcome conditions the reactions. The central argument is that a lack of quality motivates voters to signal their discontent by voting insincerely—that is, they cast a protest vote. The effect is expected to be moderated by the anticipated constituency result. The arguments are tested with two-wave panel survey data from the 2015 Canadian federal election, collected by the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project. The results support the central argument but remain inconclusive about the expected moderating effects.

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.

This article examines the influence of populism on democratic quality in Latin America. It draws on findings of qualitative work on this question as well as a theoretical framework by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser to test whether the assumptions and results of both are applicable in a comparative study. It is expected that populist actors have a negative impact on democratic quality when they are in government, but that they positively influence democratic quality when they are in opposition, where they can function as a corrective. Further, it is expected that these effects vary depending on the level of consolidation. A linear mixed-effects model and data from eighteen Latin American countries in the period 1995–2009 was used to evaluate the hypotheses. Generally, it was found that populist actors in opposition have a large positive influence on democratic quality and that populist actors in government have a negative influence.

AbstractAre populist citizens a threat to democracy? Some philosophers view populism and democracy as irreconcilable conceptions of governing. Another line of thought describes populism as useful democratic corrective. Drawing on nationally representative surveys from four European countries, this study investigates how European populist citizens think about democracy. Descriptive analyses reveal that populist worldviews only weakly predict how people think about democracy. On average, populist and non‐populist citizens aspire to similar kinds of political systems and both endorse liberal‐democratic institutions. Yet, populists and non‐populists differ in the degree to which they hold inconsistent beliefs. Citizens with populist outlook more frequently express contradictory demands that political institutions cannot possibly deliver. Based on these findings, we conclude that most populist citizens do not pursue an elaborate anti‐democratic conception of governing. Rather, the widespread dissatisfaction among populists may create an indeterminate openness for institutional change that political elites could steer in different directions.

Multidimensional concepts are non-compensatory when higher values on one component cannot offset lower values on another. Thinking of the components of a multidimensional phenomenon as non-compensatory rather than substitutable can have wide-ranging implications, both conceptually and empirically. To demonstrate this point, we focus on populist attitudes that feature prominently in contemporary debates about liberal democracy. Given similar established public opinion constructs, the conceptual value of populist attitudes hinges on its unique specification as an attitudinal syndrome, which is characterized by the concurrent presence of its non-compensatory concept subdimensions. Yet this concept attribute is rarely considered in existing empirical research. We propose operationalization strategies that seek to take the distinct properties of non-compensatory multidimensional concepts seriously. Evidence on five populism scales in 12 countries reveals the presence and consequences of measurement-concept inconsistencies. Importantly, in some cases, using conceptually sound operationalization strategies upsets previous findings on the substantive role of populist attitudes.

Abstract
The literature on populist attitudes frequently makes one of two assumptions: populist attitudes are either stable or unstable. However, few studies have examined these diverging assumptions empirically. We use panel data collected over six panel waves between 2017 and 2021 in Germany to assess the stability of populist attitudes. Integrating inter-individual stability (variable-centred) and intra-individual stability (individual trajectories), we find that populist attitudes are neither fully stable (trait) nor fully flexible (state). For example, some respondents constantly changed their view on populism while the attitudes in one out of three individuals remained stable. We also explore empirical consequences and find that populist attitudes are more closely linked to vote choice when they are stable. Accordingly, we argue for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of populist attitudes, both at the variable and individual levels, where these attitudes are stable and consequential for only a subset of individuals.

Eine bedeutende, aber unterentwickelte Erklärung für den Aufstieg des Populismus verweist auf das Gefühl, von der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft "abgehängt" zu sein. Im Kern steht die These, dass die Unterstützung des Populismus von der Wahrnehmung getrieben wird, nicht die gesellschaftliche Anerkennung zu erhalten, die man verdient. Dieser Beitrag baut auf der Erkenntnis auf, dass das Gefühl mangelnder Anerkennung auf unterschiedliche Weise und aus unterschiedlichen Gründen auftreten kann. Wir argumentieren, dass - aufgrund dieses facettenreichen Charakters - die gemeinsame Wahrnehmung einer fehlenden gesellschaftlichen Anerkennung ansonsten heterogene Bevölkerungsschichten in ihrer Unterstützung für den Populismus vereint. Basierend auf Daten aus der Vorwahlbefragung der German Longitudinal Election Study zur Bundestagswahl 2021 untersucht unsere präregistrierte Studie die multiplen Wurzeln populistischer Einstellungen in Gefühlen mangelnder gesellschaftlicher Anerkennung. Erstens weisen unsere Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass - von Individuen in ländlichen Regionen über solche mit soziokulturell konservativen Einstellungen bis hin zu solchen mit niedrigem Einkommen - scheinbar unverbundene Segmente der Gesellschaft Wahrnehmungen fehlender Anerkennung teilen - allerdings aus unterschiedlichen Gründen. Zweitens ist, wie erwartet, jedes dieser distinkten Gefühle fehlender Anerkennung mit populistischen Einstellungen assoziiert. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Relevanz scheinbar unpolitischer, tief in der menschlichen Psyche verwurzelter Faktoren, um gegenwärtige populistische Stimmungslagen zu verstehen. Durch die Integration zuvor auseinanderlaufender Perspektiven auf den Aufstieg des Populismus bietet die Studie eine neue Konzeptualisierung des "Abgehängtseins" und erklärt, wie Populismus - über traditionelle Cleavages hinweg - zu ungewöhnlichen Allianzen führen kann.